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Abstract 
Law and art are oftentimes perceived as standing in opposition, and even seen in conflicting 
terms. The first is dismissed as provincial, rigid, and bureaucratic, while the latter is repeatedly 
characterized as global, flexible, and dynamic. Yet, closer observation and analysis reveal hidden 
links and layers, and substantial preoccupation by both legal and art practitioners in the visual 
and in the judicial. It is through the unraveling of spaces, gaps, and lacunae in which both fields 
of practice and knowledge intersect that this publication sets in motion an exploration of 
influences and interactions between law and art. 
Offering a new critical approach and methodology to deal with existing and imagined relations 
between law and art, this publication analyzes curatorial and artistic projects by revealing 
overlooked legal dimensions embedded within them. It introduces legal theory and scholarship in
relation to visual artworks in order to expand and foster new paths for both judicial and visual 
activism. Based on the reassessment of artistic and curatorial capabilities and encounters in a time
of globalization, it is concerned with broadening our perception of the role of art and legal 
practitioners with regard to justice.  
Following an introduction of Nancy Fraser's three-dimensional concept of justice, and Saskia 
Sassen's notion of capabilities in a world shaped by the dual existence of the nation-state and 
globalization, Chapter One focuses on the 7th Berlin Biennale as a curatorial case study for 
political and artistic activism, and on “Artist Organisations International” (AOI) as an example of
artist-created institutions concerned with political activism.
Two artistic projects that premiered during the 7th Berlin Biennale are then critically examined in
Chapters Two and Three. An in-depth exploration of Yael Bartana's First Congress of The Jewish 
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Renaissance Movement in Poland (JRMiP) as a space prompting global justice is the focus of 
Chapter Two. The building of a Parliament in Rojava by Jonas Staal's New World Summit (NWS)
as an artistic reinvention of the Right of Intervention is the concern of Chapter Three. 
Judicial-visual activism is further developed in Chapter Four through an inquiry into the theory of
the emergence of disputes, and the Right of the Encounter in relation to artistic actions taking 
place in state institutions. Chapter Five contains a reflection on my own recent curatorial projects 
dedicated to encounters that I facilitated between legal and art practitioners. The result of these 
encounters led to the exhibition Motions for the Agenda structured around five motions/projects 
developed in a collaboration between the participants dealing with legal texts and documents, just
as with the place of law, its language, and its archive.
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Introduction
1. The Fictive-Witness: An Early Curatorial Proposal 
At the center of this research lies an interest in exposing and exploring the complex relations that 
arise when law and art are brought into close proximity. In order to facilitate the intersection of 
knowledge and practice of two different fields, and examine its outcomes, I have chosen to 
follow a threefold methodology. The first phase, manifested in Chapters Two and Three, begins 
with a quest to unravel already existing, but mostly hidden or seldom acknowledged, legal 
components in artistic and curatorial projects with which I have been professionally involved. 
The second phase in the executed methodology focuses on linking law and art through legal 
interpretative methods. This suggests that legal theory and scholarship can be used in discursive 
and interpretative manners when we critically analyze contemporary works of art. Based on the 
developments in the first two stages, the third phase leads us into curatorial practice as it sheds 
light on measures I refer to as judicial-visual activism. With this stage, I shall seek to demonstrate
how one might be able to cultivate a position in which art activates a position alongside, after, 
and possibly beyond existing legal concepts and institutions. 
My preliminary assumption when embarking on this research was that a growing number of 
contemporary artists, long recognized for their activism and politically engaged art, might hold a 
certain affinity with the legal field. This understanding has been based on almost a decade of 
working as a curator with artists such as Yael Bartana and Jonas Staal. Researching their work 
alongside the work of other artists with whom I have collaborated, such as Aernout Mik, Public 
Movement, and Lawrence Abu Hamdan, I came to realize that this inclination, this interest in law
and the legal sphere on the part of artists, has rarely been critically explored, or thoroughly 
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observed and reflected upon. This led me to acknowledge the long journey I myself had had to 
make, from studying and practicing law before changing my trajectory into the art world. It was 
only during the process of working and writing the curatorial text for my first large-scale museum
exhibition titled A Generation1 that I began to comprehend the lingering influence of my legal 
studies and several years of practicing law on my curatorial work. 
It is worth noting that none of the works in A Generation dealt consciously with legal matters. 
The starting point was rather an investigation of mechanisms employed by contemporary artists 
when dealing with private and historical events. I delved into this topic after coming to learn of a 
video work by Frédéric Moser and Philippe Schwinger titled Acting Facts (2003). Based on 
testimonies of both victims and victimizers of the My Lai massacre in Vietnam in 1968, I aimed 
at furthering my investigation into the inherent tension signaled in the video’s title: between 
acting and facts. With an emphasis on video and film works, the exhibition was intended to 
discover the space between illusion and truth as it is manifested in works in which the borders 
between the private and the public, between facts and fiction, have evolved into the creation of a 
new sensitivity of our perception of the world. A Generation drew inspiration and theoretical 
ground from two main publications: Giorgio Agamben's Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and
the Archive,2 and Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub's Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in 
Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History.3 What struck me at that time as most relevant to my 
1A Generation, 25.3.2010 – 26.6.2010, Petach Tikva Museum of Art, Israel. Participating artists: Rosa 
Barba, Yael Bartana, Martin Dammann, Ohad Fishof, Sirah Foighel Brutmann, Eitan Efrat and Daniel 
Mann, Aernout Mik, Frédéric Moser and Philippe Schwinger, See: 
http://petachtikvamuseum.com/en/Exhibitions.aspx?eid=1246.
2 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (New York: Zone Books, 2002).
3 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and 
History (New York and London: Routledge, 1992).
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curatorial practice was the relentless, unsolvable paradox of witnessing. In his renowned book, 
Agamben touches upon the impossibility of bearing first witness to the abyss of Auschwitz. Even 
though Holocaust survivors struggle to give an account of and bear witness to the horrific 
conditions they had been forced to endure, witnessing encounters a great deal of limitation. By 
stating that, “Those who saw the Gorgon, have not returned to tell about it or have returned 
mute,”4 Agamben concludes that most survivors testify more so indirectly, or by proxy. Shifting 
this notion to the creative process, it was Felman and Laub who claimed that writers and 
filmmakers hold little or no choice after the horror of the Holocaust but to testify and bear 
witness, for if not they risk committing perjury.5 
In a challenge to myself and to the visual artists I invited to participate in the exhibition, I aimed 
for the exhibition to be a space in which one could actively propose and seek alternative practices
of witnessing. Wishing to fill in the void, the gap, the lacuna of the witness as exemplified by 
Agamben, Felman, and Laub, I coined the term “fictive witness.” It was an attempt to describe the
position and the role taken up by visual artists – expanding the field of reference beyond writers 
and filmmakers to which Felman and Laub refer – when investigating events of which they had 
either very little recollection, or at which they had no possibility of being present in the first 
place. By doing so, by suggesting a term in which the fictive and the witness enmesh into one, in 
which illusion and the real are united as one, I tried to join the imaginative with reality. Proposing
artists as fictive witnesses, I curated the exhibition as a space through which one could question 
and engage in the presumption that artists might hold a key to understanding and reflecting on 
situations in which the act of witnessing is impossible. As I stated then in the catalogue 
4 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, p. 33.
5 “To commit perjury” are the words of writer Elie Wiesel quoted by Shoshana Felman at the beginning of 
her essay “In the era of Testimony: Claude Lanzmann's Shoah,” Yale French Studies 79 (1991): 39. 
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accompanying the exhibition, the quest was to unravel artistic creation as a “means to draw 
nearer to the inconceivable, to that which may only be imagined.”6 Suggesting a role and position
for artists as fictive witnesses, I endeavored to connect fiction and reality as a manner through 
which to approach the paradox of witnessing via the curatorial and the artistic. 
In the preliminary research for the exhibition, I came upon a much earlier example of the 
complexity embedded in the act of witnessing. I found that the problem of the witness arises 
already in rabbinical interpretations of the Bible. In the Book of Genesis, the following sentence 
appears: “Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men builded.”7 
The need for God Almighty to descend and bear witness to the work of men also puzzled the 
Jewish Sages of the Mishna, Tosefta, and Talmud eras. God's need to bear close and personal 
witness was an indication to the Sages of both the importance and complexity of any given 
testimony. It is therefore not surprising that already in biblical times it was established that there 
was a need for more than a single witness: “At the mouth of two witnesses […] shall the matter 
be established”8 in order to come to a just verdict.
2. Truth and Falsehood in the Era of the Witness
Returning to more recent times, by famously declaring the post-World War II era as the “era of 
the testimony,” Felman has immanently linked art and law. In her revolutionary research on 
witnessing, literature, and trauma, Felman has established the legal and artistic essence in bearing
witness. At the very beginning of an essay by Felman that preceded her publication with Laub, 
6 Avi Feldman, A Generation, Petach Tikva Museum of Art, 2010, exhibition catalogue, p. 55.
7 Gn 11:5.
8 Deut 19:15.
14
she articulated the act of bearing witness as an act of speaking the truth, be it “before a court of 
law or before the court of history […] as the narrative account of the witness is at once engaged 
in an appeal and bound by an oath.”9 Following Felman's steps, I also referred to a ruling by a 
court of law in the exhibition as an entry point for my exploration of the artist as a fictive witness.
In the context of A Generation, I was particularly interested in finding legal precedents in which a
court had had to make judgments on such issues. The case of the film Jenin, Jenin (2002) 
directed by Mohammed Bakri, banned by the Israeli Film Ratings Board (IFRB), had proved to 
be such an occasion. It was the first film in almost two decades to be censored in Israel, evoking a
great public debate.10 Eight out of the eleven members of the IFRB voted to ban the film that 
portrayed the “Battle of Jenin,” a deadly fight between Israel Defense Forces and Palestinians in 
the Jenin refugee camp in the West Bank (April 1-11, 2002). In order to overturn the decision by 
the IFRB, the case was brought to Israel's High Court of Justice (HCJ). In the verdict given by 
Justice Dorner (ret.), we learn that one of the main reasons given by the IFRB was that they 
found the film to be “a distorted presentation of events under the guise of documentary truth 
potentially misleading to the public.”11 Justice Dorner's decision against the IFRB begins with a 
quote taken from Maimonides in which he stated: “Through the intellect man distinguishes 
between the true and the false.”12 According to the HCJ ruling, it is not in the authority of the 
9 Shoshana Felman, “In an Era of Testimony: Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah,” Yale French Studies 79, 
Literature and the Ethical Question (1991), p. 39. 
10 Regretfully, nowadays censorship in Israel is once again taking center stage, as the Ministry of Culture 
is headed by an ex-chief censor and spokeswoman for the Israel Defense Forces. 
11 HCJ 316/03. Translated by Daria Kassovsky for the catalogue. The verdict can now also be found in 
English translation: http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/03/160/003/l15/03003160.l15.pdf. For verdict 
(in Hebrew): http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/03/160/003/l15/03003160.l15.HTM. 
12 Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, trans. M. Friedlaender (London: Aeterna Press, 2015),
Pt. I, Ch. 2.
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IFRB to embody the intellect given to humans. Justice Dorner clearly expressed that it did “not 
lie within the competence of the censorship board to determine what is true and what is false. It is
not equipped to do so, nor does it have a monopoly over the truth.”13
The verdict, thus, demonstrates the deeply shared engagement of both law and art in the 
complexity of distinguishing between truth and falsehood, reality and illusion. Even when taking 
into account the prevailing discussions on the autonomy of art, or of art as opposing and negating
the rule of law, the issues of truth and non-truth, of reality and fiction, contentiously bind them 
together. Felman and Laub do not shy away from the difficulty in distinguishing between the real 
and the imagined. By claiming that, after the Holocaust, artists have no other choice but to 
engage with the act of witnessing in order to rethink history and historical events, they indicate 
that it is exactly in the impossibility of bearing full witness where the strength and commitment 
of testimony endures. The truth of testimony “engaged in an appeal and bound by an oath” comes
about exactly in the moment when the court (just as in the case of the Eichmann trial to which 
Felman refers) willingly “embraces the vulnerability, the legal fallibility, and the fragility of the 
human witness. It is precisely the witness's fragility that paradoxically is called upon to testify 
and to bear witness.”14 
3. From the Era of the Witness to the Era of the Forensic
In more recent years, the conclusion reached by Felman has been challenged through the research
and writing of Eyal Weizman. In Forensic Architecture: Notes from Fields and Forums, Weizman
13 HCJ 316/03. Translated by Daria Kassovsky for the catalogue. Link to verdict (in Hebrew): 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/03/160/003/l15/03003160.l15.HTM. 
14 Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 134. 
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stated that the era of the witness has possibly reached its end, to be replaced by the forensic era.15 
In these notes, Weizman does not mention Felman, but in an earlier text written together with 
Thomas Keenan,16 Weizman refers to her directly. In that essay, Keenan and Weizman define the 
time scale of Felman's era of the witness as beginning with the Eichmann trial in 1961, and 
ending with the discovery of the skull of Josef Mengele in 1985. Tracing the story behind the 
finding of Mengele's skull, they put forward the incident as the founding moment in the creation 
of a forensic sensitivity. According to this, testimonies and evidence should be an outcome of a 
forensic scientific investigation in contrast to the fragile, uncertain, difficult-to-believe, and 
proven spoken testimony of the witness. Keenan and Weizman mention “DNA, 3D scans, 
nanotechnology, and biomedical data” that, when examined in relation to a person's biography 
based on physical and medical records as instruments, can provide much more reliable, truthful 
evidence in the courtroom. In other words, the two main differences between the era of the 
witness, and the era of the forensic, can be summed up as follows: first, a move from an oral 
testimony to an object of evidence; second, a shift from the fragmented, inconsistent testimony of
the event, to a reconstructed, coherent narrative of the affair. If, in the era of the witness, it is the 
fractured quality that provides an oral testimony with legal and moral accountability, in the era of 
the forensic it is the scientific promise of a higher probability of speaking the truth that 
determines the quality of the evidence. Nevertheless, Weizman and Keenan realize there is a 
further (and risky) step that needs to be taken when oral testimony is being replaced by an object. 
Unlike a witness's testimony, which can be directly heard, the forensic object of evidence needs a 
15 Eyal Weizman: Forensic Architecture, Notes from Fields and Forums, dOCUMENTA (13): 100 Notes, 
100 Thoughts #062 (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2012), pp. 5-6. 
16 Thomas Keenan and Eyal Weizman, “Mengele’s Skull,” Cabinet 43, “Forensics” (Fall 2011), accessed 
July 1, 2019 http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/43/keenan_weizman.php.
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mediator in order to bear witness. The forensic investigation requires, thus, either a voice or an 
image in order for it to be presented in court and/or to the general public. We can “never really 
overcome the complexities of the subject, the ambiguity of language, and the fragility of witness 
memory,”17 writes Weizman, and hence we end up once again within the complexity of testimony.
4. The Unraveling of the Legal in Art
At this point, the methodology I put forward at the beginning of this introduction comes into play.
According to this, an investigation of art and of curatorial projects for their legal components is 
an alternative path that can be said to lie between the solutions to the crisis of witnessing as 
studied by Felman, and the movement towards the forensic as maintained by Weizman. I wish to 
position my research, as it is put forward in this publication, as a third option: a path that seeks to 
underscore the possibility of an artwork, or an art project, as holding and embodying legal 
grounds and qualities. It suggests that there is a need for a preliminary stage when considering the
legal: a stage in which art is a source for the reflection and the creation of legal justice, rights, and
institutions through artistic and curatorial theory and practice. This aspect is mostly neglected by 
both Felman and Weizman, as they fail, to my understanding, to consider art, and art 
practitioners, as having capabilities18 to create legal space and content on their own merits. As 
such, Felman and Weizman engage with art and the curatorial mostly as ancillary contributions 
and resources in any given legal context. Weizman acknowledges the role of art in questioning 
the concept of truth, but while he claims that, “We want to show another possibility of art—one 
17 Eyal Weizman, Forensis: The Architecture of Public Truth (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2014), p. 10.
18 I use here and in the rest of this book, as will be explained in detail in Chapter One, the term 
“capabilities” as a descriptive form similar to that suggested by Saskia Sassen, and not in the manner 
suggested in the capability approach of Martha Nussbaum. See: Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, 
Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 8.
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that can confront doubt, and uses aesthetic techniques in order to interrogate,”19 in reality the use 
of art and the curatorial in Forensic Architecture remains instrumental. 
In contrast to this, by juxtaposing a trial staged by Dada a century ago in Paris with an artistic 
congress created by Yael Bartana based on a fictive movement calling for the return of more than 
three million Jews back to Europe, Chapter Two of this publication aims at challenging our 
perception of legal justice as it is performed and manifested in art. It begins by underlining and 
contextualizing the artistic and historical landscape in which the Trial of Maurice Barrès came to 
fruition. Devoting significant contemplation to the influence the Dreyfus trial had on Dada, I 
have aimed at marking and underpinning the legal quality that surrounded the Dada trial and that 
was evoked by its initiator André Breton. Against this backdrop, I was able to critically confront 
two very different artistic means of expression and conduct. Identifying the legal influences of 
Dada as a connecting point with Bartana's Congress allowed me to explore both projects' interest 
in judicial activism and justice. 
By doing so, I have chosen an experimental, at times perhaps even speculative, methodology of 
interpretation – one that reaches out and expands the initial artistic creation by shifting it onto 
new legal horizons not regularly imagined or assigned by the artist. The process of engaging the 
work of Bartana with real and fictive trials never before discussed in relation to her work had a 
surprising effect. Having worked with Bartana on several projects since 2007, I also served as an 
assistant director for a performance in 2010 that preceded the Congress. However, it was only a 
couple of years later, in the process of doing research for my dissertation, that I began to trace 
and acknowledge the overlooked significance of the historical trials of Alfred Dreyfus and Émile 
19 Hili Perlson, “The Most Important Piece at documenta 14 in Kassel Is Not an Artwork. It’s Evidence,” 
Artnet, June 8, 2017, accessed August 5, 2017, https://news.artnet.com/exhibitions/documenta-14-kassel-
forensic-nsu-trial-984701.
19
Zola on Bartana's performances. The legal undertones never before explored in Bartana's work 
assisted me in establishing a rooted historical and political comprehension and perception of the 
Congress as I linked it also to the writings of Jacqueline Rose, Hannah Arendt, and Bernard 
Lazare. In the chapter dedicated to this exploration, I set in motion a discovery of legal 
characteristics and capabilities from Dada to Bartana in order to cultivate a legal positioning of 
art that may hold a realization that escapes the capacities of both witness testimony and the 
forensic object. The research presented herewith brings art to the forefront, as I question and 
extract artistic capabilities to change and re-imagine justice and the legal system.
5. The Unraveling of Art Through the Legal
Dwelling on possible hidden legal components in the artistic and the curatorial leads to the 
second phase of the suggested methodology: the unraveling of art through legal scholarship. This 
stage complements the first one, as it further emphasizes the legal capabilities embedded in art. It 
also demonstrates the shortcoming of artistic capabilities, and especially of political and social 
art, when the legal remains marginal, unnoticed, and discarded. I aspire to do so mostly in 
Chapters Three and Four through engaging with the work of such artists as Jonas Staal, Mierle 
Laderman Ukeles, Ruti Sela, and Lawrence Abu Hamdan, along with the writings of legal 
scholars. In Chapter Three, it is especially the groundbreaking essay by legal scholar Catharine A.
MacKinnon with which I attempt to approach Jonas Staal's New World Summit (NWS) and its 
exploration of terror and of the legal and political condition of the stateless. The linking 
suggested by MacKinnon, between women’s rights and the “war on terror” following the events 
of 9/11, provide me with profound insights into Staal's engagement and intervention in the 
autonomous region of Rojava. The legal sphere is not foreign to Staal, who has been working 
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regularly with legal practitioners since the first summit of the NWS, and beforehand.20 
Nevertheless, the proposed juxtaposition of Staal's work with legal theory shall provide new 
elements for interpreting his political and artistic action in the context of international law and 
human rights.
In the case of Mierle Laderman Ukeles, the legal work of scholars William L.F. Felstiner, Richard
L. Abel, and Austin Sarat has provided me with a legal methodology and terminology through 
which to suggest the capability of an artwork to name, blame, and claim justice. Their theory on 
the emergence of disputes encouraged me to investigate whether the framing they proposed can 
be implemented in art as well. The process they established in the perception of individuals 
towards experiences of injustice resonated with me when I began to research the work of Ukeles. 
From her manifesto for maintenance art from 1969 to her residency at the New York City 
Sanitation Department, I questioned whether one could link her act of naming of her injurious 
position as a maintenance artist to a legal theory of dispute. Working as part of a statutory 
bureaucratic environment was the initial motivation that drew me to further investigate Ukeles' 
work. Finding that her decades of work as part of the New York municipality did not yield a legal
interest in Ukeles, similar to what I saw in art and legal scholarship, provoked me to attempt to 
formulate an entry point into this for myself. A recently published work by legal scholar Itamar 
Mann on a relatively new field of legal research – the right of the encounter – turned out to be a 
fruitful entry point to assessing Ukeles' oeuvre. The notion of the encounter, which has also been 
explored by art scholars, as in the work of Griselda Pollock that I discuss in this chapter, further 
20 In his new essay for the OnCurating issue that I edited, Staal writes about his first encounter with the 
Dutch legal system following charges against him filed by Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch 
ultranationalist Freedom Party (PVV). See: Jonas Staal, “Law of the State, Truth of Art. Two Case Studies 
of Art as Evidence,” OnCurating 28, Imagine Law (January 2016). 
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connected Ukeles’ work to that of Ruti Sela and Lawrence Abu Hamdan. The demand that arises 
in the event of the encounter, and the duty one has when facing the other, is discussed at length in
Chapter Four as I endeavor to underscore the right of the encounter as a mutual ground for both 
art and law. 
The above-suggested unraveling and interpretation of law in art is indebted to earlier influential 
accomplishments that began in the 1970s with the establishment of the field of law and literature. 
To my understanding, Shoshana Felman's use of literature as an entry point to the law cannot be 
fully contextualized without acknowledging James Boyd White's publication from 1973, The 
Legal Imagination. White is “arguably the modern law and literature movement's founder,”21 and 
it is intriguing to note, especially in the context of art, his attempt to establish imagination as a 
vital component of legal theory and practice. Trying to break away from the common dichotomy 
of law as either a set of rules or a set of policies, White argues that law's power is to be found in 
its language. He goes further to state that, “For me the law is an art, a way of making something 
new out of existing materials – an art of speaking and writing [...] this book accordingly 
addresses its law student reader ‘as an artist.’”22 White's research has led to the evolution of a 
movement in which law in literature and literature in law have been the main two trajectories of 
interest of scholars of both literature and the law. Through concepts of theoretical interpretation, 
storytelling, and narrative, a flourishing common ground that connects from within the two fields 
has been recognized and studied. 
21 Robin West, “Communities, Texts, and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature Movement,” Yale 
Journal of Law and the Humanities 1 (1988): 129. For further reading on earlier research on law and 
literature, see, for example: John Hursh, “A Historical Reassessment of the Law and Literature Movement 
in the United States,” GRAAT On-Line 14 (June 2013).
22 James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), xiv.
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To continue momentarily with White, one cannot escape the realization that at times his 
arguments of law as a field, in which differing voices, languages, and cultures must integrate 
through the legal text, seem naive and even misleading. In my recent curatorial practice, to which
Chapter Five is devoted, I have related to White's writings by giving the encounters I initiated 
between legal and art practitioners the title of “Towards Legal Imagination.” It was an attempt to 
re-think White's legal imagination by acknowledging what numerous scholars poignantly 
demonstrate, that is, it is oftentimes that the language of the law hides more than it wishes to 
expose. Bruno Latour eloquently stated that law is manifested through an abundance of texts that 
“are omnipresent, and the subject matter is invisible.”23 It is in the language of the law, argues 
lawyer and activist Avigdor Feldman, where voices outside of the closed circle and class of legal 
practitioners are constantly being eliminated. His essay, discussed in Chapter Four, was translated
into English for the first time on the occasion of Issue 28 of OnCurating that I edited in January 
2016 as part of my research.24 I will be following Feldman’s understanding in relation to the work
of Lawrence Abu Hamdan, as he demonstrates how “rules of relevance, laws of evidence, and 
inadmissibility of hearsay” are all part of the “acoustic insulation”25 that, along with the 
architecture of the court space, eliminates the voices of those located on the margins of society. 
6. Legal Imagination and Artistic Imagination – On the Side of the Countryman
23 Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d'Etat (Cambridge, Malden: Polity 
Press, 2010), p. 129. In Humor, Irony and the Law, Gilles Deleuze poignantly writes: “Clearly THE LAW, 
as defined by its pure form, without substance or object or any determination whatsoever, is such that no 
one knows nor can know what it is. It operates without making itself known.” Gilles Deleuze, Masochism:
Coldness and Cruelty, trans. J. MacNeil (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 83. 
24 See Appendix.
25 Avigdor Feldman, “The Sirens’ Song: Speech and Space in the Courthouse,” OnCurating 28 (January 
2016): 64.
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Hence, between White and Latour, Felman and Feldman, I aspire in this publication to walk in 
the shadows of the seen, just as in the margins of the hidden, as I account for the ideological 
apparatuses that shape our consciousness and our perception of law, justice, and art. In the 
suggested methodology, in which one reads and activates art through the lens of the legal, I seek 
to open new corridors through which knowledge and practice from both fields can intersect. It is 
a game of attraction and repulsion that exists between the law and art, as legal scholar Sabine 
Mueller-Mall suggests.26  Mueller-Mall’s examination deliberately calls for a confrontation 
between the law and art from which mutual and reciprocal attributes arise from within, thereby 
providing a route for artistic and legal imagination to be manifested. The seeming separation 
between law and art, broken only rarely by scholars and mostly in relation to literature, theater, 
and film, is thus being contested and challenged by expanding the scope of research into the 
realm of contemporary visual art. Second, the pendulum movement suggested in this study – a 
movement from law to art and back to law – is directed towards the act of imagining from within,
alongside, beyond, outside, and without existing legal institutions. The entanglement of law and 
art is intended to envision law beyond both the repressive and ideological legal apparatuses. 
In this context, I wish to briefly conclude by considering Franz Kafka's story “Before the Law” 
published in 1915, which continues to be relevant in terms of our perception of the law to this 
very day. I will return to this story in Chapter Five, but for now it is sufficient to contemplate 
Kafka's man from the country who wishes to enter the law, but ends up for the rest of his life 
remaining before the law. When voicing a request to enter the law, the man is confronted with a 
doorkeeper who, if following Louis Althusser's notion of ideology, can be said to represent the 
repressive state apparatus. No measures of force need to be implemented from the doorkeeper’s 
26 Sabine Mueller-Mall, “LAW/ART:  Constructive Interferences,” OnCurating 28 (January 2016): 6-13.
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side, as it is clear that the ideological state apparatus has already interpellated the man from the 
country. The man from the country is a subject of the law, since “ideology has always-already 
interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are 
always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last 
proposition: individuals are always-already subjects.”27 This is evident because even when the 
law is invisible – represented in the story only via a gate – and even when the gate of the law 
remains clearly open, the man from the country obeys the gatekeeper as he awaits his time to 
enter the law. This indicates the force of the law, since even when living in the country, where the
law does not seem to hold a physical presence, state ideology controls the man who is subject to 
the rule of law prior to his actual standing before the law. “The law, he thinks, should surely be 
accessible at all times and to everyone,”28 writes Kafka, providing the reader with an insight into 
the thoughts held by a man who has been interpellated to become a subject of state ideology and 
its hegemonic power. As a result, his conviction in the accessibility of the law will be held by him
to his death even when never being granted entry to the law.
Jacques Derrida, in a lecture dedicated to Kafka’s story, draws our attention to the title of the 
story in which, according to his reading, being before the law suggests being outside of the law as
well. Derrida claims that the position of being before the law, or outside of the law, is an 
27 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 
175-6. A similar conclusion can be reached by following Jacques Derrida's understanding of the 
enforceability of the law. “The word ‘enforceability’ reminds us that there is no such thing as law (droit) 
that doesn’t imply in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility of being 
‘enforced,’ applied by force.” See: Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of 
Authority’,” Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, eds. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, David
Gray Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 6.
28 Jacques Derrida, “Before the Law,” in Acts of Literature, trans. Avital Ronell and Christine Roulston, ed.
Derek Attridge (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 183.
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indication that, “He is neither under the law nor in the law. He is both a subject of the law and an 
outlaw,”29 which is similar to the conclusion that can be reached by Althusser's study of ideology. 
Moreover, writes Derrida, this condition is true to both the doorkeeper and the man. Both are 
before the law, or might we say outside of the law. Yet, the two do not seem to be able to share an
alliance, since the gatekeeper, even when remaining outside of the law, serves the repressive state
apparatus. Through Derrida's reading of Kafka, we are left to assume a full surrender on the part 
of the man from the country when standing in relation to the law. As the story goes, not only will 
he end up never being admitted into the gate of the law, but before his death he will learn that the 
gate he waited before was meant especially, and only, for him to enter. Before he dies, the man 
from the country is left only to hear the gatekeeper telling him that, “I’m going now to close it.”30
The cruel ending of the story prompts the reader to contemplate whether the lifelong waiting 
before the law was entirely in vain. This position leaves little, or none whatsoever, chance to 
think or imagine a state of being after or beyond or without the law. Yet, what if we read an active
resistance to the law in the life of the man from the country? What if the life and the endless 
waiting of the man were not only a purposeless exercise of power? By this, I wish to add the 
possibility of an action that might come as the outcome of the man's initiative to stand before the 
law. In this, I follow Giorgio Agamben's reading of the story, and his disagreement with Derrida 
regarding the interpretation of the ending of the story. According to Agamben, the closing of the 
gate does not necessarily indicate an event that did not happen. Rather, he suggests, the insistence
of the man to sit before the law, and even to die before the law, should be seen as a planned 
29 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, p. 204.
30 Franz Kafka, “Before the Law,” trans. Ian Johnston, accessed August 3, 2017, 
http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/kafka/beforethelaw.htm.
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strategy in its own right. The closing of a gate, which Kafka writes “stands open, as always,”31 is 
perceived by Agamben as an active intervention through which the man is able to “interrupt the 
law's being in force.”32 With the possibility of this interpretation in mind, I wish to suggest the 
reading of the following research as a contribution to the realizations of strategies of interrupting 
and intervening in the law in an attempt to imagine a time and place with, beyond, and after the 
law. I endeavor to do so through the intersecting of law and art, as I attempt to diverge and 
expand the road paved by scholars of law, literature, art, philosophy, and sociology. It is an 
attempt that does not overlook its preliminary and fundamental limitations, yet continues to 
struggle for justice in positioning itself on the side of the man from the country who sacrificed his
life in order to think, imagine, and experience institutions that are serving justice after and 
beyond the law of the nation-state and its prevailing ideology. 
31 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, p. 183.
32 Giorgio Agamben, “The Messiah and the Sovereign,” in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, 
ed. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 174. 
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Chapter One: From Visual and Judicial Activism to Artist Organizations: Justice in Times 
of Globalization
1.1 Between Visual Activism and Judicial Activism
The April 2016 issue of the Journal of Visual Culture,33 which followed a symposium at 
SFMOMA in March 2014,34 was dedicated to the term “Visual Activism.” In an art world 
saturated with debate and action aiming at the political and the social, the symposium and 
publication were an attempt to offer new terminology and definitions, while also proposing some 
sort of unification of ideas and concepts. In the introduction to the journal, the editors – Julia 
Bryan-Wilson, Jennifer González, and Dominic Willsdon – clarify that they have borrowed the 
term from the South African photographer Zanele Muholi.35 In her renowned work, 
photographing herself alongside her partner, Valerie Thomas, in a setting that exudes a mundane 
domesticity, she invokes us to reconsider how we define both visual and activism. Considering 
the segregated history of South Africa, the photo series ZaVa (2013-) of black and white women 
sharing daily, intimate moments in the private surrounding of their bedrooms, the editors argued 
for a new, more subtle reading of activism.36 They endorse a wide range of interpretations for 
visual activism, seeking to connect the abundant uses of “social practice” or “socially engaged 
33 Themed Issue on Visual Activism, Journal of Visual Culture 15(1) (April 2016).
34 “Visual Activism,” Symposium at SFMOMA, March 14-15, 2014. 
https://www.sfmoma.org/event/visual-activism.
35 “We take the term visual activism directly from Muholi, and we credit her for inventing this phrase as a 
flexible, spacious rubric to describe her own practice, which documents and makes visible black lesbian 
communities in South Africa.” Julia Bryan-Wilson, Jennifer González, and Dominic Willsdon, Editors’ 
Introduction to Themed Issue on Visual Activism, Journal of Visual Culture 15(1) (April 2016), p. 7.
36 “A different modality of visual activism – one perhaps less immediately readable as 'activism' in a 
narrow sense[...].” Ibid., p. 6.
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art” with a term that connects activism with the visible. Maintaining a sense of openness and 
ambiguity that does not examine activism based or depending on an end goal, the editors 
advocate a visual activism as all non-neutral art directed towards tackling economic, social, and 
political matters; an attempt to redefine and re-establish the limits and scales of both activism and
the visual.37
An essay by T.J. Demos published as part of the journal38 further clarifies the term “visual 
activism,” claiming that it “refers to politically directed practices of visuality aimed at catalyzing 
social, political, and economic change.”39 The pairing of the visual with activism, argues Demos, 
also contains within it a certain amount of unease. It is especially true in our times, in light of 
“mediatized social fragmentation, migrant images capable of endless reformatting, and 
compromised arenas of presentation (especially commercial galleries and corporate websites) 
riven by conflicting interests.”40 In the current situation in which one can either join the neoliberal
economy or attempt to leave it completely, states Demos, visual activism runs the risk of being an
empty rationalization of any possibility of achieving or prompting social justice. Demos ends his 
essay by quoting John Jordan, who is one of the initiators of The Laboratory of Insurrectionary 
Imagination (Labofii).41 Jordan poses a relevant question, to my understanding, for curators, 
activists, and artists alike: “Are museums public spaces that can become alternative common 
spaces of debate and action planning to reclaim the rights of the city, or are they palaces carefully
37 Ibid., p. 8.
38 T.J. Demos, “Between Rebel Creativity and Reification: For and Against Visual Activism,” Journal of 
Visual Culture 15(1) (,April 2016). 
39 Ibid., p. 86.
40 Ibid., p. 87.
41 http://www.labofii.net.
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engineered for us to play the fool in, whilst outside the kings and queens continue to play Russian
roulette with our future whilst enriching theirs?”42 Jordan's question resonates with me, as I shall 
continue in the following pages to contemplate and expand the notion of visual activism in 
relation to large-scale exhibitions and biennials that have been dramatically growing in numbers 
worldwide in the last couple of decades.43 
Yet, shortly before doing so, it is worth noting that to legal practitioners the term visual activism 
might bring to mind a much debated legal concept – judicial activism. Not unlike the term used in
the art world, the legal one also requires further clarification, as oftentimes its meaning is 
disputed and misunderstood. The term was coined by the American historian Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr. in 1947, who did not offer a clear definition.44 This did not deter the term from powerfully 
emerging so as to hold ground to this very day, shaping much of the discourse regarding judicial 
power and influence. Since its first use in 1959 in a judicial opinion by a United States federal 
judge, the term continues to draw differing opinions. As legal scholars have shown, the ambiguity
of the term allows both liberals and conservatives a broad interpretation that culminates in an 
overuse and abuse of the term.45 The suggested analogy between judicial activism and artistic 
42 Ibid., p. 98. Taken from John Jordan, “Part 1 - A is for Artwashing, B is for Bicycle, C is for Commune, 
Art & Activism in the Age of the Anthropocene,” Films for Actions, October 8, 2014, accessed June 13, 
2017, http://www.filmsforaction.org/articles/art-and-activism-in-the-age-of-the-anthropocene/.
43 For more on the subject: Tim Griffin, “Global Tendencies: Globalism and the Large-Scale Exhibition,” 
Artforum 42(3) (November 2003).
44 See: Craig Green, “An intellectual History of Judicial Activism,” Emory Law Journal 58(5) (2009): 
1200–09; 1195. 
45 As stated by Corey Rayburn Yung, “The term normally has been overwhelmingly loaded with negative 
connotations.” They also quote Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook referring to it as “that notoriously slippery 
term” ending with the fact that, “The concept has not been effectively measured and studied throughout 
the federal court system.” See: Corey Rayburn Yung, “Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of 
Judicial Activism in the Federal Courts,” Northwestern University Law Review 105(1) (2011): 7-8.
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activism holds, in my opinion, a promise for the future, as it demands us to recalibrate whether 
and how these categories might still be essential to both contemporary law and art. “Activism is a
helpful category in that it focuses attention on the judiciary institutional role rather than the 
merits of particular decisions. Activism goes to essential questions about the role of the judge in 
our democratic order.”46 In a similar manner, I shall be devoting much attention in this chapter to 
the position of the art institution and of the artist in an attempt to portray an overall picture of 
visual activism in our time. By suggesting a constant and reciprocal exchange and immersion of 
legal terminology, concepts, and scholarship into the artistic and the curatorial and vice versa, I 
shall attempt to broaden the scale of reference and offer new perspectives on a much debated 
concept. Identifying and proposing new meanings and relevance to activism in art through 
linking it to law and the legal sphere articulates the need to reassess artistic activism, as it 
exposes a legal dimension in art rarely conceived of. The quest to find the space, or perhaps the 
gap, between legal and artistic activism might begin by realizing that both are multidimensional. 
Both are “failing to follow textual meaning, departing from history or tradition [...] using broad 
remedial powers [...] issuing an opinion inconsistent with prior precedent [...] creating new rights 
or theories, altering prior doctrines or interpretations, establishing substantial policy, and failing 
to use an accepted interpretative methodology.” These are some of the most essential components
of judicial activism according to Corey Rayburn Yung.47 After deducing some specific legal 
elements from the expanded list given by Yung, such as “overruling actions by other federal 
branches,” or “failing to follow an originalist view of the Constitution,” one begins to notice 
possible shared categories for identification between the two sorts of activism. A subsequent 
46 Ibid., p. 9.
47 Corey Rayburn Yung, “Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism in the Federal 
Courts,” p. 10.
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statement by Yung further clarifies this reading: “Judges are activists when they substitute their 
judgment in place of that of other significant actors. When judges do not follow prior precedent, 
they are placing their judgment above that of prior courts. When judges strike down legislation, 
they are similarly placing their judgment above that of legislators. And when judges seek to 
achieve certain policy results regardless of doctrine, they put their judgment about what is ‘right’ 
above what various other actors believe the law to be.”48 Is that not what artists and curators are 
attempting to achieve in their political and/or social work? Are they not constantly being 
criticized for taking upon themselves the role of governments, social institutions, or NGOs? Are 
they not oftentimes perceived as forcing their judgment above that of others? One might agree or 
disagree with the merits or legitimacy of this tendency, yet one cannot ignore the expansion of art
into the political and legal spheres. 
Visual and judicial activism can be fruitful keys through which art and legal practitioners may 
challenge history and tradition, cultivate and imagine new means of power, and break from 
previous structures by manifesting new means for the making of judgments and by creating new 
legal rights. Judicial and visual activism confront existing laws, rituals, doctrines, and policies as 
they prompt new interpretations of the political, social, and economic. Catalyzing social, 
political, and economic change, either through artistic or legal practice, perpetuates a struggle to 
construct new paths for thought, speech, imagination, and action. Activism in law and in art 
maintains that both fields have the ability to break away from existing norms when confronted 
with injustice, inequality, or injurious circumstances. The upcoming chapters will be devoted to 
exposing, mapping, and examining spaces and sites from which visual and judicial activism can 
be operating based on mutual positions. I shall argue that when law and art actively make a 
48 Ibid., p. 12.
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commitment to social justice, they attempt to occupy a space previously maintained by other 
actors. It is a space in which visual activists or judicial activists seek to position their work, 
views, or judgment above, beyond, and after that of prior generations of people and institutions. 
When visual activism joins forces with judicial activism, even on limited grounds and for a 
limited time, it may hold a substantive subversive power with regard to the law, the legal system, 
and justice. The realization of that “which operates without making itself known,”49 as Gilles 
Deleuze defined THE LAW (capital letters in the original text), suggests that the visual may place
itself above the law, above the legislator, above prior precedents, above previously made 
judgments, and above existing policies, once it begins to realize the need to make the legal 
known, to make the legal visible, to mark its significance in what Hannah Arendt defined as the 
space of appearance that “comes into being wherever men are together in the manner of speech 
and action.”50
1.2. The 7th Berlin Biennale: Between Debate and Action
Now, let us return to John Jordan's criticism of art institutions. I find that it is poignant and 
relevant in the case of the 7th Berlin Biennale, as the Biennale was premised on an exploration of
artistic activism from within a political sphere. In the following pages, I will explore whether it 
was able to turn itself into a space for debate and action or, rather, to use Jordan's metaphor, it 
maintained the role of the fool. My suggested reading of the Biennale, its ambitions and failures, 
will assist me in proceeding to explore questions of law and justice in the era of globalization in 
relation to contemporary developments in both curatorial and artistic platforms. 
49 Gilles Deleuze, in Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 83.
50 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 199.
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It is widely agreed that the curators51 of the Biennale positioned their curatorial endeavors as part 
of an overall attempt to support and play an active role in the global movement for social 
change.52 Conceived during the volatile time of global demonstrations that were demanding in-
depth reforms in politics and the economy, spanning from the Arab world to the Middle East, 
Europe and North America, the Biennale opened its main space at the KW Berlin to a number of 
Occupy Movement members and other affiliated organizations.53 Under the title “Forget Fear,”54 
the curatorial team led by Artur Żmijewski manifested a determination to engage in political 
actions through art. It began with several preliminary projects that took place ahead of the 
opening of the Biennale, and continued throughout the months of the Biennale in selected venues 
around Berlin. The motivation of the Biennale can be summarized using the words of the curators
as an intention to “present art that actually works, makes its mark on reality, and opens a space 
51 Artur Żmijewski invited associated curators Warsza, Oleg Vorotnikov (a.k.a. Vor), Natalya Sokol (a.k.a. 
Kozljonok or Koza), Leonid Nikolajew (a.k.a. Leo the Fucknut) and Kasper Nienagliadny Sokol from 
Voina, to work in collaboration with him on the Biennale. 
52 It is worth mentioning that, in July 2012, just as the Berlin Biennale came to its conclusion, Carolyn 
Christov-Bakargiev, the artistic director of dOCUMENTA (13), also decided to welcome the local Occupy 
movement representatives and their tents into the main square of documenta in Kassel. Yet, in contrast to 
the Berlin Biennale, the separation between the curated exhibition and the Occupy group was strongly 
maintained. “dOCUMENTA (13) Artistic Director Welcomes the ‘Occupy’ Movement,” dOCUMENTA 
(13) News Archive, July 8, 2012, http://d13.documenta.de/#/press/news-archive/press-single-view/?
tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=159&cHash=e26d0c1a6f7cd3f67904003cbb2aeb33.
53 “...the grand non-project of the Biennale—Indignados | Occupy Biennale—that is, the presence of 
members of Occupy, 15M, as well as other movements in the exhibition hall of KW [...].” See Artur 
Żmijewski, “7th Berlin Biennale for Contemporary Politics,” http://blog.berlinbiennale.de/en/allgemein-
en/7th-berlin-biennale-for-contemporary-politics-by-artur-zmijewski-27718.
54 The notion of forgetting as a structural curatorial proposal is worth further research, which is beyond the
scope of this thesis. Only recently, curator Adam Szymczyk also proposed forgetting and unlearning as 
keys to understanding and experiencing documenta14. See Hili Perlson, “The Tao of Szymczyk: 
documenta 14 Curator Says to Understand His Show, Forget Everything You Know,” artnet news, April 6, 
2017, https://news.artnet.com/art-world/adam-szymczyk-press-conference-documenta-14-916991.
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where politics can be performed.”55 This was manifested by inviting artists alongside 
representatives of the Occupy Movement to exhibit and to physically be present at the main 
venue of the Biennale. Utilizing the space of the KW in a manner that allowed art objects to be 
exhibited along the ongoing presence of “Occupy” activists, the Biennale was an attempt to 
position artists and activists on mutual shared ground. 
Yet, this effort is especially questionable when one realizes that there was a de facto clear 
separation throughout the Biennale between the “Occupy” activists and the “artists” in terms of 
discourse, space, and action. Situated in the main ground floor space of the KW in Berlin the 
“grand non-project of the Biennale —Indignados | Occupy Biennale,” “members of Occupy, 
15M, as well as other movements”56 were invited to use the space as they, presumably, saw fit. 
From possible contemplation to engagement with visitors or simply among each other, the 
curators announced in advance their intention to maintain a non-interference approach. For them, 
the mere presence of Occupy in the Biennale defied any exhibition logic and forms of curating.57 
According to Żmijewski, “Out there, among the people discussing their participation in the 
Biennale, radical democracy, based on participation, is already taking place.”58 For him, what 
should be cherished as the main goal of the curatorial effort was the effort “to open access to 
performative and effective politics that would equip we ordinary citizens with the tools of action 
and change.”59 Art, he proclaimed, should be understood and consequently used as one of the 
55 Artur Żmijewski, “7th Berlin Biennale for Contemporary Politics.”
56 Ibid.
57 “Their presence goes beyond the logic of the exhibition. It is a situation that we don’t curate, supervise, 
or assess.” Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
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available tools for creating and advancing transformative change in society today. Furthermore, 
the epilogue text of the Biennale as it appeared on its website suggested that its greatest success 
was in the fact that it has sparked an unprecedented amount of debate. “More discussion than 
even before”60 announced the headline, highlighting an aim to achieve political influence through 
long-lasting processes in which the Biennale is only serving as a first or rather partial platform 
for further reflection and action. Yet, and to go back shortly to Jordan's question, was the 
Biennale able to link debate with action? In other words, can museums, or biennials, or other 
large-scale exhibition formats flourishing worldwide bring together debate and action in a 
political sense, or are we doomed to play the fool in the hands of “the kings and queens”?
I am of the opinion the Biennale failed in being a political platform that enhanced visual activism 
due to the fact that the notion of justice was not seriously tackled and implemented. The question 
and demand for social justice was the point of departure for the Biennale, yet a thorough 
acknowledgment of the part of justice in “social justice” was not observed. I argue, along other 
critics, that the structural division constructed by the Biennale between participants of the 
Occupy Movement and the visual artists prevented any debate from elevating into possible 
action. Critic Ana Teixeira Pinto asks the question, “If true art is the art of direct action, why are 
the ‘activist’ artists neatly distinguished from the ‘artist’ artists? Why is it that the logic of 
distribution of ‘speech’ and ‘noise’ inside the biennial so clearly dovetails with the logic of power
outside the biennial?”61 The split between the “artists” and the “occupy” resulted not in negation 
of the establishment, she states, but rather the opposite. It is a confirmation of existing power 
structures and not a call against them as, “The exhibition leaves everything in its proper place: 
60 “The 7th Berlin Biennale—More Discussions Than Ever Before,” http://blog.berlinbiennale.de/en/1st-
6th-biennale/7th-berlin-biennale.
61 Ana Teixeira Pinto, “7th Berlin Biennale,” art-agenda, April 27, 2012.
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speech and noise, power and protest, cruelty and kitsch […] incapable of begetting political 
articulation, and, if anything, it reinforces the established order, or what Rancière called the order
of the ‘police.’”62 It has proven how an invitation by a biennial culminates in a powerful 
castration effect of all parties involved. The invitation of the “Occupy” group into the exhibition 
space of the KW ended up narrowing, if not completely eliminating, the political and social 
outreach of the movement. As noted by Steven Henry Madoff, the result was “transforming the 
actualization of politics embodied by the real actors of the Occupy movements into play acting, 
into—in the well-worn phrase—the aestheticization of politics.”63 No sign of art's “tools of action
and change” against governments and institutions is to be found in the Biennale according to 
Madoff. No sign for a revolution besides as a slogan welcoming visitors into the space of the KW.
According to Madoff, “What Żmijewski serves us is the opposite of radical provocation,”64 as 
instead of radical thinking he surrenders to the same economy and en vogue curatorial practices 
he claims to be against. In the self-imposed comparison offered by the Biennale between the 
“artists” and the “Occupy” movement, Madoff finds the Biennale to be just “armed but not 
dangerous,” as no artwork presented holds “societal impact […] equal to the Occupy movements 
or the revolutions of the Arab Spring.”65 The potential in fostering a bond between Occupy and 
art by the Biennale failed, or perhaps was never taken as a serious proposition by the curators.66 
62 Ibid.
63 Steven Henry Madoff, “Armed, But Not Dangerous: The Berlin Biennale's ‘Forget Fear’ Exhibition is 
Fearfully Forgettable,” Modern Painters 24(7) (2012): 92.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 “Forget Fear ‘a disaster’ based on a curatorial that took its cue from the Occupy and the Los Indignados 
movements, holding BB7 up as proof that art is incapable of extending or facilitating the development of 
political movements. Rather, art had capitalized on politics instead, reducing Occupy to a fetish object 
uncomfortably reinforced in the camp’s placement at the rear basement of the KW Institute of 
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By considering the relation between the visual and the judicial, between art and justice and the 
legal system, I wish to propose a manner in which art holds equal ground with the political. I 
shall demonstrate in this chapter and in the following ones that without a thorough 
acknowledgment of the legal sphere, most, if not all, political action or debate runs the risk of 
falling short. Without considering the possible link between visual and legal/judicial activism, 
most, if not all, curatorial attempts to define and demand political artistic activism will fail to 
deliver on its initial promises. Examining the Biennale through judicial-visual activism shall 
direct us toward realizing that the separation is not a symptom but the issue itself.  
1.3. The Three Dimensions of Justice
Taking the Biennale as a case study, the first step should be addressing the fact that social justice 
was understood in its narrow sense. More accurately, I argue that thinking through and with 
judicial-visual activism demands us to begin with a broader understanding of the meaning of 
justice. I find that Nancy Fraser offers one of the more intriguing readings of justice as she has 
expanded her own initial definition of it in recent years. If, in the past, Fraser advocated for a 
two-dimensional justice, in recent years she has written extensively on the need to redefine 
justice as a three-dimensional concept. Justice, states Fraser, is the ability to participate and 
interact in all aspects of social life. Injustice, thus, can be overcome when institutionalized 
barriers in the form of maldistribution and/or misrecognition are dismantled. The problem of 
maldistribution is the economic dimension of justice rooted in the social class structure. 
Misrecognition, on the other hand, is the cultural dimension of justice that stems from the status 
quo. The two dimensions of justice – recognition and distribution – correlate, yet Fraser now 
Contemporary Art.” See: Stephanie Bailey, “The Fear of Failure,” Metamodernism, July 24, 2012, 
http://www.metamodernism.com/2012/07/24/the-fear-of-failure-on-politics-and-non-politics-in-the-7th-
berlin-biennale-and-documenta-13/#_ftnref.
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comes to the conclusion that each alone, or together, cannot give a whole account of justice. In 
relation to the Biennale, I find that the separation between the artists and Occupy was an attempt 
to provide the latter with recognition (by a major art platform and affiliated institutions, direct 
interaction and participation with new publics, press, etc.) and new means of distribution 
(financial funding from the Biennale, free space for activities, press and publications, etc.). In 
other words, the Biennale provided the Occupy with new economic and cultural structures, as 
justice is perceived as a two-dimensional concept.
Nancy Fraser admits in her book, Scales of Justice, that for quite some time she was convinced 
that these two dimensions of justice were sufficient to “supply the necessary levels of social-
theoretical complexity and moral-philosophical insight.”67 Nowadays, states Fraser, there is a 
need to reassess our notion of justice, and as a result she has begun to advocate for the necessity 
to add a third dimension to it – the political. In the following pages, I will go further into the 
reasons for this change; however, for my discussion here on visual and judicial activism, and 
without diminishing the political aspects of distribution and recognition, it is worth noting that 
with the third dimension Fraser added the level of jurisdiction to the discussion: “I mean political 
in a more specific, constitutive sense, which concerns the scope of the state's jurisdiction and the 
decision rules by which it structures contestation.”68 According to this, questions of distribution 
and recognition are decided upon and are played out in the frame constructed by the political 
dimension, which Fraser identifies as the dimension of representation. Matters such as exclusion 
from the political community, an equal voice, and the opportunity to take part in public decision-
making are all issues of representation considered by Fraser under the political dimension of 
67  Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010),p. 17. 
68 Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World, p. 17. 
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justice. Therefore, concludes Fraser, there is “no redistribution or recognition without 
representation.”69 Adding the political to justice as a dimension of representation is both the 
concern of the visual and of the law. Two projects that premiered during the Biennale will lead us
from the curatorial to art projects as case studies for questions of representation, justice, and the 
legal sphere. 
 1.4. Artist Organisations International: Two Case Studies 
Against the backdrop of the criticism I expressed regarding the Biennale, two projects in 
particular, which were based outside of the main venue of the Biennale, prove to hold a key to 
cultivating a political synergy between debate and action, between the visual and the legal, 
between justice and representation. These two long-term projects, on both of which I will 
elaborate extensively in Chapters Two and Three, were invited and hosted by the Biennale for the
very first time, and were presented at two different theaters in Berlin.70 The paths they proposed 
shed light on the Biennale's shortcomings, while also on the immense potential held initially by 
the Biennale. The projects are Yael Bartana's First Congress of The Jewish Renaissance 
Movement in Poland (JRMiP), and Jonas Staal's New World Summit (NWS).71 Both also had a 
visual presence at the KW venue of the Biennale; however, their actions took place in theatrical 
spaces. The Congress and NWS were curated as part of the Biennale's satellite events that took 
place a week apart. Both were described by the Biennale as a “contribution to the culture of 
political debate” as part of the Biennale's line-up of events dealing with influencing reality and 
69 Nancy Fraser, Reframing Justice (Assen: Uitgeverij Van Gorcum, 2005), p. 51.
70 Both Congress and NWS had visual presentations at the KW venue of the Biennale; however, their 
actions took place in theaters away from it.
71 I will be discussing the NWS more in-length in the next chapter.
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society.72 While I am surely in agreement on the shared sense of political debate found in 
Bartana's Congress just as in Staal's NWS, in the following I intend to examine how the artists' 
intentions and actions go beyond a mere debate, as they seek justice through a re-imagining of the
legal frame, and the re-constitution of existing laws. I will demonstrate how these artists have 
been aiming, each in her/his differing terms and structures, for the creation of artistic and political
legal organizations and spaces that challenge existing structures of the nation-state and its legal 
structures in time of globalization. Whether creating a movement, congress, or a summit, Bartana 
and Staal manifest an interest in reformulating the relation between art, politics, and the legal 
realm, albeit using rather different methods. I shall argue that they reach beyond the Biennale's 
premise as they expand the notion of the visual through what I identify to be judicial-visual 
activism. The Biennale's curators acknowledged, of course, the political intentions of these 
projects, but as I will show in the following, they fell short of placing them in a new frame of 
politics, justice, and law.
However, before offering an analysis of Bartana and Staal's projects, I must position them as part 
of what I perceive to be a current transitional tendency in which visual activism is being created 
and operated through the space and format of artist-made and run organizations. My claim 
follows Sven Lütticken's reading of “social art practices”73 as aiming “to recompose art’s 
relationship to its social basis and organisational structures.”74 According to Lütticken, recent 
72 “The 7th Berlin Biennale—More Discussions Than Ever Before,” http://blog.berlinbiennale.de/en/1st-
6th-biennale/7th-berlin-biennale.
73 For a short survey of social art practices from the “new genre public art in the 1990s” to “new 
communities” of the early 21st century, see: Nina Möntmann, ed., New Communities (Toronto: Public 
Access, 2009), pp. 11-19.
74 Sven Lütticken, “Social Media: Practices of (In)Visibility in Contemporary Art,” Afterall 40 (Sept. 
2015).
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developments in the art world mark a clear departure from artists’ engagement in Institutional 
Critique as we have known it from the 1960s toward forming “organisations that are (at least 
partly) based in the art world and its institutional structures, but that are not art organisations or 
art institutions — not even alternative ones, in the sense of artist-run spaces.”75 Contemporary 
artists, according to him, are formulating an aesthetic practice that allows them to work from 
“within” via a new mechanism. Unlike before – whether it be “avant-garde attempts to merge art 
with life and, or on the other hand, Institutional Critique’s insistence on operating immanently 
and critically within the institutional structures of art”76 – their presence is from “within” 
organizations specifically formed to carry out their artistic and political aspirations and actions.
Against this backdrop, a relative recent example of the growing interest by artists in organizations
can be found in a conference titled “Artist Organisations International” (AOI).77 Initiated by two 
curators – Florian Malzacher and Joanna Warsza – and an artist, Jonas Staal, it took place in 
January 2015 at the Hebbel am Ufer Theater in Berlin.78 AOI can be perceived as a curated 
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Alongside AOI, it is worth mentioning another recent curatorial example: Making Use – Life in 
Postartistic Times is an exhibition curated by Sebastian Cichocki and Kuba Szreder at the Museum of 
Modern Art in Warsaw (February – May 2016). The exhibition was a large-scale effort to gather in one 
place over 70 artists, collectives, and social movements, under the title of “pata-institutions.” These 
institutions, according to the curators, are “springing up all over the world like mushrooms after rain. 
Experimental cooperatives, flying universities, artistic collectives, grass-roots think tanks, hacker 
coalitions, and so on, encircle the globe in a loose network of connections.” The notion of “pata-
institutionalism,” the curators share with us, is derived from a fictional discipline outlined in the 
nineteenth century by the French symbolist writer Alfred Jarry. “It is highly likely that today we are no 
longer dealing with art. We simply overlooked the moment when it transformed into something entirely 
different, something that already escapes our capacity to name it. Beyond any doubt, what we are dealing 
with today has a greater potential.”. “Making Use: Life in Postartistic Times,” Muzeum: Museum of 
Modern Art in Warsaw, http://artmuseum.pl/en/wystawy/robiac-uzytek; 
https://makinguse.artmuseum.pl/en/.
78Artists Organisations International, http://www.artistorganisationsinternational.org.
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platform during which, over the course of three days, more than twenty international 
organizations founded by artists were presented. From “Chto Delat,” founded by a group of 
artists and writers in Saint Petersburg in 2003, to the Office for Anti-Propaganda founded by 
Marina Naprushkina in 2007, to the Institute for Human Activities (IHA) founded in 2010 by 
artist Renzo Martens, to Yael Bartana's Jewish Renaissance Movement in Poland (JRMiP) 
initiated in 2007, the AOI aspired to demonstrate the phenomena of a growing number of artists, 
scholars, and activists engaged in a variety of modes of self-created and formed organizations. 
The audience who entered the theater were introduced to slogans written in black on a white 
background adorning the large stage. “Artists Organisations Choose the Form of The 
Organization,” along with “Artist Organisations Seek Structural Engagement with Social and 
Political Issues” were some of the banners hanging atop the stage, where representatives from a 
wide range of organizations spoke, performed, discussed, and argued about the very premise of 
such a conference and its overly constraining title – “Artists Organisations International.” Thus, if
in the case of the Berlin Biennale, it was mainly the job of the Occupy group to define the space, 
here we have an example of a space being occupied by its curatorial team, in that they welcomed 
the artists and the public into an ambivalent curated space of politics and propaganda through 
which the curatorial team manifested a call to catalyze political change through means of visual 
activism. Unlike the Berlin Biennale, which kept power structures intact, the curatorial decisions 
– from the conference's title to its logo, banners, chosen phrases, and color design – indicated a 
desire to create a space reflecting antagonistic positions, creating a temporary space for 
“agonistic” confrontation. This went on to be the case in the opening remarks of Jonas Staal. In 
his words, he put forward the question of “Why do or should artists organize themselves?” 
Connecting recent boycotts initiated by artists from the 19th Sydney Biennale (2014), to 
43
Manifesta 2014 in St. Petersburg, and the call of artists participating in the 31st São Paulo 
Biennial to withdraw funding received from the state of Israel. According to Staal, these actions 
come to prove the possibility of artists influencing “institutions to adapt their ethical stances to 
those of the artists and not the other way around.”79, 80 Furthermore, Staal described a recent shift 
that he and the curatorial team of the conference observed, in which artists are determined to 
work not on temporary projects, but rather on long-lasting and sustainable infrastructures. He 
mentions four main characteristics of this rather new artistic phenomenon:81 1) artists’ 
organizations are founded by artists; 2) artists’ organizations choose the form of the organization, 
which is perceived by Staal as a mechanism that allows for the longevity of the organization 
beyond and further from the initial idea of the artist him/herself; 3) artists’ organizations seek 
structural engagement with social and political issues; 4) artists organizations propose social and 
political agendas. According to Staal, this perceived shift “means that the artist in the first 
instance no longer makes him or herself dependent on the cultural institutions but first of all 
organizes him or herself as an institution in its own right.”82 He underlines the historical 
connection of such a shift to Institutional Critique, already proposed by such artists as Andrea 
Fraser, as he states that the new positioning “is a tool to regain control of the means of 
79 For a video documentation of the opening of the conference, see: https://vimeo.com/117264568.
80 Sergio Edelsztein in his article, “Are Boycotts the New ‘Collective Curating’?,” sees in the growing 
number of recent boycotts a reaction to the growing influence of corporate financing in the art world. 
Edelsztein denotes boycotts as “nothing more than a withdrawal and is decidedly not a form of activism.” 
Sergio Edelsztein, “Are Boycotts the New ‘Collective Curating’?,” OnCurating 26 (October 2015), 
http://on-curating.org/index.php/issue-26-reader/are-boycotts-the-new-collective-
curating.html#.VvFnFkewXb0.
81 Most of the participants of the conference represented organizations created in the last two decades. 
Concerned Artists of the Philippines (CAP) is a veteran organization among the rest, founded in 1983.
82 From a video documentation of the opening of the conference, see: Artist Organisations International, 
Artist Organisations International.1. Propaganda and Counter-propaganda (Part 1), January 9-11, 2015. 
Vimeo video, 1:39:09, 2015, accessed August 8, 2017, https://vimeo.com/117264568.
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production, distribution, and dissemination of art. It imagines not only an artwork, but it imagines
the world in which the artwork ideally operates...it makes a world.”83 One should, of course, ask 
what sort of a world is Staal suggesting to us? And what world is being imagined by artists’ 
organizations? The escalating differences among the participants of the conference indicated that 
in order to imagine and operate in this world, and turn against existing hegemony, there is a 
preliminary need to confront and accept the antagonism that structures the politics of the different
organizations. Unlike the Berlin Biennale, during the three days of the conference, conflicting 
and opposing voices and forces had a space in which to erupt and engage in a vivid exchange.
From the opening words of Staal to the final debate led by Charles Esche, it was clear that much 
division and unease existed among the participants of the event. Regardless of the mutual shared 
title of the conference and the wishes expressed by Staal to find comradeship and exchange 
among the participants, the difficulty in finding common ground for further collaboration could 
not be avoided. Esche acknowledged straight on the difficulty of moderating the last session, 
expressing that his task was “to try and see whether we can come to some sense of exchange...of 
inevitably different positions.” Wishing not to be deterred by conflicts, he expressed a need, in 
the spirit of the writings of Chantal Mouffe, to “live within the conflict and see whether the 
conflict itself can be productive.”84 He seemed to have echoed Mouffe's argument against our era 
of the “post” in favor of taking a stand and establishing what she describes as a “chain of 
equivalence” among differing parties. In a democracy, Mouffe argues, one should not strive for a 
83 “To make a world” is also the title of three-part essay written by Staal between 2014 and 2015 for e-flux.
For Staal's opening speech, see:  Artist Organisations International, Artist Organisations International.1. 
Propaganda and Counter-propaganda (Part 1)
84 All quotes are from the video documentation here: Artist Organisations International, Artist 
Organisations International. 6. Final Debate, January 9-11, 2015, Vimeo video, 2:45:40, 2015, accessed 
August 8, 2017. https://vimeo.com/118486463. 
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simplistic notion of consensus, or for the mere maintaining of the status quo. Rather, one must 
realize that antagonism is part of the political and its institutions. In this spirit, Esche was 
determined not to shy away from disagreements and conflicts, or in other words fitting to Mouffe,
he opened an agonistic public space during the AOI. “The task for democratic theorists and 
politicians should be to envisage the creation of a vibrant 'agonistic' public sphere of contestation 
where different hegemonic political projects can be confronted.”85 It is in this sort of created 
sphere, argues Mouffe, that politics strives and prospers, as it allows differing opinions between 
adversaries to be confronted as part of a shared democratic frame and platform. 
A significant part of the conflicts voiced during the conference derived, according to Esche, from 
the fact that the artists' organizations presented are diverse and significantly different in their 
ideology and means of practice. Going back to what he perceives as the conference’s organizers’ 
starting point, Esche made clear that the conference itself should only be taken as a (curatorial) 
proposition. As such, it does not (yet) exist as an organization by its own means, for “there is no 
membership, there is no organization, there is the potentiality of an organization [...].” In doing 
so, Esche attempted to respond to those voices that feared that the conference itself wished to 
become an overall umbrella uniting all artist-run organizations, or even worse – taking over as a 
superstructure institution. According to Esche, the focus of the discussion should not remain on 
the level of the conference proposal, but rather on debating what the intention of finding common
ground between the differing institutions is: “Is it a ground which would influence the art world, 
which would influence the structures of the art world, or is it a common ground which will 
influence the world?” In prompting these questions, Esche refers directly to the need to reflect 
85 Chantal Mouffe, On The Political (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 3.
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and operate on the political structure, in which antagonistic dimensions shape the order of politics
and its manifestation among the organizations attending the conference.
Alongside this, however, the tension erupting at the conference, in my view, signals a need to go 
further than this. As much as it can be mediated according to Mouffe's understanding of the 
political and of politics, and on the phenomenon of artists’ organizations itself, it should be 
perceived as a call to re-investigate the frame itself. And by this, I ask to return once again to 
Nancy Fraser's definition of justice. As mentioned above, in her more recent research Fraser has 
argued for the expansion of the scope of justice into a structure made of three dimensions: 
recognition, distribution, and representation. With the entry of representation into the equation of 
justice, Fraser is able to address two forms of political injustice of misrepresentation. The first 
one concerns electoral systems and questions of the parity of minorities, gender quotas, etc. In 
her writings, Fraser does not elaborate at length on these issues, which she names ordinary-
political misrepresentation, or ordinary-political justice.86 According to her, the first level is 
played within the boundaries of the nation-state, or what she calls the Keynesian-Westphalian 
state. The second level becomes more intriguing as, according to Fraser, it is a form of 
misrepresentation that goes deeper, requiring a reassessment of the frame of the nation-state 
itself. Fraser describes this form as “misframing” that touches upon all matters of social justice. 
Injustice in the case of misframing, or of frame-setting, concerns members, non-members, and 
those excluded from any given political community. Hannah Arendt's “the right to have rights” is,
of course, acknowledged by Fraser, but she argues that we are now confronted with a new phase 
in the face of globalization. According to Fraser, “It is the misframing form of misrepresentation 
86 Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World, p. 19.
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that globalization has recently begun to make visible.”87 Unlike distribution and recognition, 
which address the nation-state as the “appropriate unit of justice,” misrepresentation identifies the
Keynesian-Westphalian frame as “a major vehicle of injustice, as it partitions political space in 
ways that block many who are poor and despised from challenging the forces that oppress 
them.”88 It is the frame and the misframing that are called upon for reconsideration in the time of 
globalization. As I will be demonstrating in Chapters Two and Three, the world in which Yael 
Bartana and Jonas Staal operate, just as much as representatives from other organizations on 
various levels, cannot be understood without taking into account the effects of globalization on 
what Fraser identifies as post-Westphalian order. It is no longer the nation-state at which these 
artists are aiming, but rather a transnational structure calling for new political formulation and 
action. And this, to answer Charles Esche’s questions, is the ground that connects artists’ 
organizations of our time as they aim to tackle both the art world and the world in general. The 
proposals for new social and political agendas are made by artists who create and run 
organizations that for the most part operate through a transnational global structure as they take 
aim at the injustice of misrepresentation derived from misframing.
The tension and process of misframing in a globalized context can be clearly pointed out in 
Bartana's JRMiP movement.89 It was especially poignant in the Congress of Bartana's movement 
to which delegates from around the world assembled in order to actively engage in worldwide 
politics. Her meticulous and devoted exploration of the political landscape of the State of Israel 
87 Nancy Fraser, Fortunes of Feminism: From Women's Liberation to Identity Politics to Anti-Capitalism 
(London: Verso, 2013), p. 197.
88 Ibid., p. 20.
89 Bartana's next large-scale live performance project “What If Women Ruled the World?” (2017) continues her 
investigation into global speculative issues as suggested by its title. Here Bartana calls upon a diverse group of 
women actors and experts to collaboratively solve a global emergency. 
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since the beginning of her artistic career has grown into a global scale and frame. From her first 
work titled Profile (2000), a one-channel video centered around the profile of one female Israeli 
soldier’s shooting drills, Bartana went on to creating Trembling Time (2001) dealing with the 
moment of silence commemorating Israeli soldiers. Up until 2007, with the making of Mary 
Koszmary, Bartana made more than a dozen other videos, mostly in Israel, which dealt 
predominantly with the nation's identity in a time of great social and political upheaval. One may 
claim that Bartana's work, including the Polish Trilogy, continues to deal almost exclusively with 
the Israeli nation.90 Nevertheless, it is of importance to note that a shift occurred in Bartana's 
work since the making of the first video of the Polish Trilogy. It marked a transition in her artistic
and political aspirations, in which a global, politically active agenda regarding Poland, the 
Middle East, and Europe as a whole has gradually been brought to the forefront.91 
A similar parallel can be drawn between Bartan and Staal, as he, too, began his artistic work by 
creating a series of site-specific installations dealing with local Dutch right-wing politician Geert 
Wilders.92 Stepping into the volatile discourse in Dutch society regarding the current state of 
90 Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir’s essay is one example of an explicit link made between Yael Bartana's 
Polish Trilogy and the Israeli-Palestinian wars and conflicts. “This is Not a Call to the Dead,”  
http://yaelbartana.com/text/continuing-to-think-1.
91 Following the Polish Trilogy of films, Bartana created works such as “Inferno” (2013) about the 
construction of a third Jewish Temple in São Paulo Brazil, “True Finn” (2014) about Finnish identity, and 
most recently “What if Women Ruled the World?” (2017), a performance attempting to solve global 
problems by a group of eleven women. 
92 The Geert Wilders works (2005-2008) were a series of twenty-one installations mounted in public 
spaces in the cities of The Hague and Rotterdam. Centered around the image of the populist politician, 
who became a household name in the Netherlands due to provocative statements made against what he 
viewed as the “Islamisation of the Netherlands.” Staal created installations that can be perceived as 
anything from a memorial to a space of worship. Anonymously affixing dozens of portraits of Wilders to 
trees, Staal created a mosaic piece containing all but Wilders's face and upper body. Underneath this 
image, Staal adorned the ground with a framed photo of Wilders, white flowers, candles, and also a teddy 
bear. Link: http://www.jonasstaal.nl/tekst/wilderswerkentekst_en.html.
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politics brought Staal's installations to the attention of the public, and also a determined reaction 
by Wilders himself. Fast forward a few years to the creation of the New World Summit, this 
project — perceived by Staal as an artistic and political organization — continues Staal's political
involvement, yet this time on a transnational scale and frame. Financed and supported by, among 
others, Dutch foundations such as the Mondriaan Foundation, and by such local Dutch 
institutions as the Museum De Lakenhal in Leiden, or BAK in Utrecht, the concern, motivation, 
and outreach of The New World Summit now exists by far on a global level. The recent 
development, as it has been identified by Staal in the creation of the conference Artist 
Organizations International (AOI), or by Sven Lütticken regarding the transition of artists from 
short-term projects to creating and establishing their own institutions, must therefore be reflected 
upon and explained in relation to globalization, which is the most powerful process taking place 
in this age and time.93 The Summit in Berlin was followed by other summits that took place in 
Leiden, Kochi, Brussels, Utrecht, and Rojava, the Kurdish autonomous region in Northern Syria. 
In Rojava, Staal's New World Summit evolved into what Staal depicts to be a public parliament. 
In the city of Derîk, the artist and his team of collaborators and supporters constructed and 
offered together with regional and Dutch politicians “a parliament for the Rojava Revolution.”94 
According to Staal, due to the fact that “Rojava is and wants to remain stateless, it made sense to 
think of a permanent parliament rather than a temporary one: a parliament for a stateless 
democracy,”95 on which I will expand at length in Chapter Three. 
93 I will be especially interested in the effect globalization has had and continues to hold with regard to 
justice as I follow Nancy Fraser's exploration of justice in a globalized world.
94 More on this in Chapter Three. For further general info on the Rojava project, see: 
http://www.newworldsummit.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Project-Statement.-New-World-Summit
%E2%80%93Rojava-Part-I-spreads.pdf.
95 Domeniek Ruyters, “Democracy Without the State: Jonas Staal Builds Parliament in Northern-Syria,” 
Metropolis M, Oct. 17, 2015, http://metropolism.com/features/democracy-without-the-state/.
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Back to the AOI conference, it is worth noting that Esche does not specifically use the word 
“global.” Yet, he does state that the conference and the attending organizations formulated a quest
to find out whether “we have a willingness to build a common ground beyond our specificities.” 
Climate change, noted Esche, might serve as one example of a critical collective challenge 
seeking a local and beyond response. He finds another example in the Institute for Human 
Activities (IHA) by artist Renzo Martin centered around economic inequality in the Congo. For 
Esche, the “global segregation” brought up by Martin questions whether we can put “aside our 
differences...and build a common center” for further shared exchange and action. Furthermore, an
overview of the organizations participating in the conference shows how many of them are 
positioned in between the local and the global; in between finding ways to work within and affect
local structures, while at the same time operating on a wider, connecting global reach and scale. It
is perhaps what the organizers intended when adding “international” to the title, but as I have 
shown and will continue to do, global might be the more fitting term and definition to capture 
this unique moment and configuration. While the conference stated clearly that it aims to explore 
“a current shift from artists working in the form of temporary projects to building long-term 
organisational structures,” it did not pose one crucial question – why now? Why now do we find 
this movement and change in the motivation and practice of artists as they react to what they 
perceive to be “today’s crises in politics, economy, education, immigration and ecology.” An 
answer to “Why now?” cannot be found in the tendency to explain urgent matters as an outcome 
of a time of “crisis.” As noted by Esche in his opening words of the final debate, there is nothing 
new in the use of the word crisis. As far as he recalls, the word has been in constant use since he 
made his first steps in the art world in the 1990s. Yet, the strategies and mechanisms through 
which artists’ thinking is operating nowadays show an inclination towards a new sort of 
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organizational structure. Posing the question of why this phenomenon is taking place now can 
help us, I shall argue, to not only differentiate between the different organizations and deduce 
more about their motivations, but also mark some common ground between the organizations 
presented in the conference and beyond it. Based on this exploration, I will be aiming in the 
following chapters to examine how the current change offers new means of reacting to and 
shaping our political and legal systems through the creation of new organizations, spaces, and 
structures for artistic imagination and action. 
1.5. Capabilities in a Globalized World
In order to give an account of this, I refer to the work of sociologist Saskia Sassen, especially 
through a reading of her extensive research on the global and on legal rights.96 According to 
Sassen, we must pay close attention to the transformation that globalization has brought to and 
continues to hold on the nation-state. The perception offered by Sassen strongly binds the global 
to the national, as it “is taking place inside the national to a far larger extent than is usually 
recognized.”97 Researching how the global is constituted and emerges from the national, Sassen is
advocating against a position in which the relation between the national and the global are 
portrayed as binary, arguing instead that it is based on continuous interference and power 
struggles. The dynamic between the two is derived from the tension of denationalization brought 
upon by globalization, while at the very same time the global “continue[s] to inhabit the realm of 
what is still largely national.”98 This dual existence is what needs to be further analyzed, and to 
96 Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008).
97 Ibid., p. 2.
98 Ibid., p. 1.
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some extent unmasked, she claims, since the process itself is often times obscured through 
entanglement.99 It is through creating new mechanisms and a new kind of global logic within the 
national that allows the global to flourish. “The institutional and subjective micro-transformations
denationalization produces frequently continue to be experienced as national when they in fact 
entail a significant historical shift in the national.”100 Hence, what Sassen suggests is a study of 
denationalization in the face of global transformation. It is vital to detect these changes that take 
place often from within the national while bypassing international treaties, civil society, local 
legislation, and the executive branch as they establish a new global logic. “Examples are cross-
border networks of activists engaged in specific localized struggles with an explicit or implicit 
global agenda, for example, human rights and environmental organizations.” Sassen, just like 
Nancy Fraser and other fellow social, legal, and political scholars, does not in any manner discuss
art institutions or artists, nor the possibility of visual activism in this context. However, based on 
the reframing of the nation-state due to globalization, in the following chapters I will suggest 
ways through which to perceive current developments in the art world as being influenced by and
influencing, being shaped by and shaping the changes described by Sassen and Fraser. 
“Territory,” “Authority,” and “Rights” (TAR) are three “transhistorical” concepts researched by 
Sassen in her discussion on the global. These are not inclusive terms for the analysis of the global
in relation to the national, and I will add “Justice” and “Law” to them. According to Sassen, 
“Across time and space, territory, authority, and rights have been assembled into distinct 
formations within which they have had variable levels of performance.”101 Her main concern is 
99 The notion of unmaking can be related to Nancy Fraser's reframing terminology. I will be using both as 
interchangeable in the following pages.
100 Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, p. 2.
101 Ibid., p. 5.
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on cultivating methods to study transformations of complex systems.102 These transformations, 
according to Sassen, can be identified and explained when one traces certain capabilities that are 
shared by different systems even as their objectives shift through time and space. In any given 
system, capabilities change and take on new objectives when a “foundational reorientation in 
existing systems must occur.”103 Along with capabilities, Sassen makes use of two other terms that
are tipping points, as well as organizing logics. The use of these terms assists Sassen in focusing 
not on an outcome, but rather on a critical event/moment/situation capturing the evolution of 
globalization from within the nation-state. What is crucial to underscore is that a system does not 
change completely, nor does an order end and a new one begin, but an important point occurs that
changes the ongoing system, which still continues to exist. In other words, shifts in capabilities 
gradually accumulate into a tipping point leading to the creation of a new organizing logic. To put
it another way, this investigation is concerned to a large extent with the new organizational logic, 
or new frame, of justice and law taking place based on certain tipping points due to shifts in 
capabilities. 
Time and again, what is essential for Sassen is to show how globalization as we know it today 
has achieved its enormous impact due to capabilities of the nation-state. According to Sassen, the 
authority of the nation-state has been based on legal capabilities, which are not dismissed by 
globalization, but rather are used to advance a new organizing logic in which national economies 
are opened up to the global economy. The use of given capabilities, such as the rule of law, in 
establishing a new organizing logic also needs to be addressed in order to answer a simple yet 
lingering question – why now? Or, as Sassen puts it, “why the current assemblage did not emerge
102 Ibid., p. 6.
103 Ibid., p. 7.
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at the earlier time since key capabilities for global operations were present then. Is it a matter of 
tipping points?”104 In general, and certainly in the context of this publication, it is of importance 
to highlight Sassen's claims regarding the changing capabilities of the law and the legal system. 
There have been crucial developments since the 1980s, in which there has been “a significant 
shift of power to the executive, a loss of lawmaking capacities and public oversight [...] partly as 
a result, a new critical role for the judiciary in both public scrutiny of executive action and 
lawmaking.”105 The new roles of the legislative branch, the judiciary, and the executive are based,
however, on earlier capabilities. As Sassen tells us, the fact that the global is rooted in the 
national demonstrates how certain capabilities move through time and reconfigure into a new 
logic, in the way that it is evidently “happening in the current global age when state capabilities 
historically constructed for the pursuit of national goals today get reoriented toward global 
projects.”106 Hence, one need not assume that earlier capabilities are overcome, destroyed, or 
simply erased, but rather the opposite. There has been and continues to be a constant 
“reorientation of existing capabilities.” It is what has enabled the shift into a new logic, leading 
the denationalization of the nation-state and its capabilities “toward the implementation of global 
projects.”107 
Thus, when we position Sassen’s and Fraser's critical analyses in relation to art, we find that the 
foundational transformation of the art world into a global-scale system is a redefinition of earlier 
capabilities now gaining new objectives. As I will show in the following chapters, it is not 
104 Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, p. 16.
105 Ibid., p. 17.
106 Ibid., p. 28.
107 Ibid., p. 32.
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sufficient to analyze how art institutions and artists are working in a globalized world, but it is 
necessary to engage in a critical manner with the effects of globalization as it redefines and gives 
new meanings to original artistic capabilities. Art practitioners are a vital part of this transnational
structure, which re-directs their capabilities into a tipping point leading to a new organizing logic 
of their activities in the twenty-first century. As part of this new order, Sassen mentions NGOs 
and human rights organizations, with which the newly created artists’ organizations have 
significant common ground. In the changes taking place in the executive branch, just as in the 
legislative branch and the judiciary, Sassen recognizes the formation of new cross-border 
regimes. It might very well be that artists, along with NGOs and other transnational 
organizations, are forming new classes of people entitled to specialized statutory and legal 
protections foremost with regard to a common struggle for justice.108   
Regardless if art practitioners will gain new legal rights or not in any new global logic, it is 
certain that artistic and curatorial capabilities are being reformulated toward new objectives in 
which some are directed towards the legal sphere and concepts of justice. Undoubtedly, in recent 
decades we have witnessed an ever-growing interest and engagement among art practitioners in 
social, political, and economic terrains and causes. With the crucial judicial transformation and 
reframing, and the re-reading of justice indicated by Sassen and Fraser, I argue for a tipping point
in which the legal system gains further interest and action through artistic and curatorial practice 
and research. As I have started to indicate and will develop further in Chapter Two, in the case of 
Yael Bartana's Congress, legal issues are already being tackled, even if mostly indirectly. Also, 
curatorial platforms in which the political, social, and economic take center-stage while the 
108 For a further debate on this volatile and debated resemblance and connection, please see Chapter Four.  
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judicial aspect remains neglected, such as the 7th Berlin Biennale,109 the legal sphere’s proximity 
to all political, social, and economic issues makes a demand on art practitioners of all sorts. As I 
have begun to show and will develop further in the following, legal matters are already embedded
within the artistic and the curatorial, yet they maintain a state that I consider to be one of 
hibernation. If art wishes to continue and maintain an interest in tackling everyday life,110 it 
cannot abandon and ignore the legal system that has its roots and branches entangled already 
within it.111 The least art can do is mark law's transparency, its invisibility to opacity, thus 
enabling a critical approach towards the law.112
To achieve this, in the following chapters I will explore the unique positioning and the possible 
opportunities that await art practitioners when working with, or when interpreted through, legal 
theory, structures, and perceptions. Keeping Sassen’s and Fraser’s theories as a backbone for my 
109 In the 7th Berlin Biennale’s accompanying publication, “Forget Fear,” just as in other textual materials, 
the terms “law” or “legal” or “legality” appear very seldomly and mainly in relation to Jonas Staal's 
Summit and Khaled Jarrar’s State of Palestine, which is a declarative project in which the artist created a 
Palestinian stamp. This was then used to stamp official passports, thus making a claim for Palestinian 
sovereignty. This is not to say that there are no examples of exhibitions and curatorial endeavors tackling 
legal issues. My claim is that any platform or project examining political, social, and economic matters 
cannot exclude a critical examination of legal aspects in relation to art. 
110 “Artists now place themselves in the midst of the traffic of everyday life. They can no longer afford to 
isolate themselves or presume that they are ahead of the changes that are occurring in the world. Their art 
is formed in the process of working with others and within the institutions of everyday life.” See Nikos 
Papastergiadis, Spatial Aesthetics: Art, Place, and the Everyday (Amsterdam: Institute of Network 
Cultures, 2010), p. 8.
111 In her essay for issue 28 of OnCurating , Sabine Mueller-Mall discusses what she names the “reciprocal
attraction of law and art.” Sabine Mueller-Mall, “LAW/ART: Constructive Interferences,” OnCurating 28 
(Jan. 2016), accessed August 8, 2017, http://www.on-curating.org/issue-28-reader/lawart-constructive-
interferences.html#.WH5tnVxMYRY. 
112 Zygmunt Bauman suggested this method with regard to intellectuals “to make this transparency opaque 
and hence visible and open to scrutiny.” See Zygmunt Bauman, Legislator and Interpreters: On 
Modernity, Post-Modernity and Intellectuals (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987), p. 6.
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research, my approach envisions contemporary art research and practice as one that engages with 
justice and law from within existing institutions and structures while creating new alternative 
ones. In a world that is shifting direction towards a new organizing logic and a new frame of 
justice, I disagree with creating a division between operating from within or outside of the nation-
state’s institutions. I endorse a multivalent standpoint in which artists challenge the framing of 
existing nation-state institutions through working within them, and through envisioning new 
structures, frames, and terminology for new institutions and long-term projects to come. In light 
of the enmeshed relations between the local and the global, and the reformulation of previous 
capabilities, I find there is no need to take a stance such as Chantal Mouffe, who argues in favor 
of artistic operations within existing institutions. Posing the question “Should critical artistic 
practices engage with current institutions with the aim of transforming them or should they desert
them altogether?”,113 Mouffe goes against an artistic tendency she observes, in which a 
withdrawal from working with art institutions is taking place. According to her, there is no way of
exiting since “our world” is always constructed through hegemony, since “every order is the 
expression of a particular structure of power relations.” Mouffe has been a longtime advocate for 
the creation of agonistic spaces, which according to her need to be formed from within existing 
institutions in order to counter their hegemony. She concludes her argument by declaring that, 
“Critical artistic practices, in whatever form they are conceived, are no substitute for political 
practices and […] they will never be able, on their own, to bring about a new hegemonic order.” 
Also, Mark Fisher and Nina Möntmann argue in relation to Mouffe's essay that the question 
113 All of the following quotes by Mouffe are from: “Chantal Mouffe: Strategies of radical politics and 
aesthetic resistance,” herbst. Theorie zur Praxis, September 8, 2012, accessed August 8, 2017, 
http://truth.steirischerherbst.at/texts/?p=19. .
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posed by Mouffe is “crucial” especially in times of austerity after the 2008 financial crisis.114 
They also support Mouffe’s position when they claim that there is no way out of hegemony, since
even such a claim turns quickly into a hegemonic one in the art world. For Fisher and Möntmann,
the call to withdraw from institutions eventually plays only into the hands of neoliberals. 
Furthermore, they argue that the financial crisis of 2008 has left political parties and ideologies in
disarray, which makes them a fertile ground to work within and with, rather than creating 
opposing institutions. What they suggest is the organization of transnational art networks into 
“cultural hubs” created and supported by small institutions in order to breathe new air into a 
“currently decadent parliamentary machine.” They envision a “translocal alternative to capitalist 
globalization” through the use of an already existing, they argue, critical vocabulary derived from
the recent decade of art institutional engagement with political movements, along with ideas 
formed through “institutional critique” and “new institutionalism.” 
The question of whether to work from within or to withdraw will continue to inform, challenge,
and disrupt my analysis in the following chapters.  Yet,  I  will  argue that  Mouffe,  Fisher,  and
Möntmann continuously lean on the past instead of searching for, if not new institutions, then
new fields of knowledge and practice that have been traditionally neglected by the art field. One
such field is the legal.  This is not to suggest that it is the only field that needs to be further
examined in relation to art, nor that it may bring with it all the desired solutions. However, the
proximity, tension, attraction, negation, and relevancy of the field of law to the field of art need at
least  to  be  thoroughly  acknowledged  and  investigated.  The  observation  of  the  shift  in  the
legislative and executive branches and in the rule of law may serve as far more fertile ground for
judicial-visual activism. I argue for the possibility that emerges from new artistic objectives when
114 Mark Fisher and Nina Möntmann, “Peripheral Proposals,” in Emily Pethick, ed., Cluster: On a 
Network of Visual Arts Organizations (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2014), pp. 171-182.
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intertwined with the changing landscape and perception of the legal system. I will suggest that art
practitioners  who are seeking out visual and political  activism – or what Mouffe,  Fisher and
Möntmann, and others identify as “artivism” – need to formulate new ways to engage with the
legal system in order to advance a new political order. Up until this moment, most arguments
regarding artistic or aesthetic strategies of resistance to hegemony have overlooked and neglected
the potential of a scholarly, reciprocal, multilayered relation between law and art. The upcoming
chapters shall seek to demonstrate and at times to speculate on constructive paths for judicial-
visual engagement and interventions through artistic and curatorial theory and practice.  
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Chapter Two: Performing Justice – Between the Dreyfus Affair, Barrès Trial, and Yael 
Bartana’s JRMiP Congress 
2.1. Introduction 
The “Trial of Maurice Barrès,” created by Dada in Paris in 1921, represents a significant moment 
in avant-garde art. Bridging the legal and art, the Barrès trial serves as an early example of 
pioneering experimentation with the creation of a space in which the intertwining of the legal 
with art constructs a political space of what I call judicial-visual activism. In the following 
chapter, I will explore the trial on its legal and artistic merits in order to relate it to our time, and 
to the question of the reciprocal relation between the fields of law and art. In order to do so, I 
have chosen to focus on the first Congress of “The Jewish Renaissance Movement in Poland” 
(JRMiP) created by Yael Bartana in 2012 in the framework of the 7th Berlin Biennale of 
Contemporary Art. I shall demonstrate how the juxtaposing of the Barrès trial and Bartana’s 
JRMiP Congress reflects the spirit of thinking of the French Dadaist André Breton, who claimed 
“that work perceived by its makers to be an experimental failure in its own time (like the Dada 
Season of 1921) may nevertheless have resonance in the future, under new conditions.”115 The 
positioning of the Barrès trial in relation to a contemporary art event could be seen as elusive and 
baffling at times. However, I draw inspiration from scholars such as Shoshana Felman, who has 
shown us the relevance and importance of a pendulum movement between times, trials, and 
works of art.
115 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (London: Verso, 
2012), p. 7.
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Felman discusses the historical trials of Adolf Eichmann and O.J. Simpson, in a similar manner to
the way in which she tackles Leo Tolstoy's fictitious trial of Pozdnyshev in The Kreutzer 
Sonata.116 Elizabeth Benjamin’s recent publication Dada and Existentialism117 adds partially to 
the research on the Barrès trial, on which the amount of research has been relatively scarce,118 
ignoring for the most part its artistic and legal aspects. Benjamin also uses a fictional trial – of 
Meursault in Albert Camus's The Stranger – to give an account of the Dada trial that lends 
resonance to Breton's prediction. In the following, I aspire to enlarge our perception, 
demonstrating how vital it is to unfold the Dada trial in relation to other notable and influential 
trials of the era. The Alfred Dreyfus and Émile Zola trials will allow me to better comprehend the
motivation of the Dadaists in staging their own version of a trial calling for justice through legal 
instruments and space. On a similar note, by paying close attention to the political and social 
consequences that the Dreyfus trial has had and still holds, I will devote time to analyzing 
Bartana’s Congress and its call for justice in Europe, Poland, and Israel. The general research on 
Dada and Bartana ignores for the most part the crucial influence the Dreyfus trial and related 
affairs have had. In bringing this to the forefront as a connecting missing link, I will demonstrate,
116 As Shoshana Felman's book title indicates – The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the 
Twentieth Century – it revolves around two themes: trials and traumas. Being aware of the much 
researched and debated aspect of trauma in the work of Bartana, my research directs its focus onto legal 
matters rarely discussed in her work. Thus, my focus will be on the aspect of trials in Felman's work rather
than on trauma.  
117 Elizabeth Benjamin, Dada and Existentialism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
118 In her introduction to the collection of essays The Dada Seminars published in 2005, Leah Dickerman 
points out the lack of research on the Dada movement, unlike extensive research done on Russian 
Constructivism and Surrealism. “There have been relatively few sustained efforts to examine the premises 
of Dada practice in broad view, to understand either its structural workings or the significance of its 
activities within a historical field.” See: Leah Dickerman, Matthew S. Witkovsky, ed., (Washington, The 
Dada Seminars, Center for Advanced Study in the Visual Arts, National Gallery of Art, 2005), p. 1.
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with the support of the writings of Hannah Arendt and Jacqueline Rose, the manner in which 
Bartana has taken on a role in the struggle for justice through judicial-visual activism. 
2.2. The Barrès Trial: Background and Motivations
Taking place on Friday May 13, 1921 in Paris, the Trial of Maurice Barrès was held at the Salle 
des Sociétés in Paris, revolving around the accountability of Barrès’ metamorphosis from being 
an influential revolutionary thinker to becoming a politician advocating in favor of nationalism. 
Announced in several newspapers as a prosecution of the writer-turned-politician, the Maurice 
Barrès trial was assembled by members of the Dada group (directed by poet and writer André 
Breton) around a court-like performance. Made to resemble a French court tribunal, the 
performance brought Dada members to the stage along members from the audience acting as 
defense attorneys, prosecution counsel, a judge, two assistant judges, and a president of the court.
According to Claire Bishop, the trial should be read as part of the second phase of Dada. In a 
radio interview in 1952, André Breton identified it as a development of the “lively agitation” of 
the first phase, yet now “more groping […] through radically renewed means’ phase.”119 Bishop 
writes that, “The Barrès Trial was advertised as a hearing of the author Maurice Barrès (1862– 
1923), whose book Un Homme Libre (1889), had been a great influence on Breton and Aragon in 
their youth.”120 The aim of the trial was, in Breton’s words, “to determine the extent to which a 
man could be held accountable if his will to power led him to champion conformist values that 
diametrically opposed the ideas of his youth.”121 The charges brought against Barrès during the 
119  Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship, p. 66.
120 Ibid., p. 72.
121 T.J. Demos, “Dada’s Event: Paris, 1921,” Communities of Sense, ed. Jaleh Mansoor et al. (Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 141-2.
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trial were summed up in a Dada manner as consisting of “committing an attack on the security of 
the mind.”122 
Scholars such as Bishop and James M. Harding123 begin their exploration of the trial by 
positioning this act as part of a European modernist period through which the nation-state's legal 
and administrative institutions were being reinvented and re-examined anew. Coming against the 
bourgeois idea of art as autonomous and separated from life,124 this time period “is marked by a 
self-conscious exploration of the forms of artistic expression,”125 as evident in Breton’s re-
instrumentalization of the courtroom as a platform for an artistic intervention. According to 
Harding, there is a strong duality to be found in this process, as it wanders between achieving 
remarkable innovation and yet struggling with “forms that seem no longer capable of sustaining 
them.”126 The modernist ambition to find new cultural meanings and a new language to express 
them led to the re-examination of existing formats, such as the courtroom and the legal system. 
“The staging of Western modernism was frequently tied to a fundamental search for untapped and
fresh venues […] intertwined with a basic rethinking of the very language that constituted the 
stage.”127 An earlier known example of this quest, prior to the utilization of the court and the legal
122 Ibid., p. 142.
123 James M. Harding, The Ghosts of the Avant-Garde (s) (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
2013).
124 “The European avant-garde movements can be defined as an attack on the status of art in bourgeois 
society. What is negated is not an earlier form of art (a style) but art as an institution that is unassociated 
with the life praxis of men.” See Peter Bürger, Theory Of the Avant-Garde (Minneapolis: University Of 
Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 49.
125 Ibid., p. 28.
126 Ibid., p. 28. 
127 Ibid., p. 28.
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sphere, can be observed in the Dadaists’ reuse of the format of the cabaret and the creation of 
Cabaret Voltaire during the years 1915-1917 in Zurich, which was a “mixed bills of performance,
music and poetry.”128 Later on, in what will come to be known as the “1921 Dada Season,”129 the 
Dada group will search for spaces considered by them as having “no reason to exist […] only 
areas considered not picturesque, nonhistorical […] and unsentimental would qualify […].”130 
The season was also a moment in which Dada began a process of reflection on how it might be 
reinvented before deteriorating into a routine.131 All in all, the examination of the court system by 
Dada is strongly linked to the avant-garde criticism of its own operations in the art world, along 
with being self-conscious of social, political, and economic power structures.132 The Barrès trial, 
being one of the season’s essential components, was part of Breton’s attempt to conquer new 
physical and mental terrains for Dada’s actions. Harding points out that the artistic 
experimentation characterized by the early Dadaist revitalization of theatrical formats through the
use of popular cultural venues led to a gradual greater interest in the social and political sphere, to
which I shall add an interest in the legal system as the trial suggests. The innovation of Dada 
springs from a double-edged position, explained by Harding as being posited under “the 
ideological guise of a forward-looking, self-reflective, and radical exploration of new modes of 
128 Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship, p. 66.
129 In “Artificial Hells,” André Breton recalls the background leading to Dadaist events, mentioning April 
14, 1921 as the beginning of the “Dada Season.” See, André Breton, “Artificial Hells. Inauguration of the 
‘1921 Dada Season’,” October 105 (2003): 140. 
130 Demos, “Dada’s Event,” p. 135.
131 Harding explains, “Dadaist performances were patterned after cabaret shows;” yet the lack of creative 
innovation eventually left its practitioners "discontented, hardly proud of the pitiful carnival ruses," The 
Ghosts of the Avant-Garde (s), p. 138.
132 Toby Avard Foshay, Wyndham Lewis and the Avant-Garde: The Politics of the Intellect (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), pp. 15-16.
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performance […] was almost always haunted by a conservative shadow.”133 The ambiguity of 
Dada lies exactly here – between the new and the old, in a struggle between the quest for a new 
set of values while still being engaged with already existing formats. Criticized for not having a 
clear standpoint during the trial, Breton insisted that, from an historical perspective, the strength 
of the trial would be recognized through its ability to cultivate an open, non-restrictive platform, 
in which a variety of interpretations is encouraged.134 
2.3. Dada and the Dreyfus Affair
I wish to further argue that, in order to better comprehend the Dadaist interest in the format of the
trial, one must also pay close attention the historical trials that had a lingering effect on the Dada 
movement. Specifically, I shall be bringing into my argument one of the most influential and 
controversial trials that, according to Shoshana Felman, can be considered the “trial of the 
century.”135 What has become to be known as the Dreyfus Affair, beginning in Paris in 1894 only 
to be resolved in 1906, had an immense political, legal, and social impact in France during those 
years and beyond. The atrocity and the fragility of the French Republic and its legal system had 
been brutally exposed following the Dreyfus trial, up to the exoneration of French officer Alfred 
Dreyfus. The debate surrounding the false allegations against the Army Captain Dreyfus severely 
divided public opinion, evoking issues such as anti-Semitism, nationality, and cultural identity.
133 Harding, The Ghosts of the Avant-Garde (s), p. 29.
134 Breton, “Artificial Hells,” p. 143.
135 “What makes it a landmark trial of historical significance are three profound features: (1) its complex 
traumatic structure; (2) its cross-legal nature, or the repetition it enacts of another trial; and (3) its attempt 
to define legally something that is not reducible to legal concepts.” Shoshana Felman, The Juridical 
Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2002), page 61. 
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The first trial of Dreyfus opened on December 19, 1894, at the end of which he was found guilty 
of treason. On January 5, 1895, “At a ceremony in the courtyard of the École Militaire, Dreyfus 
was publicly stripped of his rank and was sentenced to life imprisonment in solitary confinement 
in an ex-lepers’ colony on Devil’s Island off the coast of French Guyana.”136 Dreyfus faced public
humiliation as he was degraded before an enthusiastic crowd yelling “Jew” and “Judas” at him, 
while he continuously declared his innocence. The public scene of the once celebrated army 
captain losing his military rank was to become a symbol of a time of decay. Reminiscent of the 
long forgotten public tortures of medieval Europe, “It took place in the immediate shadow of the 
monument of modernity, the Eiffel Tower, then six years old […] The very improbability of such 
an act’s happening at such a time—to an assimilated Jew who had mastered a meritocratic system
and a city that was the pride and pilothouse of civic rationalism—made it a portent […] The 
Dreyfus Affair was the first indication that a new epoch of progress and cosmopolitan optimism 
would be met by a countervailing wave of hatred that deformed the next half century of European
history.”137 The Dreyfus trial, and his imprisonment on what was later proved to be unfounded 
evidence, led to several other related court trials and public turbulence, including a trial against 
Major Esterhazy as the actual perpetrator of the act of treason, and another against the writer 
Émile Zola, who in 1898 published an open letter in defense of Dreyfus in L’Aurore newspaper 
under the headline “J'accuse…!”. As a result, Zola needed to flee to England, as he was found 
guilty of libel, never to witness the tremendous effect of his civil action. Zola's open letter to the 
President of France is considered today as the “birth of the intellectuals.” The day after the 
publication of “J'accuse…!”, the same newspaper went on to publish a statement in protest of 
136 David Drake, French Intellectuals and Politics from the Dreyfus Affair to the Occupation (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 13.
137 Adam Gopnik, “Trial of the Century,” The New Yorker, September 28, 2009.
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“the judicial irregularities of the 1894 trial and ‘the mysteries surrounding the Esterhazy 
affair.’”138 This measure became to be known as the “Manifesto of the Intellectuals,” as it “was 
signed by over a hundred leading figures in the fields of letters, science and education and 
marked the entry en masse of ‘the intellectuals’ into politics, in the sense that they were stepping 
outside their spheres of expertise and were publicly and collectively taking a position on a 
political (and also moral) issue.”139  In this respect, it is worth noting the importance Shoshana 
Felman imparts to Zola not only as an intellectual, but furthermore as an artist. According to her, 
it is nothing less than an “historically unprecedented” act, since for the first time “the artist made 
– at his own cost – a revolutionary intervention in the legal process […] The writer chose 
politically to make creative use of the tool of law in order to break open the closed legal 
frame.”140 Zola, as an artist and intellectual, risked his own artistic and legal status in order to 
force the re-examination of the Dreyfus case.
It was Zola’s criminal trial for libel that led to a concrete and immediate impact on French law 
and society, attracting immense attention from the general public. It seemed that everyone wanted
to get involved in the trial against the famous author: “Never had such a numerous, more 
passionately agitated crowd invaded the Assises chamber. Lawyers were piled on top of each 
other, some clinging to the high ramparts surrounding the reserved enclosure or to the window 
sills; and mingling with them, crushed to suffocation point, in the emotion of the spectacle 
absorbing the whole world’s attention, elegant ladies, journalists, officers, men of leisure, actors, 
138 Drake, French Intellectuals and Politics from the Dreyfus Affair to the Occupation, p. 21. 
139 Ibid.
140 Felman, The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century p. 116.
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‘Everybody who was anybody—all, the cream, of Paris’.”141 The unprecedented engagement of 
artists, intellectuals, and the general public in the trials that followed the Dreyfus trial certainly 
played a pivotal role in changing and reforming artistic involvement in the years to follow. Léon 
Blum, who later became the first socialist and Jewish premier, perceived the Dreyfus Affair to be 
“as violent a crisis as the French Revolution and the Great War,”142 leading him as well towards 
active participation in French politics. Maurice Barrès, the French novelist and journalist-turned-
politician who will be the target of the later-to-come Dada trial, is also considered one of 
France’s leading intellectuals upon whom the Dreyfus trial had an immense influence. 
In Jacqueline Rose’s exploration of great writers and scholars such as Marcel Proust, Samuel 
Beckett, and Sigmund Freud, she focuses mostly on the Dreyfusards, those who stood in support 
of Dreyfus. Rose does not, however, discuss at much length the position of the anti-Dreyfusards, 
such as Barrès, for whom the Dreyfus trial had marked a dramatic ideological change in the 
direction of nationalism. Yet, I wish to emphasize that it was the Dadaists, more than twenty 
years following the Dreyfus Affair, who decided to bring to justice the case of Barrès by accusing
him of moral betrayal for “committing an attack on the security of the mind.”143 The research on 
the Dada trial for the most part does not pay attention to the reasons behind the decision to put 
Barrès on trial as opposed to any other living or dead or fictional leading figure.144 However, I 
141 Jacqueline Rose, Proust among the Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), p. 26.
142 Ibid., p. 5.
143 Demos, “Dada’s Event,” p. 142. In Beret E. Strong's words: “Crimes against the Security of the Human 
Spirit.” Beret E. Strong, The Poetic Avant-Garde: The Groups of Borges, Auden, and Breton (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1997), p. 259.
144 Elizabeth Benjamin's book Dada and Existentialism published in August 2016 is an exception to this 
rule, as I will discuss
 in the following pages.
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argue that dwelling on why Barrès became Dada’s target shall yield fruitful and relevant new 
perceptions on past and present artistic and legal intertwining leading to political activism and 
justice. As I will show, this decision by Dada attests to the remarkable influence Barrès continued
to have in France, especially for the younger generation of French intellectuals, artists, and 
politicians such as André Gide, Louis Aragon, and Blum himself. As the historian Zeev Sternhell 
states in his essay on the rise of the right wing in France following the 1870 war and France’s 
defeat by Germany: “Barrès was for the men of his generation the model of the engaged 
intellectual and the philosophe, in the eighteen-century French meaning of the term.”145 Sternhell 
further argues that for most of today’s scholars, Barrès plays a negligible role, but that in the 
context of his own time and means of influence, Barrès must be considered a modern intellectual:
“His conception of the nature of political struggle in a liberal democratic system reveals an acute 
understanding of the imperative of politics in modern society […] reflected the changes in 
occurring then in the European intellectual climate which amounted to a veritable intellectual 
revolution.”146  In what Sternhell perceives to be outstanding political intuition, he demonstrates 
how Barrès was able to present nationalism as a fulfillment of socialism, as it ensures first and 
foremost the state’s commitment to its citizens as “nationalism, Barrès claimed, ‘is deeply 
concerned with establishing just relationships among all Frenchmen’.”147 This manner in which 
Barrès impressively juggles to intertwine right and left politics amounted to a new trajectory 
during the trial of Dreyfus. Allowing a fertile ground for anti-Semitism during the trial, “Barrès 
went on to elaborate this nationalism of the ‘little man’, of all those who had nothing but their 
145 Zeev Sternhell, “National Socialism and Anti-Semitism: The Case of Maurice Barres,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 8:4 (1973): 47.
146 Ibid., p. 48.
147 Ibid., p. 56.
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rootedness, their Frenchness […]. For Barrès, it was a political conception, not mere hatred of the
Jew; it had its task to fulfill on the flanks of socialism. It was a progressive notion – Barrès was 
addressing himself to republicans and democrats meant to serve as the groundwork for a mass 
movement.”148 The figure of Barrès, holding a frightful resemblance to leading political 
representatives of our time, thus captures the ambiguity of Dada. Incoherent, untamed, 
provocative, and open to varied interpretations from the left just as from the right, Barrès is the 
perfect figure to be brought into a Dada trial. 
2.4. The Barrès Trial – A Participatory Political Space
The attempt to capture the masses and to engage in a new participatory dynamic of politics and 
debate as executed by Barrès can, to some degree, be perceived as shared by both politicians and 
artists of that time period. In order to further shed light on the notion of the participatory as a 
crucial part of the Dada trial, I must again refer to Bishop and her book, Artificial Hells. 
According to Bishop, Breton’s interest in the public sphere led him to consider the format of the 
trial as a space for Dadaist experimentation. She states that, “By spring 1921 […] the group 
decided to take performance out of a cabaret context and into extra-institutional public space.”149 
Directing her investigation towards the participatory aspects of Dada, Bishop includes the trial 
event as part of the Dada manifestations of April and May 1921, which “sought to include the 
Parisian public through ‘Visits – Dada Salon […] Summons – Accusations Orders and 
Judgements’.”150 Furthermore, the open call to the public to participate in the trial as part of the 
148 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
149 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 66.
150 Ibid.
71
jury proved to be, according to Bishop, a step towards further inclusion of the public in Dada’s 
performances. 
The shift in Dada towards a greater engagement with the public sphere, institutions, and 
audiences could also explain why Barrès was chosen as the target of the trial. In the volatile 
political atmosphere of the French Third Republic, as France was healing its wounds from its 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, Barrès adopted a new way to conduct politics. During this 
“profound crisis in French democracy,”151 Barrès had also exercised a move into direct contact 
with the general public in a call against the establishment, a move to be interrogated by Dada in 
the years thereafter: “Against the institution which was the embodiment of parliamentary 
democracy, Barrès appealed directly to the people; as against the parliamentary circus he called 
for direct action, and with the ample evocation of revolutionary imagery, sought to mobilize 
against the triumphant bourgeoisie the most deprived social levels.”152 Barrès, who at first 
belonged to the political ranks of the liberal left, is perceived by historians such as Sternhell to be
an intriguing case study for the ideological changes that began to form in France after 1870, in 
which the vocabulary of the left continues to be used by right-wing figures such as Barrès, while 
distorting any significance of its prior meaning. “Against parliamentarism, Barrès set the cult of 
the leader […] and in place of capitalism, he called for reforms whose essence was 
protectionism.”153 Sternhell concludes with the realization that “in a given situation, the masses 
could easily give their support to a party which had borrowed its social values from the left and 
151 Sternhell, “National Socialism and Anti-Semitism: The Case of Maurice Barres,” p. 48.
152 Ibid., p. 51.
153 Ibid.
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its political ones from the right.”154 Encapsulated in Dada's words, the political and legal 
establishment was proven to be “committing an attack on the security of the mind.” This 
manipulative transformation from left-wing values to right-wing politics, as in the case of Barrès,
was the essence of the Dada trial.155 
The Dada trial was set up to confront the loss of values and the corruption of state institutions by 
deconstructing the courtroom in an alternative legal space. Breton’s motivation was to challenge, 
prosecute, and seek justice from a person once considered by him and the rest of Dada as a 
beloved hero and respected ally. In order to be able to judge and bring about justice, a full-
fledged court was what Breton needed. Hence, unlike earlier events by the Dada group, the trial 
was straightforwardly conceived to replicate a real courtroom.156 From the very title to the red, 
white, and black clothes worn by Dada participants in accordance with the official French Court 
of Justice, it abandoned much of the Dadaists’ absurd performances as they headed into re-
imagining the public sphere. It is agreed upon by most researchers that the trial redirected the 
Dada movement in new directions, and mainly towards surrealism. Moreover, the turning to the 
construction of a courtroom by Dada signals “the most significant shift […]. Dada now presumed
to judge rather than simply to negate; in other words, it attempted to find a position rather than 
offering an a priori rejection of all positions.”157 It is a position of varied possibilities and 
154 Ibid.
155 In replying to criticism against the conduct of the trial, Breton writes that they seemed “not to have 
understood that our interest in this problem lay in the possibility of interpreting it variously, and that we 
were inclined to nothing so little as cohesion.” See Breton, “Artificial Hells,” p. 143.
156 Demos states that Breton invested time and effort attending hearings at the Palais de Justice prior to the 
mock trial “to study the procedural aspects of litigation.” Demos, “Dada’s Event,” p. 142. 
157 See Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 73.
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interpretations, as Breton tell us, but it can also be seen as an artistic intervention in the spirit of 
Zola.
As T.J. Demos puts it, following Rancière’s idea of the political, Dada “realizes its ‘moral 
directions’ by both transgressing and perpetuating the division between aesthetic autonomy and 
social practice.”158 The shift by Dada from rejection to a judgment that claims to bring justice 
where state institutions and courts have failed can be understood as part of a radical intent to 
“dissolve the division between the life of art and the art of life.”159 If, in the early stages of the 
Dada group, it was important to appropriate existing spaces and transform them into spaces 
immersed with Dada content and values, it was now the time to move further in other directions 
and make use of the public space, and to engage in a new relation with the general public. Using 
the “real life” format of the trial into which Dadaist content is inserted demonstrates the ability of
Dada to swing between art and life, and thus produce their own politics. Therefore, what is 
crucial to remember when analyzing the Dada trial is the constant ambivalent tension between 
being a parody of the law, while at the same time handling it wholeheartedly in earnest. The 
presumably mock trial, writes Beret E. Strong, was taken seriously by Breton.160 The trial offers 
us a break from the habitual distinction between life and art. Dada appropriates the format of the 
trial for the creation of an intervention in the public space that breaks down the barriers “between 
artistic performance and social process, resulting in a new kind of assertion of art's autonomy—
not as a self-contained ideal realm of aesthetic experience, but rather as an autonomous form of 
158 See Demos’ discussion of an earlier Dada event and the visit to Saint-Julien-le-Pauvre, “Dada’s Event,” 
p.141.
159 Ibid., p. 140.
160 See Beret E. Strong, The Poetic Avant-garde: The Groups of Borges, Auden, and Breton, p. 259. 
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social experience.”161 The trial serves as an excellent example of Dada’s ability to tap into the 
tension between life and art. By trying a living politician, the Dada trial managed to blur all 
distinctions between the real and the imaginary in a manner that cannot be more relevant to 
today’s artistic intertwining between art and the legal system. 
2.5. The Barrès Trial – Legal Form and Content
Given this backdrop, the Barrès trial can be perceived as a pivotal moment in which the 
contradictory mechanism of Dada reveals itself: “Appropriating as it did the legal structures of 
the courtroom is a gesture aimed at securing political and cultural values from a perceived 
corruption and demise […] it served as the point of departure for the fleeting infatuation with 
legal constructs that swept the Parisian avant-gardes in the early 1920s.”162 Moreover, staging a 
performance within the framework of a trial offered a mantle of legitimacy and a sense of truth, 
objectivity, and unbiased authority.163 Along with this Dadaist fascination with legal matters, the 
trial stands out as even more vital when considering Breton’s failure in assembling the “The 
Congress of Paris” later on, or in light of several lawsuits that were part of the growing rivalry 
between Breton and Tristan Tzara. “The Trial and Sentencing of Maurice Barrès by Dada marked
the beginning of a circuitous chain of events,”164 all of which exposed the divergent rhetoric of 
Dada, as well as their interest in breaking into new formats of artistic interventions in the public 
space. Without going any further into the stormy relations between Breton and Tzara,165 two 
161 Ibid., p. 141.
162 See Harding, The Ghosts of the Avant-Garde (s), p. 29.
163 Demos, “Dada’s Event,” p. 35.
164 Ibid., p. 30.
165 “The Dada Season…denotes a period of fracture within the group; specifically, it testifies to increased 
tension between Breton, Tzara and Francis Picabia.” Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 67.
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central figures of the Dada group, it is generally agreed that the trial marked a split within Dada 
that led to the emergence of surrealism.166 
What is central to my argument is a reflection on the trial as a format that captures within it 
diverse artistic and legal rhetoric and capabilities.167 I perceive the trial of Maurice Barrès to be 
the culmination of a Dadaist use of an existing state apparatus structure to which they were able 
to inject new rhetoric and anti-traditional concepts. It may have been that the trial was related to 
inner struggles for power and authority within the ranks of Dada; nevertheless, it succeeded in 
staging the old in close proximity to the new. It appropriated a state-organized format for the 
creation of a new performance that excoriated both the past and the vanguards. It is, in a sense, an
internal critique that questions the Dada mechanism itself. The trial’s duality is embedded within 
it. On the one hand, it aims to outrage its audience and public, while at the very same time it is 
concerned with confronting its own authenticity. The façade of the accused Barrès, once an ally 
and close visionary, was taken down to reveal his true face as a right-wing conservative 
politician. In the same manner, the trial is an alarming signal indicating the danger that also 
awaits Dada itself, that of becoming reactionary, nationalist, and bourgeois.168 It is the analogy 
between Dada and Barrès that symbolizes the innate, inner, and outer struggles between the 
reactionary and the progressive, which may explain Breton’s wish for the death penalty for 
Barrès. 
166 See Harding, The Ghosts of the Avant-Garde (s), p. 30.
167 “…looking backward and forward simultaneously […] openly committed to a backward-glancing 
project of recovery and preservation, i.e. to a project of rescuing youthful, revolutionary ideas from the 
ageing, increasingly reactionary, and nationalistic hands.” Ibid.
168 As Harding states, although “the question of whether Dada actually has exhausted itself was taken for 
granted and never addressed […] it constructed an analogy between Barrès and Dada.” Ibid., p. 35.
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The ability to judge and render a verdict is essential to Breton. Can there be a trial in absentia of 
the accused, who left Paris on that day only to be represented in the trial in the form of a 
mannequin?169 I agree with Elizabeth Benjamin when she claims that the absence of Barrès 
“make[s] us wonder whether justice is always decided in the absence of the accused.”170 As she 
points out, much was done in absentia, or rather, not in accordance with the official legal system, 
such as witnesses giving testimonies written in advance, or others asked to judge based on little 
knowledge on the work and life of Barrès. On the other hand, unlike Benjamin, I argue that it is 
significant to consider that, in contrast to the absent Barrès and certain legal procedures, the 
tribunal was fully rendered, as it was composed by “a judge, two assistant judges, the 
prosecution, and two counsels for the defense […] all of whom treated the proceedings with the 
utmost seriousness […] and accompanied by a phalanx of witnesses who testified to the public 
danger of the accused.”171 And not only did all seem true and real in the conduct of the trial, for 
Breton, according to his biographer, “This was no parody, but the real thing—or as close as his 
lack of judicial authority would allow.”172 In the absence of the defendant, the only opposition to 
the trial was expressed by Tristan Tzara.173 This outstanding move can be understood as part of 
the mistrust that had formed in the volatile relationship between Breton and Tzara. However, the 
statements made by Tzara during the trial proved that it extended beyond mere personal 
169 “The defendant Barrès was invited but unable to attend, as he was already committed to a prior 
engagement in Aix-en-Provence, where he was to discuss ‘The French Soul during the War’.” Demos, 
“Dada’s Event,” p. 142.
170 Elizabeth Benjamin, Dada and Existentialism (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), p. 116. 
171 Harding, The Ghosts of the Avant-Garde (s), p. 37.
172 Demos, “Dada’s Event,” p. 142.
173 As Elizabeth Benjamin tells us, Tzara's testimony was the longest of all six testimonies, also noting that 
“it also goes the furthest to break down the event, erode any serious tone the trial may have been aiming 
for, and has the widest-ranging consequences for Dada.” Dada and Existentialism, p. 109.
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disenchantment. Before leaving the stage and heading into the streets, Tzara claimed to have 
“absolutely no confidence in justice even if that justice is enacted by Dada.”174 Nevertheless, the 
trial went on and ended with Barrès being found guilty based on testimonies given against him. 
Barrès was not sentenced to death, as requested by Breton, but to twenty years of hard labor. This
verdict left both Barrès and Dada somewhat alive, since perhaps the fact that Tzara left the event 
ignited a sense that, after all, “Beneath the façade of avant-gardism, The Trial was thus embedded
in a discourse that cultivated conformity and that did so under the aura of establishing, indeed in 
securing, objective truth and order.”175 The departure of Tzara can be perceived as his own 
interpretation of what it meant to engage with the masses. It can be proclaimed that while Tzara 
called for direct engagement with the public by heading into the streets, Breton proposed or 
called upon the creation of an alternative legal system to serve the public. To him, it was clear 
that ever since the Dreyfus Affair, the judicial system had proven to be corrupt and 
malfunctioning, also proven by the fact that a figure such as Barrès should continue to escape any
kind of conviction in the existing legal system.
All in all, the influence of the Dreyfus Trial and related affairs on French society cannot be 
ignored when analyzing the Barrès Trial.176 All this suggests that perceiving the Barrès Trial 
through the prism of a mere mock trial or parody is strongly insufficient. I argue that the 
historical background of the Dreyfus Trial along with the artistic intervention by Zola in a legal 
174 See Harding, The Ghosts of the Avant-Garde (s), p.  38.  Elizabeth Benjamin translates Tzara's 
statement: “I have no confidence in justice, even if this justice is carried out by Dada,” Dada and 
Existentialism, p. 109.
175 Harding, p. 39.
176 In Elizabeth Benjamin’s book, the historical background is only briefly mentioned. The Dreyfus Affair 
is explained in a footnote, while she gives closer attention to the definition of the crime, and of the 
witnesses brought by Breton to the trial.
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procedure as distinctly portrayed by Felman177 suggest a need to contextualize the Barrès Trial 
both with and beyond the prism of previous Dada events. In the spirit of Dada, the Barrès Trial 
needs to be read with Dada and simultaneously against it; within an existing legal system and 
opposing it. Doing so brings to the forefront an early example of how artists engaged with the 
legal realm, while also rejecting it; how Dada appropriated the court system while also 
reinventing it. Dada not only “opposes the system of justice in its own right, as is particularly 
clear through its mock trial of Maurice Barrès,”178 but it also proposes alternatives constructed 
from within the legal system's own relics. This can only be achieved through a constant self-re-
examination. The Dada trial – a constant questioning of Dada and of justice – is an experiment 
proving that all judicial systems must operate from a place of inner examination and critical self-
awareness. Justice is not abandoned by Dada; much to the contrary. Accusing Barrès in what can 
be perceived by some as “a fictional crime,”179 Dada requests a re-articulation, a re-naming, of 
what crime is, and what injustice is. This is why I argue that we need to walk a fine line in which 
the Dada trial is not simply an “absurd spectacle,”180 but an attempt to conquer dualities, 
differences, variations, irrationalities, and contradictions, and to place them in a newly reinvented
legal system, in an old/new frame of a trial.  The mock element of the trial does not overshadow 
or precede other elements such as reality or justice; the flaws exposed during the trial are those of
Dada just as they are of Barrès and of the judicial system, all at once, which makes the trial as 
much anti-Dada as it is Dada. Through Barrès being the hero and anti-hero, being a mock version
of an earnest politician, being able to incorporate in one body both left- and right-leaning 
177 Felman, The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century.
178 Elizabeth Benjamin, Dada and Existentialism, p. 89.
179 Ibid., p. 100.
180 Ibid., p. 103.
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ideologies and politics, the trial reflects upon the flaws as well as the strengths of both Dada and 
the legal system.
2.6. The First Congress of The Jewish Renaissance Movement in Poland (JRMiP) – 
Between Congress and a Trial
Shoshana Felman draws correlations between the Eichmann trial on one side, and the O.J. 
Simpson trial on the other. Elizabeth Benjamin links the trial of Albert Camus's Meursault in the 
novel The Stranger to the Barrès trial. In the following, I shall make an attempt to broaden this 
line of research by introducing an investigation between a trial on the one hand, and a non-trial 
on the other hand. By this, I am also taking a leap in time to 2012 to Yael Bartana’s first Congress
of the Jewish Renaissance Movement in Poland (JRMiP).181 Firstly, I should state that in 
Bartana’s Congress one cannot speak of a direct visual interest in exploring the courtroom as a 
space for investigation as was the case in the Barrès trial. Nevertheless, although Bartana does 
not specify that the Congress function as a trial or a tribunal or a courtroom for that matter, I will 
demonstrate how she has engaged in a discourse of rights regarding Israel/Poland/the EU through
speech, parody, and public participation exercised prior to and during the event. Also, and just as 
importantly, through exposing alternative views of being Jewish, she was able to construct a 
three-dimensional constellation of justice in line with Nancy Fraser's theory as illuminated in 
Chapter One. I will demonstrate how in a globalized world in which the Congress is situated, 
Bartana tackles socioeconomic claims for redistribution, and for legal and cultural recognition. 
Furthermore, in the post-Keynesian-Westphalian, post-Cold War world, to use Nancy Fraser’s 
terminology, Bartana includes the struggle for representation – the political dimension of justice. 
181 Bartana's Congress was published as the first Congress of the JRMiP, however, as to this day no other 
JRMiP Congress has followed. 
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“No claim for justice can avoid presupposing some notion of representation, implicit or explicit 
[...]. The political dimension is implicit in, indeed required by, the grammar of the concept of 
justice. Thus, no redistribution or recognition without representation. In general, then, an 
adequate theory of justice for our time must be three-dimensional [...]. Incorporating the 
economic, cultural, and political dimensions, it must enable us to identify injustices of 
misframing and evaluate possible remedies.”182 I will claim that this was made possible through 
the mostly implicit linking of the legal with art through judicial-visual activism, creating a 
Congress in which claims for recognition, redistribution, and representation make up the core 
elements of a call for justice.  
Furthermore, at first glance, the first Congress of the “Jewish Renaissance Movement in Poland 
(JRMiP)” organized by Bartana in Berlin in 2012 has seemingly little to do with the mock trial 
organized by Breton in Paris. Dealing for the most part with the history of the Zionist movement, 
Bartana had clearly titled the three-day event, which was part of the Berlin Biennale and held at 
the Hebbel am Ufer theatre, as a “Congress” in direct reference to the first Zionist Congress, held 
in Basel, Switzerland in 1897.183 Bartana’s project, which began in 2007 with a video titled Mary 
Koszmary184 (Nightmares), culminated by the time of the JRMiP Congress in Berlin in a full-
182 Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 21. 
183 “The Congress, in which 197 delegates participate, accepts the Basel Program: Zionism strives to create
for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law […] Herzl writes in his diary: ‘At Basel I 
founded the Jewish State. If I said this out loud today I would be greeted by universal laughter. In five 
years perhaps, and certainly in fifty years, everyone will perceive it.’” From The Zionist Archives - 
http://www.zionistarchives.org.il/en/datelist/Pages/Congress1.aspx. 
184 Mary Koszmary was the first part in what is known as the The Polish Trilogy, or also as And Europe 
Will Be Stunned project, dealing “with the Jewish Renaissance Movement in Poland, demanding the return
of 3,300,000 Jews to Poland. The films Mary Koszmary (Nightmares, 2007), Mur I Wieza (Wall and 
Tower, 2009), and Zamach (Assassination, 2011) were chosen to represent Poland at the 54th Venice 
Biennale. From the Tel-Aviv Museum of Art website, accessed August 9, 2017, 
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fledged movement consisting of international registered members holding membership cards, a 
flag, an identifiable symbol, a declared manifesto, etc. Maintaining all along the way a blurred 
distinction between “real” and “fictional,”185 Bartana was able to position the movement on the 
border between being a political engagement and being a fictional artistic project. The Congress, 
organized as a roundtable space bearing the symbol of the movement at its center, revolved 
around engaging with three main issues that were formalized as questions: “How should the EU 
change in order to welcome the Other?”, “How should Poland change within a re-imagined 
EU?”, and “How should Israel change to become part of the Middle East?”186 Making an open 
call to the general public to join as delegates during the gathering of the Congress, it was declared
on the Congress’ website prior to its opening that it seeks to “collectively imagine a new future 
and to formulate the concrete platform and demands of the movement.”187 
The Congress embarked on a public reading of a letter written by the late leader of the 
Movement, Sławomir Sierakowski.188 The letter, it was announced, was found after Sierakowski’s
http://www.tamuseum.org.il/about-the-exhibition/yael-bartana.
185 The consistent debate of whether the Polish Trilogy and Congress are real or unreal is evident in 
numerous articles all pointing to this space of contradiction emphasized by Bartana. See, for example,  
Robin Cembalest, “Let My People Go—Back to Poland,” ARTNEWS 18 (April 2013), and Laura 
Cumming, “Yael Bartana: And Europe Will Be Stunned; Elizabeth Price: Here – review,” The Guardian, 
May 13, 2012, accessed August 9, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2012/may/13/art-
exhibition.
186 “Congress in Berlin,” accessed June 29, 2019, http://www.jrmip.org/.
187 Ibid.
188 Sierakowski, who plays the protagonist in Bartana’s Polish Trilogy, is himself a Polish scholar and 
political activist and founder of the Krytyka Polityczna movement in Poland. In the first video, he delivers
a speech calling for 3.3 million Jews to return to Poland. In the second video, Mur I Wieza, Sierakowski is 
already presented as a leader with followers erecting a wall and tower or Kibbutz in Warsaw, while the 
third video opens with Sierakowski’s funeral as a mass movement of people gathering from all over the 
world to attend his almost official state funeral. 
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assassination depicted in the third video of Bartana’s Polish Trilogy, titled Zamach 
(Assassination). In this fictitious letter, Sierakowski calls for radical social change to be achieved 
by following the five proposals he designates at the end of his letter. Here already, I wish to stress
how all of Sierakowski’s proposals are clearly concerned with legal matters and with justice, as 
they advocate for the urgent need for a legal amendment of Polish, Israeli, and European laws and
constitutions: “1. Polish citizenship to all immigrants! 2. Reintegration tax to cover the costs of 
moving 3.3 million Jews to Poland! 3. Hebrew as the second official language in Poland! 4. 
Dismissal notice of the Polish state concerning the concordat with the Vatican state—each 
religious institution should act on the same level! 5. Minorities House instead of Senate in Polish 
Parliament!”189 In other words, the letter calls for representation (paragraph 1 and 5), for 
recognition (paragraph 3 and 4), and for redistribution (paragraph 2), and as such, Bartana's 
Congress can be read as a tribunal concerned with achieving justice. Identifying the artistic 
claims as legal, hence, has the capacity to turn the space of art into a political manifestation. 
 I wish to argue that an early legal foundation for the Congress can be found in the movement's 
Manifesto.190 As the Congress and the JRMiP follow the Zionist movement all the way to the 
establishment of the State of Israel, one is able to draw similarities between the movement’s 
Manifesto, and the Israeli Declaration of Independence of May 1948. Declaring a Jewish State in 
Mandatory Palestine, the legal status of the Declaration was not immediately recognized by the 
courts. Due to its declarative tone and character, an early Israeli court ruling from 1948 found that
the document was an expression of the “spirit of the people,” but was not legally binding.191 
189 “Congress in Berlin.”
190 For the JRMiP Manifesto, accessed June 29, 2019, http://www.jrmip.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/Manifesto-Text2.jpeg.
191 H.C. 10/48 Ziv v. Acting Commissioner for Tel Aviv Urban Area, 1 P.D. 85. 
83
Nevertheless, in the following years, gradually the Israeli Supreme Court ratified the declaration, 
and in 1994 affirmed it as part of the Basic Laws of Israel.192 The shared characteristics of a 
declaration and a manifesto with that of a constitution allow them “to be primary devices with 
which to construct new political communities.”193 Certainly, the JRMiP Manifesto can be read as 
one powerful and lengthy declarative demand encapsulated in its opening sentence: “We Want to 
Return!” Taking its tone and direction from the Israeli declaration, both are an attempt to 
reinforce the right of return. Whether to Poland or to Israel, both documents’ main theme and 
purpose is to declare and root a Jewish right of return based on historical, spiritual, or religious 
grounds. This is reflected also stylistically, as both use a legal declarative format by opening most
paragraphs with “We Declare,” “We Appeal,” or “We Extend” (in the Israeli declaration), and 
“We wish,” “We welcome,” or “We direct” (in the Manifesto). All ten paragraphs of the 
Manifesto begin with the word “We,” thus showing to have more in common with the 
declarations of independence of states,194 rather than, for instance, with the Dada Manifesto by 
Hugo Ball (1916).195 Based on this premise, along with the letter by the movement’s founding 
father, the delegates proposed, outlined, and voted on the future JRMiP agenda during the three-
day event, oftentimes through raising the issue of legal demands. The practicality of the execution
192 HCJ 726/94 Clal Insurance Company Ltd v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 48(5) 441. For a discussion on the shift 
from having no constitutional statute to being recognized by international law, one can turn to the US Declaration of 
Independence. See among others: David Armitage, “The Declaration of Independence and International Law,” The 
William and Mary Quarterly 59:1 (Jan. 2002): 39-64.
193 Stacy Douglas, “Constitutions Are Not Enough: Museums as Law's Counter-Archive,” in Law, Memory
,Violence: Uncovering the Counter-Archive, eds. Stewart Mortha and Honni van Rijswijk (London: 
Routledge, 2016), p. 141. I will return to Douglas' essay in Chapter Five.
194 United States Declaration of Independence, accessed June 29, 2019, 
https://archive.org/stream/unitedstatesdecl00001gut/when12.txt.
195 Hugo Ball, Dada Manifesto, July 14, 1916, accessed June 29, 2019, 
http://www.391.org/manifestos/1916-dada-manifesto-hugo-ball.html#.WHRIslw5MRY.
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of those legal proposals did not seem to concern Bartana or the delegates summoned to the 
Congress, just as the invitation set by Breton for a trial of Maurice Barrès was made regardless of
whether an official legal framework actually existed or not. In both cases, participants were 
engaged in and with legal formats and themes, while simultaneously creating the premises for 
legal declarations and interventions.
Marrying an unclear dichotomy between life and art, reality and fiction, both the Congress and 
the Barrès trial could be perceived as “a dissolution that also led to the interpenetration of 
aesthetics and politics,”196 as argued by Demos in relation to the Dada trial. Held ninety-one years
apart on the very same day (the Barrès trial on the 13th of May, while the Congress closed on the 
13th of May), the two events have more in common than meets the eye, not only in what they 
leave open, blurred, or unraveled, but also in their goals and aspirations. Taking into account the 
obvious obligatory differences, and of the clear, estranged gap existing between two events taking
place in different centuries, surroundings, and contexts, I argue and shed light on their intriguing 
commonalities (without overlooking their differences), and by doing so, offer a new examination 
of the past and current artistic fascination and engagement with legal spaces. A first step in the 
route to establishing similarities shared by the two projects can be traced to their original 
motivation. For Breton, the writer Maurice Barrès was “one of the heroes of his adolescence”197 
who betrayed their shared beliefs and goals. Barrès’ political activism shifted from an early 
support in “anarchism, freedom and total individualism,” to an active involvement in right-wing 
politics, especially following the Dreyfus Affair, as he “changed his colours and turned right-
196 Demos, “Dada’s Event,” p. 138.
197 Wayne Andrews, The Surrealist Parade (New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation, 1990), p. 
38.
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wing, nationalist and bourgeois.”198 Bartana, on the other hand, has been described as acting as if 
she was a betrayed lover of Zionism.199 Pointing a blaming critical finger towards Israel’s current 
state of affairs, Bartana’s post-Zionist200 approach in her films cannot be ignored. Appropriating 
Zionist ideals and propaganda in “a kind of reverse Zionism,”201 Bartana described herself as 
coming from a “very Zionist”202 family. She has created her films, such as the Polish Trilogy, in a 
way that can be perceived as anti-Zionist; however, she states that one should “be very careful 
about using the term anti-Zionist; maybe anti-Israel is a better way to say it.”203 Hence, both the 
Dada trial and the Congress are motivated by their creators’ wish to tackle the fallout of 
ideologies and the consequent reactionary developments, and to demand justice from those they 
once perceived as open, liberal, and progressive. Determined to examine, with the participation of
the general public, the change that occurred and the responsibility this entails, both events can be 
described through the manner in which Breton explained the trial as a way “to determine the 
198 See Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 72. 
199 In an article published in Hebrew in the Ha’aretz newspaper on April 18, 2008, under the title “Leni 
Riefenstahl, just the other way around,” Bartana is described as holding a position towards Israel of a 
disappointed lover, and she is quoted saying she is not “an Israeli hater […] and I do things out of love for 
this country […] with all the criticism that I have this place remains my homeland.” (translated by the 
author).  
200 Post-Zionism emerged in the end of the 1980s mostly among Israeli academics and writers as a 
criticism directed towards the ideology of Zionism and its implications during the first decades of the 
State of Israel.
201 Roberta Smith, “Yael Bartana: And Europe Will Be Stunned,” New York Times, April 18, 2013, 
accessed June 29, 2019, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/arts/design/yael-bartana-and-europe-will-be-
stunned.html.
202 Adam Chandler, “Israeli Artist Yael Bartana in Denmark,” Tablet, August 24, 2012, accessed June 29, 
2019,  http://tabletmag.com/scroll/110143/israeli-artist-yael-bartana-in-denmark.
203  Tracy Zwick, “Return: An Interview with Yael Bartana”, Art in America, April 4, 2013, accessed July 
14, 2017, http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/previews/return-an-interview-with-yael-
bartana-/.
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extent to which a man could be held accountable if his will to power led him to champion 
conformist values that diametrically opposed the ideas of his youth.”204 From Breton to Bartana, 
the latter has throughout most of her artistic career been invested in regaining access to what is 
perceived to be the ideals of socialism in Israel, all the way back to universalist and humanist 
“phantasmagorical”205 values of Zionism. 
Moreover, the demands made by the delegates emerge from the past, but only in order to make 
clear claims for the future as enshrined in the movement's manifesto.206 While some have raised 
territorial demands for the “EU to expand until it includes China,” many of the demands are 
based around the three dimensions of justice (recognition, redistribution, and representation): 
“Polish citizenship to all immigrants; reintegration tax to cover the cost of moving 3.3 million 
Jews to Poland; the state of Poland should devote 15% of its annual budget to culture and arts 
[…].”207 The direction of the Congress, from the reading of the “last words” written by the 
movement’s late leader, to the demands made during the three-day event, can be defined by the 
same words used by art historian and critic Demos with regard to the Barrès trial: “It transferred 
the forms of aesthetic creativity into legal affairs, so that an intellectual's political developments 
and ensuing contradictions could be publicly debated and the offender held accountable within an
unconventional courtroom that was sui generis.”208  
204 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 72.
205 “We are revivifying the early Zionist phantasmagoria [...] We long to write new pages into a history that
never quite took the course we wanted.” JRMiP Manifesto, accessed August 8, 2017, 
http://www.jrmip.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Manifesto-Text2.jpeg.
206 “We reach back to the past [...] in order to shape a new future [...] The Kibbutz apples and watermelons 
are no longer as ripe.” JRMiP Manifesto.
207 Yael Bartana, Wenn Ihr wollt, ist es kein Traum (Vienna: Revolver Verlag, 2013).
208 Demos, “Dada’s Event,” p. 143. 
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The broad reading of the Congress through a legal prism is derived from the overarching 
dimensions of the Congress itself. As such, Bartana’s project should be understood as constituting
a strategy of imagination beyond the initial scope of the Congress. These overarching attributes 
have been strongly established in the movement’s ambitious manifesto, which calls for the 
inclusion of “all those for whom there is no place in their homelands – the expelled and the 
prosecuted. There will be no discrimination in our movement. We shall not ask about your life 
stories, check your residence cards or question your refugee status […].”209 And although these 
embracing arms may seem a mockery of the nation state or a parody on the current state of anti-
refugee acts and laws in Europe just as in Israel, I suggest applying a more complex view of 
Bartana’s project, in the manner I proposed with regard to the Barrès trial. The political stances 
taken by Bartana are fruitful exactly because she maintains an ambivalent position between the 
serious and mockery, between real life and art. Similarly to Dada, Bartana’s utilization of the 
Congress offers a rearrangement of existing legal and political formats, which opens possibilities 
for “reconfiguring art as a political issue, or asserting itself as true politics.”210 From the first 
video in the Polish Trilogy to the Congress, Bartana asserts her aim towards a reconfiguration of 
the space between art and life, the real and the imaginary. Releasing the JRMiP movement and its
first Congress from the immediate concerns of whether it is real or fictive opens a possibility of 
being neither true nor fictional. The perplexing thoughts and emotions evoked by Bartana’s 
videos and Congress confirm the objection of preconceived borders between a legal discourse 
and an artistic practice. 
209 JRMiP Manifesto.
210 Demos, “Dada’s Event,” p.  141.
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Long after the Dada trial claimed ownership of the format of the court by “joining aesthetic to 
ethical judgment and reinforcing it with (pretend) legal authority,”211 the JRMiP Congress 
continues to experiment with the artistic ability to transfer aesthetics into the legal realm and 
leading into a political sphere of action. Positioning the Congress as a space in which to discuss 
focal questions relating to the future of Europe and the Middle East has enabled it to become a 
platform for public debate, where legal and artistic alternatives are intertwined and imagined 
even when presumably being far-fetched and unconventional. I argue that Demos’ statement 
regarding the Dada trial is also valid for Bartana’s conduct, in which “the aesthetic regime 
introduces continuity between art and politics, such that aesthetics exceeds the realm of art by 
endowing the political world with visible forms.”212 Creating a platform, like in the Barrès trial, 
in which tensions go hand-in-hand productively, the Congress’ impact is gained through its 
fluctuating movement between aesthetics immersed with the legal, and the judicial with visual 
activism, evolving into a space for politics. 
2.7. The Dreyfus Affair and Bartana’s JRMiP Congress
Against this backdrop, I hereby attempt to further link the Barrès trial to the JRMiP Congress and
to the Dreyfus Affair. The latter is usually mentioned as part of the prerequisite historical 
background of the Zionist narrative, but until now it hasn’t held much ground in the analysis of 
the Congress by Bartana or of Bartana's Polish Trilogy.213 I find it intriguing and of much help to 
211 Ibid., p. 143.
212 Ibid.
213 On Yael Bartana's website, one finds a number of texts by distinguished scholars such as Juli Carson, 
Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, Jacqueline Rose, Joanna Mytkowska, and Boris Groys, all devoted to the 
Polish Trilogy. I found that only Juli Carson's text (translated also into German) mentions the Dreyfus 
trial. She does so only in relation to the effect the trial famously had on Theodor Herzl. I will also note 
this; however, my argument is the first to expand on the effect the Dreyfus trial holds in relation to 
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return to the Dreyfus Affair by further exploring it, as I did previously in relation to Dada. 
Mentioning Proust and Barrès earlier as two prominent figures for which the Dreyfus trial was a 
determinant turning point, I wish to include in this list a young journalist by the name of Theodor 
Herzl, for whom the Dreyfus trial left an equally indelible mark. Reporting from Paris on the 
Dreyfus Trial for the Austrian newspaper Neue Freie Presse, Herzl is better known as the 
founding father of Zionism. What began as an observational report on the trial of Dreyfus 
gradually led Herzl to organize the first Zionist Congress in Basel in the following years, which, 
as mentioned above, provides the basis for Bartana’s Congress. Moreover, I shall argue that, from
a contemporary standpoint, the Dreyfus Affair’s influence should be further emphasized when 
dealing with Bartana’s Congress. Just as the Dreyfus Affair had a tremendous long-lasting effect 
in France, it also holds a profound, ongoing legacy and relevance in contemporary Israel, as 
demonstrated by Jacqueline Rose. She eloquently describes the involvement of Proust in the 
Dreyfus Affair and the impact his writing has had on French and European culture. However, she 
does not halt there, as her journey from Dreyfus, Proust, and Freud leads her to Israel and to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, “from the heart of Europe at the turn of the twentieth century to the 
Middle East, where the legacy of Dreyfus is still being played out to this day.”214 Later in her 
book, Rose further states that, “There is a line, we are often told, that runs from the Dreyfus 
Affair to the creation of Israel as a nation.”215 This can already be found in Hannah Arendt’s The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, in which she states that the immediate effect of the Dreyfus Affair 
“was that it gave birth to the Zionist movement.”216 Therefore, since Bartana's work from early in 
Bartana's work. 
214 Jacqueline Rose, Proust Among the Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), p. 10.
215 Ibid., p. 60.
216 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: A Harvest Book, 1979), p. 120.
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her career, and certainly in the Polish Trilogy and Congress, revolves a great deal around the 
history of the establishment of the State of Israel, I argue that one needs to pay close attention to 
the Dreyfus Affair and its undeniable impact. 
The Congress created by Bartana does not give in to the notion that with the establishment of the 
Zionist movement by Herzl following the Dreyfus Trial, the idea of Jewish emancipation came to
an end. There is a sense of truth in drawing a line from the Dreyfus Trial to the establishment of a
Jewish state in Israel; however, as Rose also states, this is not the only valid narrative. Instead, 
she claims we should “take from Dreyfus a warning—against an over-fervent nationalism, 
against infallible armies raised to the level of theocratic principle, against an ethnic exclusivity 
that blinds a people to the other peoples of the world, and against governments that try to cover 
up their own crimes.”217 Following my short introduction to Herzl, it is now worthwhile to bring 
yet another figure into the discussion – that of Bernard Lazare. Lazare’s unique personality and 
philosophy sheds a new light on the variety of impacts the Dreyfus Affair had among Jewish and 
Zionist scholars and activists. The two distinguished voices of these personalities have already 
been examined by Hannah Arendt in a number of publications. In the comparison that Arendt 
draws between the two who “had witnessed the Dreyfus trial, and both were profoundly 
transformed by the experience,”218 she writes that they “were turned into Jews by anti-Semitism 
[…] For them their Jewish origin had a political and national significance,”219 yet it came to be 
that “Herzl’s views dominated twentieth-century Zionism whereas Lazare had become a pariah 
217 Ibid., p. 61.
218 Richard J. Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), 
p. 46.
219 Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), p. 338.
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among his own people, dying in poverty and obscurity.”220 It is a historical fact that the first 
Zionist Congress was initiated and presided by Herzl, but I argue that it is more the voice of 
Lazare that Bartana has been channeling in hers.221 Although Lazare was not mentioned in the 
Polish Trilogy, the Congress, or in writings about Bartana's work, with Lazare we can better 
comprehend how Bartana deconstructs the Zionist Congress. It is with Lazare, I will show, that a 
clear quest for justice can be constructed and realized throughout the Congress of Bartana's 
initiated Jewish Renaissance Movement in Poland. 
2.8. On Being Jewish and On Justice
As speculative and baffling as the JRMiP Congress might seem to be in its intersection of truth 
and fiction, of legal matters and imagination, Bartana’s artistic maneuver is based on creating and
facilitating a frame in which differing or even negating powers and ideologies can form an 
encounter.222 In the most immediate way, one can say that Bartana appropriates Herzl’s first 
Zionist Congress in order to bring divergent views into it.223 One example of this is the turning of 
the Congress to an all-inclusive event dealing with universal and global issues to which not only 
220 Richard J. Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, pp. 46-7.
221 In this sense, Yael Bartana can be said to be following the early writings of Hannah Arendt. Adi Armon 
argues that the influence of Bernard Lazare, whose name first appears in the Arendt essay “From The 
Dreyfus Affair to France Today” in 1942, can be traced in Arendt's “biography on Varnhagen, in her 
articles on Zionism in the 1940's, and in The Origins of Totalitarianism” linking all these writings 
together. Armon ends his essay with the claim that, “Hannah Arendt is the adoptive daughter of Bernard 
Lazare.” Adi Armon, “The Origins of the Origins: Antisemitism, Arendt, and the influence of Bernard 
Lazare,” Tabur 7 (2016): 66, 75. (In Hebrew, translated by the author). 
http://tabur.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/tabur/files/armon7tabur.pdf.
222 More on the event of the encounter in Chapters Four and Five of this book. 
223 Here again, one notices a similar artistic act shared both by Bartana and Dada. Bartana begins from the 
Zionist Congress in order to exhaust it and to pour into it newly imagined content, just as Dada did with 
the format of the court, or the French tribunal.
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Jews were invited. Titled the Jewish Renaissance Movement in Poland, by the time the Congress 
took place, it was clearly stated that the movement was open to all nationalities and religions, just
as to all refugees and to stateless people. This ambivalence, on one side the movement keeping 
the “Jewish” in its title, while on the other side defining and providing a framework open to all,224
is crucial to the understanding of the aim of justice called upon by the Congress. I will argue that 
the perception of the Congress by Bartana as a space demanding legal justice offers us a path to 
understanding part of the ambiguity of the Congress, which lies precisely in the tension between 
Jewish and non-Jewish; between being inclusive to being exclusive. In order to achieve this, I 
shall further link, as promised earlier above, the Congress to the Dreyfus Affair, and more 
precisely to Bernard Lazare. 
In her writings, Hannah Arendt considers Lazare the epitome of a “conscious pariah”225 alongside
other notable figures such as Heinrich Heine, Rahel Varnhagen, and Franz Kafka. According to 
Arendt, it was Lazare who translated the position of the pariah into a political discourse: “Living 
in the France of the Dreyfus affair, Lazare could appreciate at first hand the pariah quality of 
Jewish existence.”226 Furthermore, Arendt argued that Lazare was aware that a solution to Jewish 
persecution could not be dealt with in isolation, as Herzl advocated, but through building 
alliances with other minorities and prosecuted people: “The emancipated Jew must awake to an 
awareness of his position and, conscious of it, become a rebel against it—the champion of an 
oppressed people.” In doing so, and by entering the space of politics, “Lazare’s idea was, 
224 From the JRMiP Manifesto: “We direct our appeal not only to the Jews. We accept into our ranks all 
those for whom there is no place in their homelands – the expelled and the persecuted. There will be no 
discrimination in our movement.”
225 Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings, p. 274.
226 Ibid., p. 283.
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therefore, that the Jew should come out openly as the representative of the pariah […] He wanted 
him to stop seeking release in an attitude of superior indifference or in lofty and rarefied 
cogitation about the nature of man per se.”227 Another important essay by Arendt to be mentioned 
in the context of Bartana’s Congress is titled “Herzl and Lazare.” In describing the different 
positions that each of the two prominent figures took following the Dreyfus trial, Arendt stresses 
that when hearing the mob crying “Death to the Jews!”, Lazare “realized at once that from now 
on he was an outcast and accepted the challenge.”228 In contrast to Herzl, for whom the event 
prompted him to write his book The Jewish State, where he argues for the need for a particular 
state dedicated only to the Jewish nation, Lazare directed his efforts in a more universal direction 
“as a conscious Jew, fighting for justice in general but for the Jewish people in particular.”229 
Herzl planned an “escape or deliverance in a homeland,” while for Lazare “the territorial question
was secondary.”230 Unlike Herzl, whose interpretation of the Dreyfus trial has been in seeing anti-
Semitism as a deeply rooted, not-to-be-solved problem, Lazare sought to find in France and in the
rest of Europe “real comrades-in-arms, whom he hoped to find among all the oppressed groups of
contemporary Europe.”231 
Almost completely ignored by France’s Jewry and failing to reach out to others in Europe, Lazare
was unable to embark on his mission to find allies among the weak and the persecuted. Yet, 
Lazare’s aspirations eagerly inhabit, more than a century later, Bartana’s project and its 
227 Ibid., p. 284.
228 Ibid., p. 338.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid., p. 339.
231 Ibid., page 339-340.
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accompanying manifesto as it proudly declares, “We shall be strong in our weakness.”232 
Moreover, "We Shall be Strong in Our Weakness. Notes from the First Congress of the Jewish 
Renaissance Movement in Poland"233 was also the name of a performance directed by Bartana in 
May 2010 at the Hebbel am Ufer, the same theatre that would host her Congress two years later. 
This performance, for which I served as assistant director and contributing writer, was a sort of 
preview of the Congress. From its title to the speech given by actress Susanne Sachsse, it evokes 
similarities both in vocabulary and actions to be traced in the thinking of Lazare. The solo 
performance was an early call by Bartana for a Jewish Renaissance in Europe. Much in the spirit 
of Lazare, it was a call not to the Jewish community but to all “Fellow Europeans!” to join forces 
as comrades. On an empty stage, dressed in a black suit and wearing a white shirt, Sachsse's 
performance was in the format of a public “larger than life” speech accompanied by vibrant 
pulsing music. Her image was projected onto the background of the stage along with the emblem 
of the JRMiP movement dominated by a lighting design of black, red, and white colors. Holding 
white paper on which the symbol of the movement was also printed, Sachsse can be perceived as 
conjuring234 the words of Lazare: “In the name of JRMiP, I call upon all those of you who are free
in spirit and of independent mind to join us...to achieve a mutual goal – A true Jewish 
232 JRMiP Manifesto.
233 For more information about the performance that opened the Polski Express Festival, please see “Polski
Express III – Programme,” Goethe-Institut website, accessed August 8, 2017, 
http://www.goethe.de/ins/pl/lp/prj/cit/the/tpe/pep/enindex.htm.
234 Volker Pantenburg denotes the development in the work of Bartana from her video Summer Camp 
(2007) to the Polish Trilogy as a move from documentation to conjuration. Volker Pantenburg, 
“Loudspeaker and Flag: Yael Bartana, from Documentation to Conjuration,” Afterall: A Journal of Art, 
Context and Enquiry 30 (Summer 2012). accessed June 29, 2019, 
http://www.afterall.org/journal/issue.30/loudspeaker-and-flag-yael-bartana-from-documentation-to-
conjuration
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Renaissance. We need you from all different backgrounds, religions and faiths, to help us evolve 
from the shadows of the past into a concrete new chapter of the future.”235
In the case of Lazare, not only did he fail to succeed in forming an alliance among Jews and 
Christians in Europe during his time, he has also been cast into an ultimate oblivion. At the final 
footnote of Arendt’s article on Herzl and Lazare, she mentions the contribution of the French 
writer, poet, and Dreyfusard Charles Péguy, who wrote a memoir titled Le portrait de Bernard 
Lazare, which saved Lazare’s memory from fading away with no return. Interestingly enough, 
Lazare’s writings and ideas are gaining new recognition and new followers. Jacqueline Rose, for 
instance, describes Lazare as “a key player and for me a hero of this drama.”236 Although not 
focusing her investigation on Lazare, Rose identifies him as “the first public defender of 
Dreyfus.”237 Rose’s reading of the Dreyfus Affair through his contemporaries, such as Freud and 
Proust, offers an insight into the way the Dreyfus Affair was crucial to the intellectual 
development of European writers and scholars at that time, and all the way to our days. More 
importantly, Lazare is acknowledged by Rose as a remarkably prophetic political thinker who had
the capacity to envision in a different way the significance of the anti-Semitism erupting in 
France during and following the Dreyfus Affair to the one offered by Herzl. Born to a Jewish 
family in the southern part of France, Lazare’s upbringing and education did not have much to do
with forming a Jewish identity.238 As observed by Arendt, Lazare was forced to be confronted 
with being Jewish during the Dreyfus trial in the same manner as Herzl. The hatred showed by 
235 A Cookbook for Political Imagination, Sebastian Cichocki and Galit Eilat, eds. (Warsaw and Berlin: 
Zachęta National Gallery of Art and Sternberg Press, 2011), pp. 133-136.
236 Jacqueline Rose, Proust Among the Nations, p. 10.
237 Ibid., p. 57.
238 Ibid., p. 58.
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the masses to Jews sent him down this path; however, for him it meant that “I am a Jew and I 
know nothing about the Jews.”239 According to Rose, “For Lazare, therefore, being a Jew did not 
mean an exclusive ethnic identity. It was more like a project, an identity to be discovered and 
forged against hatred, as well as a form of continuous self-education.”240 Since Lazare understood
himself to be a Jew without religious conviction, the question that remained open to probing was
—how and what can be the content of his non-religious faith? His answer, as quoted by Rose, 
was, “I belong to the race of those […] who were first to introduce the idea of justice into the 
world. [...] All of them, each and every one, my ancestors, my brothers, wanted, fanatically, that 
right should be done to one and all, and that injustice should never tip unfairly the scales of the 
law.”241 In the words of Léon Blum introduced by Rose at the opening of her book, “Just as 
science is the religion of the positivists, justice is the religion of the Jew.”242 From this idea of 
understanding being Jewish as justice, the parallel I draw to Bartana’s project becomes evident. 
Defending her position as not anti-Zionist, Bartana quite similarly to Lazare, who was a Zionist 
and worked at the beginning alongside Herzl, sets to bring into a Zionist platform—the Congress
—voices long forgotten, such as that of Lazare. Through a contemporary investigation, Bartana 
invites us to imagine the Zionist movement anew. And she does this very much in accordance 
with Lazare, as it is safe to say that each of them embarked on a quest to uncover and bestow new
content and relevant meaning on what it is to be Jewish just as much as on what it is to seek and 
perform justice.
239 Ibid.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid., p. 59.
242 Ibid., p. 21.
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Chapter Three: New World Summit – Terror, Gender, and an (Old) New Right of 
Intervention 
3.1. Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to a closer observation of the work of artist Jonas Staal, and in 
particular the New World Summit he established in 2012. As I began to discuss in Chapter One, 
The New World Summit (NWS) embarked in 2012 as part of the 7th Berlin Biennale. An ongoing
work of Staal’s, it has to this date converged eight times in various locations from Leiden (the 
Netherlands) to Kochi (India). Proclaimed from its early foundation as an organization identified 
as being both artistic and political, it is concerned with the creation of alternative spaces for other
organizations “excluded from democracy.”243 
According to Staal and the NWS, these organizations are facing a state of “democratism” in 
which Western hegemony is expanding its rule and influence in the name of democracy.244 “The 
War Against Terror” is one recent and critical manner of “democratism” that the NWS seeks to 
confront through artistic imagination, speech, and action. One aspect of this war, which the NWS 
has been studying closely since the first summit, is the “designated lists of terrorist 
organizations.”245 Mostly represented by lawyers, or figures previously de-listed from being 
243 New World Summit - About, accessed June 29, 2019, http://newworldsummit.org/about/.
244 As Judith Butler states: “We can note from the start that the struggle over ‘democracy’ as a term 
actively characterizes several political situations. How we name that struggle seems to matter very much, 
given that sometimes a movement is deemed antidemocratic, even terrorist, and on other occasions or in 
other contexts, the same movement is understood as a popular effort to realize a more inclusive and 
substantive democracy.” See: Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), p. 2.
245 Perhaps best known are the lists published by the Bureau of Counterterrorism in the US Department of 
State, but other countries from the UK to Israel list and de-list foreign organizations according to local 
legislation. 
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considered part of a terror organization, the Berlin summit’s first day, titled “Reflections on the 
Closed Society,” was dedicated to giving a voice and to listening to the various groups’ 
representatives. These reflections strongly signaled the aim of the summit to alter and reconstruct 
the common public image of terror and of terrorists in a manner fitting what has been established 
in this publication thus far as visual activism. 
As I will continue to demonstrate, Staal and the NWS visual activism began with the act of 
listening, continues with creating a new image of terror, and ends in the creation of a permanent 
active space as part of the Rojava revolution in the north of Syria. In analyzing and reflecting on 
the work of Staal and the NWS, I shall be following a similar methodology to the one I used with 
regard to the work of Yael Bartana in Chapter Two. My interest and motivation lie in a 
determination to expose legal aspects that are usually hidden, neglected, or underrepresented. 
This is in light of the dominant discourse in the art world in recent years, which has been 
narrowed to dedicating and devoting resources and much attention to whether art is political, or 
to the conditions that make art political. While I surely agree that these are all pivotal questions, 
and my research is indebted to the knowledge and expertise cultivated from this particular 
discourse, my direction is focused towards the law and justice, as I seek to discover and shed 
light on legal perceptions we tend to overlook. Their meaningful existence and profound potential
and relevance to both politics and art will be demonstrated in this chapter mainly through the 
legal and gender-based reading of Catharine A. MacKinnon. Her original and insightful writing, 
along that of Susan Sontag, captures an essential component of women’s rights after and in 
relation to the events of September 11, 2001, crucial in my view to establishing a critical 
discussion on terrorism, gender, the nation-state, art, and law in our times. The chapter will 
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conclude with the third step in my proposed methodology, in which the Right of Intervention is 
proclaimed through judicial-visual activism.
3.2. Inside the New World Summit – Aesthetics and the Law
As mentioned above, the first New World Summit (NWS) took place in Berlin in 2012 as part of 
the 7th Berlin Biennale. From its early stages, the NWS advocated an interest in constructing a 
new concept and relation towards terrorism in Western democracies. Signs of the Summit's visual
activism began already in the entrance leading to the hall in which the Summit’s two-day 
assembly unfolded. Just as in the case of the AOI discussed in the first chapter, one can trace here
the visual and political language of Jonas Staal, aiming to immerse the general public in an 
environment embodying a clear sense of visual activism. This was manifested right from the start
in the reversing of roles and in shifting the perception of members of the public, who upon 
entering the Sophiensaele Theater were asked to show identification cards. The preliminary 
knowledge of the public – that inside the hall terrorist representatives were assembled – turned 
this small, and almost mundane, gesture of identification into an event demonstrating the 
transparency of power relations and of acts of control asserted under the rule of law. The mere 
request to present an ID card at a theater in Germany is a rare enough matter to have raised some 
eyebrows. Moreover, and in a very subtle manner, perhaps even unintentionally, it marked the 
audience as a possible threat and blurred the line between them and those listed as terrorists. The 
request to present an ID card, with which European citizens are able to exercise the basic human 
right of free movement within the EU, was a reminder of how easily it is revoked and denied to 
others by the same regimes.246 The space inside continued this play between friend and enemy, 
246 The freedom of movement is recognized by nation-states' constitutions and international law as a basic 
human right. It is a right that needs constant support, as “Both performance studies and disability studies 
have offered the crucial insight that all action requires support and that even the most punctual and 
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familiar and unknown, by means of visualization and the architectural plan of the space. Entering 
the space to take a seat, the audience needed to pass through a round curtain structure circling an 
inner arena. The double-faced construction, which brought to mind the movement of a 
weathervane, stood as if a filter between what remained outside the hall, in the shadows, and 
what waited inside, exposed under the light of the theater. Using the colorful flags of the varied 
terror organizations as a buffer zone, it turned what could be perceived as the unsettling content 
of the flags into a sort of a protective shield. It isolated the audience from the world outside, 
while at the same time provided a secure space for the voices of the representatives of 
organizations listed as terror groups to be heard. In this way, the flags of the organizations, 
usually associated as a threat to Western democracies, were acting as harmless symbols of 
representation, while they were at the same time defining and creating the structure in which to 
assemble. 
As I learned later in a conversation I had with Staal, the reason for creating this sort of partition 
made of flags of the organizations listed as terrorist organizations had more than an aesthetic 
double-meaning declarative impact. Staal informed me that the idea of a summit hosting and 
giving a space and voice to so-called terror organizations put the Biennale at financial risk and 
possible cancellation. Being supported by the German Federal Cultural Foundation 
(Kulturstiftung des Bundes), the Summit seemed to have posed a legal problem for the Biennale 
organization. As a foundation established by the German federal government, the endorsement of 
the NWS as part of the Berlin Biennale propelled a legal challenge. This was due to the fact that, 
seemingly  spontaneous  act  implicitly  depends  on  an  infrastructural  condition  that  quite  literally  
supports  the  acting  body.  This  idea  of  ‘support’  is  quite important not only for the retheorization of 
the acting body, but for the  broader politics of mobility,” argues Judith Butler in “Rethinking 
Vulnerability and Resistance,” in Vulnerability in Resistance, Judith Butler, Zeynep Gambetti, and Leticia 
Sabsay, eds. (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2016), p. 19.
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according to German law, it is forbidden to fund or support an organization listed as a terror 
group.247 It turned out to be that the crossbreeding of visual activism and terror organizations 
accumulated into an action of standing up against the existing political and aesthetic order via the
field of art. In other words, the NWS created an artistic action that was political exactly because 
of its intervention “in the general distribution of ways of doing and making as well as in the 
relationships they maintain to modes of being and forms of visibility,” as argued by Jacques 
Rancière.248 Or, in other words and in following the concept of judicial-visual activism, Staal's 
NWS catalyzes an active resistance to the existing legal and political order. 
The spiral structural arrangement of the flags must have been satisfactory, as the federal 
foundation did not withhold its support of the Biennale. Yet, the question of whether a change in 
design placated the foundation, or there were other conditions demanded or not, is secondary to 
the question of whether or not the mere idea of a summit, created by an artist for an art 
institution, could jeopardize the legality of the conduct of Germany's largest and most prestigious 
cultural foundation. Furthermore, even if the foundation had no or little knowledge of the summit
and its contents, one may ask from a legal perspective whether the Summit created an 
intervention, or a space of exception, in German and/or European law.  
3.3. From Berlin to Kochi – The Legality of the NWS Questioned, Again
In 2013, a year after the Summit in Berlin, the legality of the NWS was brought more explicitly 
and publicly into question in India. It was the third edition of the NWS, planned to take place by 
247 For general information on Germany's Anti-Terrorism legislation see: Jenny Gesley, “Global Legal 
Monitor,” Library of Congress, July 10, 2015, accessed August 11, 2017, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-
news/article/germany-new-anti-terrorism-legislation-entered-into-force/.
248 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).
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invitation of the Kochi-Muziris Biennale. With clear resemblance to the architectural design of 
the Summit in Berlin, the space constructed in Kochi was designed as an open-air triangle 
surrounded once again by flags. This time around, in order to further relate to the local space in 
which the Summit took place, half of the flags were of “banned organizations in India, the other 
half organizations from abroad, thus placing India’s policies of political exclusion in an 
international context in which occupation plays a central role.”249 Following the local and global 
intrinsic relations I noted in previous chapters, the now global action of the NWS facilitated a 
space for debate touching upon local Indian political matters. This action landed the Summit in 
controversy once again, situated on the blurry line between law and politics. The daily newspaper
Indian Express reported that a row was sparked due to Staal's plan to present Indian and 
international organizations banned as terrorist groups. The newspaper went on to indicate that the
police had been closely inspecting the space of the planned Summit with its colorful constructed 
pillars of flags representing the variety of international and local banned organizations. 
Interestingly enough, unlike the first Summit in Berlin, for which, to the best of my knowledge, 
the legality of its premise and conduct were never openly discussed, neither by Staal and the 
NWS, nor by the critics or the press, Kochi's Police Commissioner M R Ajith Kumar was quoted 
by the newspaper as confirming that the NWS installation was under full police and legal 
investigation. “We will take action if his [Staal's] installations are against the law [...] Appropriate
action will be taken if the event is illegal.”250 The complexity of existing relations between art and
politics was further revealed when the newspaper informed its readers of a number of high-
249 New World Summit,” accessed June 29, 2019, http://newworldsummit.org/locations/kochi/.
250 Shaju Philip, “Kochi Biennale: Dutch artist plans a summit of terror outfits, sparks row,” The Indian 
Express, Dec. 30, 2012, accessed June 29, 2019, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/kochi-biennale-
dutch-artist-plans-a-summit-of-terror-outfits-sparks-row/1051936/.
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ranking political figures, such as the Kerala Home Secretary and former Kerala Chief Secretary, 
who were serving as members of the Kochi's Biennale trust. In a true twist of irony, the 2012 
Kochi-Muziris Biennale curator's note commenced with a declaration that, “There couldn’t have 
been a better space than Kochi for symbolic free speech.”251 Yet, as indicated on the NWS 
website, local law enforcement had other plans in mind. According to the NWS, after a raid by 
the Kochi City Police, the flags in dispute were painted over by staff members of the Biennale 
itself, who also removed the wall text announcing the Summit. Furthermore, legal action was 
taken, as charges were brought against Staal and three other members of the NWS under the 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act Section 10 (4). “This is the very same act that is used to ban
the organizations that the New World Summit aimed to host.”252 In between the “Our summit is 
legal” statement by Staal, as quoted by the local newspaper, and the Kochi-Muziris Biennale's 
promise “to open a new discourse, one that will explore a new, hitherto unknown language of 
narration,” law enforcement had the upper hand. “Blurring the boundaries,” as called for by the 
curators, could not be achieved as long as the board of the Biennale consisted of “senior 
government advisors,” was the NWS's reaction to the experienced turmoil.
3.4. From Kochi to Rojava – Action, Debate, and Justice 
Up until this point, I have shown how the NWS ignited legal challenges and questions as part of 
what I consider to be its judicial-visual activism. As I have argued in previous chapters, the 
legality, or the legal issues, in the work of Staal – just as in the work of Bartana – seems on the 
surface to be rather a by-product to of the work itself. Nevertheless, it is my intention to continue 
highlighting these aspects, creating greater awareness of them in order to expose, mark, and 
251 “New World Summit – Kochi,” accessed June 29, 2019, http://kochimuzirisbiennale.org/concept/.
252 “New World Summit.”
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underline their legal importance, originality, and significance especially in the struggle for justice.
In doing so, I argue for a more intensified, nuanced, and layered perception of the practices and 
knowledge gained by artists. I further argue that judicial-visual activism is positioned and 
expressed in the realm of politics and law based on previously acquired artistic capabilities. Art, 
law, and justice are inherently intertwined, and any “attempt to redeem the social value of art 
repeats the false assumption that art, politics, and ethics are already external to each other.”253 
However, the task of identifying those spaces in which art actively intersects with law becomes 
more and more complex at a time when politics and law seem to be blending into one “fuzzy 
middle zone,”254 as the example discussed in the case of the Summit in Kochi suggests. Thus, my 
investigation is concerned with revealing sites and establishing paths in which art positions law 
away from being “a mere instrument of political power” on the one hand, or, on the other hand, 
of being a mere “ideological mask for the machination of politics.”255 The artistic relationship to 
law and legal matters will hopefully be further uncovered through dedicating the rest of this 
chapter to an even closer observation and analysis of yet another NWS summit. 
3.4.1. Impressions of the New World Summit – A Critical Reading
This particular summit, which took place at the autonomous region of Rojava in northern Syria 
on October 16 and 17, 2015,256 brings with it, I shall claim, yet another perspective on judicial-
253 Nikos Papastergiadis, Spatial Aesthetics, Art, Place, and the Everyday (Amsterdam: Institute of 
Network Cultures, 2010), p. 19. 
254 Matthew Stone, Illan rua Wall, Costas Douzinas, eds., New Critical Legal Thinking: Law and the 
Political (Abingdon: Birkbeck Law Press, 2014).
255 Ibid., p. 1.
256 A second summit in Rojava is being planned, but has yet to take place at the time of my writing. In the 
meantime, the NWS has been engaged in opening the Rojava Embassy in Oslo, Norway. The temporary 
Embassy was opened on November 26-27, 2016 at the Oslo City Hall. This is the second Embassy opened
by the NWS for representatives of “stateless” organizations following the opening of a temporary 
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visual activism situated on the borders of law and politics. Unlike previous summits that were 
mostly hosted and supported by local institutions, the one in Rojava marked a significant change 
in the practice of Staal and the NWS. In short, by utilizing temporary spaces for the assembly of 
representatives from a variety of worldwide organizations, it signaled a shift toward the 
establishment of a permanent space for a designated local community in the form of a public 
parliament constructed in the city of Derîk. But first, as I did not attend this summit (unlike the 
one in Berlin), I need to begin by giving a descriptive introduction to a video titled Impressions 
of the New World Summit – Rojava Part I257 (2015) sent to me by Staal following the summit. 
Following that, I will offer a few possible ways to approach and analyze the video and the 
summit with the support of two films by Jean-Luc Godard and his filmmaker collaborators. 
The video opens with a yellow slide, on which appears – next to the words “New World Summit”
and “Rojava” in Latin and Arabic lettering – the coat of arms of Rojava with its three stars in 
blue, red, and white along with the Rojava flag’s distinctive colors of yellow, red, and green. 
Over the background of what appears to be Kurdish traditional music, the video depicts the 
arrival of twenty-seven delegates to the Democratic Self-Administration area of Rojava. Large 
white trucks are seen crossing a bridge over a river, while smiling people seem to be at an early 
stage of getting to know one another. Without words, while instrumental music plays to which 
singing voices join, we are introduced quickly to local people and sites during the opening minute
of the video. The camera lingers on the tricolor flags of Rojava adorning public squares and 
boulevards before taking us indoors with images of musical bands, people dancing, the playing of
Embassy of Azawad Utrecht in September 2014. I will not be able to elaborate on these actions and 
platforms within the scope of this book. Link: http://newworldsummit.org/news/new-world-embassy-
rojava; http://newworldsummit.org/news/new-world-embassy-azawad.
257 New World Summit. 2015. New World Summit: Rojava - International Delegation, Vimeo, 07:13, 
November 6, 2015, accessed June 29, 2019 https://vimeo.com/144890359.
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instruments, and talking. In between these images and sounds, we can also observe the presence 
of soldiers at a checkpoint, reminding us that we are situated in one of the most war-stricken 
areas in the world. The presence of armed soldiers is made even more evident when the video 
presents the entrance to the Tev-Çand Cultural Center in the city of Derîk, as soldiers gather in 
front of the building and on its rooftop. In this space, the first part of the NWS in Rojava will 
soon take place, but not before more local flags will be arranged and hung along the center’s 
fence, and across the street as well. Finally, the gate of the center opens, through which one sees 
only women entering after being closely examined by female soldiers for security reasons. After 
about two minutes of an exposé into the background of the summit and its geopolitical 
complexities, Jonas Staal takes the stage and opens the fifth NWS. One cannot miss the 
remarkably different setting in which Staal and the subsequent speakers are situated. It is not 
unusual for Staal to be assuming the task of the host and welcoming figure, which he has done in 
all previous summits. Through this declarative and representative act, he has maintained his 
position as founder of the NWS, taking on “the responsibility” as he stated in his opening speech 
in the summit in Berlin.258 Yet, while in earlier summits Staal and the rest of the speakers were 
invited to stand and talk from clean-cut wooden podiums, in Rojava Staal is seated next to a male
interpreter with no less than nine microphones cast in different positions in front of him on the 
table. "Welcome friends” are the first words uttered by Staal, who seems more anxious about this 
summit than he was during previous ones. One cannot but dwell on the differences between 
previous summits in relation to the one in Rojava, taking into account the extreme conditions in 
which the latter is taking place. The four cantons that make up the autonomous region of Rojava 
258 In comparing this to Yael Bartana's position regarding the JRMiP Congress, one needs to notice the very
different approaches of both artists. While Staal is visible to the viewer and takes a vocal and written 
position throughout the summit (and also before and afterward), Bartana is nowhere to be seen or heard on
stage.
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gained their autonomy in 2013 as a result of the Syrian civil war and armed conflicts that spread 
in the area beginning in 2011. These extraordinary developments were mostly ignored by the 
international press.259 I will elaborate on the lack of attention and interest on the part of Western 
media later; at this point, it is important to note that only the siege of the canton of Kobanî, and 
the massacre committed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), was able to bring 
widespread attention to the killings and constant threat endured by the people of the region. 
Staal's noticeable excitement about the accomplishment of organizing a summit in an isolated, 
marginalized, and bloodshed-filled region cannot be ignored or belittled. The vision of free, 
equal, and self-governing communities who are ruled through direct democracy cannot but 
inspire us when listening to the local speakers following Staal's welcoming words. “We regard 
democratic confederalism as the best suitable model for this region,” declares Amina Osse from 
the Democratic Unity Party (PYD). She continues, saying that, “We are building a society on the 
basis of equality and friendship [...] A society where laws are ethical and just.” Osse will be 
followed by Akram Hesso, Prime Minister of the Cizîrê Canton, further stressing the democratic, 
self-administrated order brought by the Rojava revolution, which he hopes will serve as an 
example to the whole of Syria. The next speaker appearing in the video, the political writer Janet 
Biehl, will bring the name of Murray Bookchin into the discussion, whose writings are perceived 
259 In an opinion column by David Graeber published in The Guardian in October 2014, he comes out 
against the disregard of the international community for the “remarkable democratic experiment” taking 
place in Rojava. David Graeber, “Why is the world ignoring the revolutionary Kurds in Syria?,” The 
Guardian, October 4, 2014, accessed June 30, 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/08/why-world-ignoring-revolutionary-kurds-syria-
isis. Almost five years after Graeber’s article was published, the question why Rojava is being ignored by 
the media is still relevant as an article in Ha'aretz asks “Why is no one talking about Rojava?,” see Dor 
Shilton, “In the Heart of Syria's Darkness, a Democratic, Egalitarian and Feminist Society Emerges,” 
Ha'aretz, June 9, 2019, accessed June 30, 2019, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-
news/.premium.MAGAZINE-amid-syria-s-darkness-a-democratic-egalitarian-and-feminist-society-
emerges-1.7339983.
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as having made a major contribution to the structuring of the ideology of the Rojava revolution.260
Biehl assured the listeners of the influence of the American socialist and anarchist whom she 
thinks “would have been gratified to see these developments in both parts of Kurdistan,” just as 
she was.261 Further declarations on the importance diversity, local art, culture, and education seem
to be shared by all participants regardless of gender, ethnicity, or religion. As the female co-
mayor262 of Derîk, Dejle Hamo stated that the “goal that brings us together is building a 
democratic system, in which everyone can express her or his cultural identity.”263 Seated next to 
her co-mayor Hussein Adam, Staal talks about the life that has been sacrificed by those who died 
for the revolution as he goes on to say that, “(W)e could not have an international conference like
260 A personal account by Wes Enzinna as a teacher in Rojava, to which I will return later, was published in
The Times Magazine in 2015, in which he identifies Biehl as Bookchin’s partner and assistant. Wes 
Enzinna, “A Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard,” The Times Magazine, November 24, 2015, 
accessed June 30, 2019, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/magazine/a-dream-of-utopia-in-hell.html. 
261 It is commonly agreed that Abdullah Öcalan’s interest in Bookchin began at the moment of his arrest by
Turkey in 1999. In the third part of his series of articles published between 2014 and 2015 by e-flux under 
the title “To Make a World,” Staal portrays Öcalan's rise to power, and the changes that occurred in the 
PKK especially in relation to the Kurdish Women’s Movement. According to Staal, Öcalan was reading 
Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky in prison, but it was through Bookchin that he found a way to re-
examine his own absolute power, and re-structure the rigid hierarchical structure of the PKK. This had 
been achieved, as stated by Staal, through the incorporation of Bookchin's paradigm of the “ecological 
society” and its interpretation by Öcalan into what he perceived to be “democratic confederalism.” Based 
on Bookchin's principles of “communalism,” “confederalism,” and “direct democracy,” Öcalan proposes a
form of autonomy through practice, a series of interlinked structures of self-governance that operate 
independent of, but parallel to, existing states. The objective of the PKK thus switched from attaining 
recognition by Turkey and the international community, to self-recognition through practice.” Jonas Staal, 
“To Make a World, Part III: Stateless Democracy,” e-flux Journal 63 (March 2015), accessed August 12, 
2017, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/to-make-a-world-part-iii-stateless-democracy/#_ftnref34.
262 In the system established in Rojava, “Political positions, such as that of the mayor, were now required 
to have both a male and a female representative operating on the basis of absolute equality—a concrete 
achievement of the newly autonomously organized Kurdish women’s movement.” Jonas Staal, “To Make 
a World, Part III: Stateless Democracy.” 
263 New World Summit. 2015. New World Summit: Rojava - International Delegation, Vimeo, 07:13, 
November 6, 2015. https://vimeo.com/144890359. 
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this without the sacrifices that have been made.”264 Also in the video are words of solidarity with 
the Rojava revolution by international supporters from the Democratic Movement of the 
Philippines, the Scottish National Party (SNP), the Popular Unity Candidacy of Catalonia (CUP), 
and the Feminist Initiative (F!) in Sweden. These speeches will culminate in Staal reappearing in 
order to close the summit and to announce the cooperation between the NWS and the Democratic
Self-Administration of Rojava towards the building of the anticipated parliament in the city of 
Derîk. Upon this announcement, the attendees are all invited to join and visit the space of the new
parliament. Sounds of Kurdish traditional music return, and the video ends with a festive 
gathering around tables with an abundance of food in celebration of the construction of the 
parliament. At the end, we are exposed to the empty construction site, which is enclosed by two 
sets of reinforced steel pillars resembling the Maman (1999) spider sculptures of Louise 
Bourgeois. The words “Self –Defense” is engraved in four different languages on one of them. 
3.4.2. On the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Terror
The above-described artistic endeavor by a Western artist taking place in the Middle East in the 
midst of a revolution immediately draws intense and varied reactions. The video, which can be 
argued to be a crossbreeding between a propaganda film and a national promotional video with 
its blending of flags, soldiers, and local music, can also be seen as part of a long-running Western
voyeurism, or artistic “tourism” into areas of conflict and devastation. Yet, taking into account the
consistent ignoring of the revolution in Rojava by Western media, one must look with care into 
Staal’s work in this region hovered over with conflicts and wars. “Why is the world ignoring the 
revolutionary Kurds in Syria?” asks David Graeber, pointing the blame not only at the press, but 
towards the international community and large parts of the “international left” as well.  Graeber, 
264 Ibid.
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who visited Rojava in December 2014,265 argues that an answer can be found in the fact that the 
Rojavan Revolutionary Party (PYD) collaborates with the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), which 
is listed as a terror group.266 Graeber's statement leads us, once again, to the designated 
international terrorist lists, which have been on the agenda of the NWS since its first summit in 
Berlin in 2012. Graeber, similarly but independently from Staal and the NWS, perceives a 
dramatic change in the PKK based on the shift in ideology by its founder and leader Abdullah 
Öcalan. According to Graeber, whose insights into the Rojavan revolution are very much in line 
with Staal and the NWS, “The Kurdish struggle could become a model for a worldwide 
movement towards genuine democracy, co-operative economy, and the gradual dissolution of the 
bureaucratic nation-state.”267 
265 Graeber visited the canton of Cizîrê in Rojava independent of Staal and the NWS. An interview with 
Graeber is also published as part of the NWS Reader on Rojava. More on Graeber’s position on the 
subject can be found here (accessed June 29, 2019): https://zcomm.org/znetarticle/no-this-is-a-genuine-
revolution/.
266 To be clear, the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) remains to this day on terror lists of governments such 
as the US, the UK, and Australia. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, accessed 
June 30, 2019, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. “Proscribed Terrorist Organisations,” 
UK Home Office, accessed June 30, 2019, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/795457/
Proscription_website.pdf. “Listed Terrorist Organisations,” Australian National Security, accessed June 
30, 2019, https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx. In light of 
the war against ISIS, scholars such as David Phillips and Kelly Berkell make an argument in favor of 
delisting the PKK from the terror list. Based on the two ceasefires of 1999 and 2013 between the PKK and
Turkey, they underline that official Turkish representatives have met with Öcalan and recognized his 
leadership. In 2014, they mention, more than 33,000 scholars and politicians signed a petition calling for 
the US government to remove PKK from the list of international terrorist organizations. See David 
Phillips, Kelly Berkell, “The Case for Delisting the PKK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” Lawfare, 
February 11, 2016, accessed June 30, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/case-delisting-pkk-foreign-
terrorist-organization.
267 Graeber, “Why is the world ignoring the revolutionary Kurds in Syria?” 
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In the Reader titled “Stateless Democracy” published in 2015 by the NWS and made in 
collaboration with the Kurdish Women's Movement,268 Dilar Dirik, one of the Reader's co-editors,
further argues that it is the “solid ideological base”269 of the Rojava revolution rooted in Öcalan’s 
writings that unmasks the failure of Western political, social, and economic structures and 
policies. This ideology is based on Öcalan's manifesto titled “Declaration of Democratic 
Confederalism in Kurdistan,” introduced in 2005. In a nutshell, the Declaration is considered a 
pivotal turning point in the politics of the PKK. In it, Öcalan has articulated that a solution to the 
“Kurdish problem” is not to be directed towards an independent state, but rather to the creation of
local assemblies united into a confederation – “democracy without the state.”270 Along the idea of 
a stateless democracy or a “democratic confederalism,” a “Social Contract” was collectively 
written by the representatives of the different groups of people living in Rojava. As I will show in
the following, it is also through the positioning of women at the forefront that Staal and the NWS 
provide a critique and an alternative to the nation-state and its legal institutions.271 Staal and the 
NWS demonstrate the need to redefine and recreate rights from within the nation-state that go 
beyond the exclusivity of the nation-state, in the manner suggested by Saskia Sassen and 
described in Chapter One.
3.5. Stateless Democracy, Terrorism, and Gender Equality
268 Renée In der Maur, Jonas Staal, Dilar Dirik, eds., Stateless Democracy, New World Academy Reader 
No. 5, BAK, basis voor actuele kunst, 2005, accessed June 30, 2019, http://newworldsummit.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/NWA5-Stateless-Democracy.pdf.
269 Ibid., p. 48.  
270 Wes Enzinna, “A Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard.”
271 “The contribution of women frontliners to resistance is usually invisible to outsiders and for the most 
part goes mostly unnoticed, but it exhibits a great deal of power and resilience,” Nadera Shalhoub-
Kevorkian, Militarization and Violence Against Women in Conflict Zones in the Middle East (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 1.
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The charter that constitutes the foundation of Rojava's administration guarantees “a secular 
political system; full autonomy for each of the three cantons; the minimization of centralized rule 
and maximum agency for local councils and cooperatives; the implementation of quotas 
guaranteeing a minimum of 40 percent political participation by both women and men; and a 
common commitment to developing a new ‘social ecology’.”272 The NWS Reader includes the 
charter, and just like the summit in Rojava, it revolves around the two main elements of the 
Rojavan ideology – the concepts of the stateless and of gender equality are enshrined in the 
charter. These two elements can also be traced from the first Summit in 2012 onward, as it has 
maintained a consistent tying of the question of stateless democracy, in defiance of the nation-
state, to gender and women’s rights. The particular study of the PKK and the Rojava case and 
Summit makes it possible to broaden the discussion on the role and function of democracy in our 
time in light of the emergence of stateless regions in which gender equality plays a vital role. 
I shall argue that this should come as no surprise when considering the contribution of gender 
studies to our perception of terror and the “war on terror” dominating international law and 
politics since the events of September 11, 2001. Although Catharine A. MacKinnon’s 
groundbreaking essay, “Women's September 11th: Rethinking the International Law of 
Conflict,”273 was not mentioned at the Summit or in the Reader, I suggest bringing it into the 
discussion. This extraordinary article is an original and insightful contribution, in my view, to any
discussion on terror after 9/11, due to its core argument regarding the connection between terror, 
non-state actors, and gender. In the case of Rojava, where terrorism, human rights, gender 
272 The full version of the Social Contract can be found in In der Maur et al., Stateless Democracy, pp. 131-
158.
273 Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Women’s September 11th: Rethinking the International Law of Conflict,” 
Harvard International Law Journal 47, 2006.
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equality, and the question of the state/non-state are deeply intertwined, MacKinnon’s words 
resonate in their fullness. Asking what the connection is between 9/11 and women's rights, 
MacKinnon demonstrates how a new international order has formed since 2001, giving new 
meaning to any international armed conflict. According to international law, “If states are not the 
units or focus of the fighting, the conflict may not qualify”274 as an armed attack. With this in 
mind, MacKinnon address the events of 9/11 by pointing out two crucial facts: first, Al Qaeda is a
non-state actor, a private network established by Osama bin Laden who was a private citizen 
himself, and second, the World Trade Towers were legally located within the United States, but 
were a civilian target in which private citizens were working for mostly private corporations. “On
September 11th non-state actors committed violence against mostly non-state (nongovernmental 
and civilian) actors,”275  therefore the UN Council resolution implying that the events are an 
“armed attack” is not in accordance with international law. The attack on the Towers, states 
MacKinnon, should have been “pursued judicially,”276 but instead, “NATO invoked collective 
defense for the first time in its history.” An international “war on terror” began regardless of the 
fact that “international law does not have a conflict like this primarily in mind [...].”277 Identifying
the attacks of 9/11 as “armed attacks” in order to legitimize an international “war on terror” is for 
MacKinnon an extraordinary example of how international law can be manipulated and 
implemented according to changing needs and circumstances. Yet, the “playfulness” of the law, 
as MacKinnon brilliantly establishes, is gender restrictive. MacKinnon demonstrates how, in the 
case of violence against women, in which both the victims and the perpetrators are private 
274  Ibid., p. 5.
275 Ibid., p. 10.
276 Ibid., p. 10.
277 Ibid., p. 11.
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persons, a war is hardly to be imagined. MacKinnon does not call for any sort of war, but instead 
calls us to stop and think of both September 11th and violence against women as gender-based 
“acts by formally nonstate actors against nonstate targets.”278
The analysis offered by MacKinnon demands us to address the same hypocrisy Dilar Dirik 
addresses when she states: “Patriarchy is much older than the nation-state, but nation-states have 
adopted its mechanisms.”279 Paraphrasing Virginia Woolf's Three Guineas, MacKinnon states 
that, “Women have no state, are no state, seek no state.” Thus, violations against women are not 
considered terror, but a cultural matter of everyday life. On the other hand, attacks against men 
are perceived as terrorist acts against “their” states, “seen to form a politics, on the way to having 
human rights.”280 Once again, when women are attacked, the matter is dealt with locally or on a 
national level; however, when men are attacked, “particularly certain men,”281 international law is
redefined, and it “becomes a war – complete with war crimes, military tribunals, potentially 
justified acts of self-defense, and prisoners of war.”282 Interestingly, as MacKinnon points out, no 
“special ad hoc tribunals or truth and reconciliation commissions”283 were installed or even 
proposed in the case of male violence against women. Following MacKinnon's reasoning, one 
can argue that the Kurdish people of the Rojava revolution share a similar position with women 
as they as well “have no state, are no state, seek no state;” Similarly to MacKinnon, the Kurdish 
revolution demonstrates the failure of the nation-state from a gender perspective and critique. In 
278 Ibid., p. 19.
279 In der Maur et al., Stateless Democracy, p. 38.
280 MacKinnon, “Women’s September 11th: Rethinking the International Law of Conflict,” p. 17.
281 Ibid., p. 17.
282 Ibid., p. 11.
283 Ibid., p. 13.
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the case of the Kurdish people, their alternative to the nation-state is a source of fear and anxiety 
and even an attack on “particularly certain men.”284 One big difference remains in the fact that 
violence against women is not considered an attack on the nation-state, while the utopian ideas at 
the core of the revolution are considered as such. At the end of the day, the determinations used 
by the nation-state are similar to the ones described by MacKinnon after the events of 9/11 
resulting in identifying the PKK and the Kurdish revolution as terrorists and terror acts.
Exposing, through MacKinnon, the manipulation of international law by patriarchy and gender-
biased politics provides, hence, a path to addressing Staal's work and the NWS’ actions in support
of the Rojava revolution and its stateless democracy based on gender equality. Nevertheless, one 
can still question the political, legal, and ethical actions in Rojava by a Dutch-based artist such as 
Staal and his Western-supported and European-based organization. Can the establishment of a 
parliament in Rojava by the NWS be further explained and supported through the frame provided
to us by MacKinnon? Does the NWS propose and create a new right of intervention in 
international law and politics as part of a struggle for justice? Hito Steyerl echoes these questions 
in her contribution to the NWS Reader on Rojava, as she asks us to ponder, “What is the task of 
art in times of emergency?”285 Therefore, even when possibly agreeing with MacKinnon on the 
need to take action in times when the nation-state fails to do so, the question remains regarding 
the role of art and artists in a revolution, emergency, or time of war. It is especially relevant when 
284 For further reading, see, for example, Edward Hunt, “Trump Is No Friend of the Kurdish Struggle,” 
Jacobin, June 26, 2019, accessed June 30, 2019, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/06/trump-rojava-
turkey-syria-kurds. Also, the US has been continuously reluctant to support the Kurdish fighters, but the 
Trump administration has indicated that it is inclined to arm Kurdish fighters combating the Islamic State. 
See Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Trump to Arm Syrian Kurds, Even as Turkey Strongly 
Objects,” New York Times, May 9, 2017, accessed June 30, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/trump-kurds-syria-army.html. 
285 Hito Steyerl, “Kobanê Is Not Falling,” e-flux, October 10, 2014, accessed July 15, 2017, http://www.e-
flux.com/announcements/30525/koban-is-not-falling/.
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considering critically the past and present involvement of Western artists and intellectuals in such
cases. Is it sufficient to claim and prove that the urgency of the cause is enough to support Staal's 
intervention? Is it enough to argue and show that, through the work of Staal and the NWS, the 
Rojava revolution gains extensive international attention by the media and the international 
community? Is it enough to claim and demonstrate that Staal's actions provide us with the space 
to stop, think, and act against the injustice and atrocities inflicted upon the Kurdish people? 
“There is nothing wrong with standing back and thinking. To paraphrase several sages: 'Nobody 
can think and hit someone at the same time'” is what Susan Sontag wrote in her seminal book 
Regarding the Pain of Others.286 For Sontag, the American intellectual and filmmaker known for 
her own journeys to conflict areas such as Sarajevo and Jerusalem, the involvement of an artist in
war zones is inevitable. Maintaining an outsider's position of a spectator, Sontag argues, ends in a
patronizing and privileged view that only Western people can afford to hold. It results in ignoring 
and belittling the effect of images of suffering diffused to us by those artists who do take part in 
reality. “In fact, deriding the efforts of those who have borne witness in war zones as ‘war 
tourism’ is such a recurrent judgment that it has spilled over into the discussion of war 
photography as a profession,”287 states Sontag.
3.5.1.  Artists and the Revolution: The Case of the Film Letter to Jane 
Against this backdrop, in an attempt to propose at least some reflections, and possible answers on
the matter, I turn to two films from the 1970s that tried to tackle, or to begin to chart, some 
possible strategies and methods for dealing with the question of the role of art in a time of 
emergency. It is my attempt to go beyond an argument in favor or against the Rojava revolution, 
286 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (London: Penguin Books, 2004), p. 106.
287 Ibid., p. 100.
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and its relation to the PKK and possible terror groups, in order to possibly answer Steyerl’s 
haunting question, “What is the task of art in times of emergency?” We might learn very little if 
nothing at all from history, but bringing revolutions in Vietnam and Palestine into the discussion 
through the observation and work of celebrated filmmakers, I intend to identify several points of 
connection and offer further possible readings of the NWS and of the role of the artist in our time 
in relation to what I perceive to be judicial-visual activism. The first film that comes to mind on 
the subject matter is Here and Elsewhere directed by Jean-Luc Godard, Jean-Pierre Gorin, and 
Anne-Marie Miéville, which also received renewed attention in the art world when an exhibition 
on contemporary art in the Arab world opened in 2014 at the New Museum in New York with the
film's title as its own.288 Yet, before discussing this film dedicated to the Palestinian revolution, 
and before positioning it in relation to the NWS video from Rojava, I turn first to an earlier and 
lesser known film by Godard and Gorin. 
The 1972 film titled Letter to Jane revolves around the Vietnamese revolution, and has generally 
received little attention from audiences and researchers. Nevertheless, it provides a unique 
background and understanding of the work of Godard, and of the role of artists in a time of a 
revolution, war, or emergency in general. Perceived as an essay film for being personal, 
subjective, and relating to social history,289 the film's expressive analysis of social and political 
positions found in a single photo is a manifesto on the role of “intellectuals”290 as they are 
288 Here and Elsewhere, New Museum, Past Exhibitions, accessed June 30, 2019, 
http://www.newmuseum.org/exhibitions/view/here-and-elsewhere.
289 Paul Arthur, “Essay Questions: From Alain Resnais to Michael Moore,” Film Comment 39, no. 1 (2003):
58.
290 I will dedicate more attention in this chapter to the role of the intellectual, which also has a particular 
French context and meaning. Nevertheless, it is safe to claim already at this preliminary stage that 
Godard’s interest is in art and artists who are perceived as intellectuals. 
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referred to by the directors of this ambivalent film. What part should cinema play in the 
development of revolutionary struggles, or, in other words, what part should intellectuals play in 
the revolution? These are the main questions and staggering themes that unfold in this film. These
questions asked by the directors capture, as far as they are concerned, the essence of their film, 
and are highly relevant, as I shall claim, to the work of Staal and many of the current artworks 
framed as political or social art. Let us first detect how these questions are unpacked through a 
meticulous observation and analysis of one photo of an actress known at that time as “Hanoi 
Jane.”291 As suggested by its title, the film begins as if in the format of a letter with the words 
“Dear Jane” and is concerned with one particular photo of Jane Fonda taken during her visit to 
Vietnam in July 1972. The picture shows Fonda solemnly directing her gaze towards a person, 
though we see mostly his hat (or perhaps it is his helmet), and hardly a glimpse of his face. 
Between Fonda and this unidentified person, another person directs his gaze directly into the 
camera. He is standing in the background of the photo, without a hat or other garment or 
instrument. The image of his agonized face, of the quiet presence of an anonymous Vietnamese 
citizen, will be probed by the directors in contrast to the central and dramatic image of Fonda. 
Nevertheless, it is the gaze of Fonda, beyond looking and perhaps disregarding the person caught 
by the camera between her and a possible soldier, which holds the answer to the question 
regarding the role of the intellectual in a given revolution. 
The manner in which this answer is brought forward through the photo is what primarily 
concerns the two directors. According to them, any immediate answer ignores other relevant 
291 For Godard and Gorin, Fonda, who comes from a celebrated Hollywood cinematic family, represents 
first and foremost American imperialism and capitalism. Fonda's visit to Vietnam was seen by some as an 
act of treason, and its controversy remains to this day. In 2011, Fonda published the public post “The 
Truth About My Trip To Hanoi” on her website with the wish of further clarifying the facts surrounding 
her visit. In 2014, a play, The Trial of Jane Fonda, premiered at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe, with shows
that ran in London during the summer of 2016. 
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questions that need to be asked and addressed. Therefore, the answer provided by this photo 
unveils at the same time the problem of the image as a whole, and the error of Fonda and all other
artists and intellectuals when intervening in war zones. In their opinion, as it is expressed in the 
film, it is rather by not answering the question directly wherein the strength of their feature film 
Tout Va Bien lies. The task, as understood by the directors, is to learn how to ask new questions 
and reinvent new forms of practical action. Unlike both Fonda and the North Vietnamese 
National Liberation Front (Việt Cộng), which, according to the directors, invited Fonda in order 
to seek immediate answers in response to their political situation, the directors on the other hand 
wish to raise new questions and new forms of activism. “How can cinema help Vietnamese 
people win their independence?”, ask the directors. This question is connected to the photo of 
Fonda and of intellectuals in the revolution when one realizes, as the directors claim, that the 
main objective of the photo was achieved through the vast exposure the photo gained via 
worldwide publications. The importance of the photo to its makers is in its practical results, 
which the directors see as a problem of expression, for it was conceived and made with the sole 
intention of disseminating it.292 The directors are of the opinion that this quick and practical 
answer avoids the complexity of the situation in a world that is far from clear. Hence, it also 
reduces the role of the intellectual and of cinema and of other forms of art just as much. Quoting 
292 In the film, the directors voice the difficulty of choosing the image of Fonda rather than one of a 
politician or a male actor. According Godard and Godin, the fact that the photo was made to be published 
and ignited a worldwide commotion turns the photo into a special case, while Fonda was also immediate 
to them due to her role in their previous film. Moreover, in an interview in 1973 they dismiss the 
possibility of using an unknown person: “The North Vietnamese don’t need unknown Americans to say 
‘peace in Vietnam.’ They need very well known people because Nixon is not an unknown American. The 
star system is very important.” (from:  David Sterritt, ed., Jean-Luc Godard: Interviews (Jackson, 
University Press of Mississippi, 1998), p.63). Nevertheless, the directors’ explanation and call to Fonda to 
respond to their letter and to talk to them in readings planned in the US does little to diminish Godard's 
misogyny as expressed in his use of images of women throughout his artistic career. For further reading: 
Colin McCabe with Mick Eaton and Laura Mulvey, Godard: Images, Sounds, Politics (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 79-104.
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Fidel Castro, who said that “for revolutionaries there are never any obvious truths,” the directors’ 
intention is to delve into the non-obvious. In a state of uncertainty with no obvious truths, they 
argue, there is a need to make an effort and to ask questions differently. In a time of struggle, one 
should not rush to find answers, but rather invest the time and resources into observing the way in
which people express their struggle. New questions, new paths of expressing them, and new 
answers to come are what is requested at the time of a revolution.  
Thus, the directors emphasize the lack of attention given in the photo, and in the descriptive text 
by the press accompanying it, to the local people. The people, to their understanding, are situated 
in the background, while it is the militant who is positioned in the foreground along with the 
actress. The text that appeared next to the photo stated, according to the directors: “Jane Fonda is 
questioning the people of Hanoi,”293 but what are the questions asked and what are the answers 
given? It is utterly important, they argue, to make the distinction between talking and listening, 
which is not only ignored by the actress, but also overlooked by the press, which is even more 
troublesome. It is within the magazine’s duty and responsibility to look further, beyond the 
mechanism initiating the photo, in order to interrogate it, to question its premise. In the eyes of 
Godard and Gorin, the caption is basically a lie, and the magazine is able to lie because of such a 
photo.294 “How can we really help Vietnam?”, the directors retort. “Peace in Vietnam” is too 
quick of an answer, argue the directors, as they express their divergence from Western 
Communist allies just as from organizations such as the UN or the Red Cross. According to them,
help can be provided by reversing the narrative, in accordance with the local cause and struggle. 
293 “Jane Fonda talks with Vietnamese people during a trip to Hanoi in 1972” is commonly the English 
translation of the description of the photo taken by Joseph Kraft. 
294 These arguments seem incredibly timely in a post-Trump world of fake news; however, in the context 
of this publication, I will not be able to address this much further.
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New questions and new answers mean coming to a realization that changes in Vietnam should 
direct a change in our own world. For Godard and Gorin, it is clear – the image of an actress, of a
Hollywood star in Vietnam, mainly harms the cause of the local people in the long run. It is, 
according to them, only an empty gesture in the service of capitalism. For them, the same is true 
for all photos representing places of struggle and disaster – empty expressions of empty faces 
waiting to be filled by capitalism. “How can one fight against this situation?” the directors ask. 
The answer they give – not by banning publication of such photos, but “by publishing them 
differently.” Subsequently, they claim, a new and important role will be given to actors and 
intellectuals in times of emergency. Moreover, the answer to what, precisely, the role of an artist 
is can be found, they suggest, in the face of the Vietnamese man directing his gaze to the camera 
while remaining in its shadow. His day-to-day struggles are what one recognizes in his face. His 
face holds a message that needs no caption. Unlike Fonda's face that can be diverted into endless 
meanings from daily life to an acting scene in a Hollywood film, his face, argue the directors, 
even when isolated from the rest of the photo, holds a powerful particularity. His struggle as a 
Vietnamese man is immediately identified, and it is to him that one needs to listen before talking 
or questioning. Listening, to conclude this aspect of the film, is the role of the intellectual in a 
time of a revolution. 
3.5.2. Artists and the Revolution: The Case of the Film Here and Elsewhere
The act of listening returns as an essential component in a later film directed by Godard and 
Gorin, this time created together with Anne-Marie Miéville. Released in 1976, Here and 
Elsewhere began filming in Jordan in 1970 through the invitation of Fatah (the Palestine 
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Liberation Organization).295 What was supposedly intended to become a film in support of the 
Palestinian fight for independence changed course internally, through an investigation into the 
position of the filmmaker/artist coming from “Here” (First World/Europe/France) while wishing 
to investigate and represent “Elsewhere” (Third World/Middle East/Israel/Palestine).296, 297 “In 
1970, this film was called 'Victory'. In 1974/5, it is called 'Here and Elsewhere’”298 – the same 
voice-over sentences are heard at the beginning and at the end of the film. The voice of a man 
opens the film indicating the year 1974, while at the end of the film the year changes to 1975. 
What process took place that maneuvered the film from a self-declarative “Victory” to a more 
benign interest in a geopolitical study? What does the year gap between the opening and the 
ending of the film represent? Or perhaps a better question might be, what can be learned from the
six-year gap from its early days of filming to the final product? 
It is known and well-researched that the film’s initial intended title was “Jusqu’à la Victoire” 
(Until Victory), but due to the events of Black September in Jordan the filmmakers were unable 
to complete the film as first planned, and changes were required. I will return to these events, but 
beforehand, and before answering the above questions (beyond the historical events that shaped 
them), I wish to contextualize the film Here and Elsewhere in relation to the work of Staal. 
Without disregarding, or ignoring, the obvious differences in time and place, it is intriguing to 
295 Terri Ginsberg and Chris Lippard, Historical Dictionary of Middle Eastern Cinema (Historical 
Dictionaries of Literature and the Arts) (Plymouth, UK: Scarecrow Press, 2010). 
296 Irmgard Emmelhainz, “From Third Worldism to Empire: Jean-Luc Godard and the Palestine Question,”
Third Text 23:5 (September 2009): 649-656. 
297Here and Elsewhere, New Museum website, Past Exhibitions, accessed June 30, 2019, 
http://www.newmuseum.org/exhibitions/view/here-and-elsewhere.
298 Here and Elsewhere (Ici et ailleurs), directed by Jean-Luc Godard, Jean-Pierre Gorin, and Anne-Marie 
Miéville (1976; Gaumont), 35 mm film. 
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dwell on some similarities that nevertheless accumulate once these works are brought into a 
shared interrogation. In a rather similar method and spirit of the analysis as the one I suggested in
Chapter Two, dedicated to Yael Bartana's Congress and its intertwining with the Dada trial, in the 
case of Staal and Godard the time frame has narrowed, and with it the differences in motivation 
and points of departure. One pivotal argument for bringing Staal's NWS, and especially the 
summit in Rojava, together with the film Here and Elsewhere becomes apparent when one 
understands the role of women in both the NWS in Rojava and in the film on the Palestinian 
revolution. Just as in the video I described earlier regarding the Rojava revolution, the importance
of women in the Palestinian revolution is made clear from the very beginning of the film, as we 
are introduced immediately to an image of a female Palestinian soldier holding a rifle. Against 
the backdrop of pine trees and a blue sky, she is practicing how to grasp her weapon, turning it 
from side to side while a fellow male soldier stands next to her. In the Palestinian revolution, as it
is depicted throughout the entire film, women play a major and crucial role. In the film, they 
consistently reappear as strong and independent, as this first image indicates – a young woman 
practicing her military skills while her head is loosely covered with the Arabic Keffiyeh, a 
symbol for the Palestinian fight for independence. Shortly after, in a section titled “Political 
Work,” a woman dressed in traditional Palestinian dress, a rifle leaning against the wall behind 
her, is reciting a text as part of her political education: “The most important result of the armed 
Palestinian revolution is the direct participation of the Palestinian woman in the revolution, in 
order to play her part side by side with the Palestinian man.” The ending of the text is no longer 
heard via the voice of the Palestinian woman, but through the film’s female voiceover. The film's 
section has also changed, and it is now titled “Prolonged War.” Along with this shift, new images 
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appear, this time of young girls dressed in military uniforms standing in organized rows taking 
part in a military parade along with young boys. 
Just like in Letter to Jane, the film emphasizes its aim to connect to the local people and to follow
their steps in their own revolution. It is the people and “The people's will” that they seek, declares
the film's voiceover, which the directors and their camera unfold through the role of women in 
the revolution. It is those young women portrayed during training, patrol, loading of ammunition,
reading, or marching as part of the “armed struggle, the people's war” that claims center stage. 
When the voiceover declares that “this is what was new in the Middle East” while showing 
images of young and determined Palestinian girls dressed in uniform, the message of what is new
is heard and seen. The resemblance of Staal's video and collaboration with the NWS to the 
Kurdish Women's Movement cannot be ignored. Yet, rather quickly, the film steps into its next 
phase, in which images and sounds are contextualized and analyzed through categories of “Here” 
and “Elsewhere,” as the title of the film indicates, and which the NWS video seems to lack. The 
film informs its viewers that these sounds and images were taken “Elsewhere” in 1970 – meaning
in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. It happened “Elsewhere,” and was paid for and supported by the 
Fatah's Information Department, clarifies the voiceover. This was “Elsewhere,” but at one point 
the directors returned home to recover and reflect. “Here,” in France, the time passed, and with it 
emerges the difficultly in realizing what happened and was experienced during the time spent 
“Elsewhere.” Confronted with France’s and Europe's social, political, and economic problems, as
well as with the banal and the mundane actions of everyday life, the directors are puzzled, 
sending their work “Elsewhere” into a long hiatus. The events that will be known as “Black 
September,” during which an armed conflict between the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) and the Jordanian Armed Forces resulted in the death of thousands of people, marks yet 
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another staggering setback. A film that set out to portray the Palestinian revolution is forced into a
rethinking and renewed evaluation, as the directors realize that many of the people filmed were 
killed during the deadly events of September 1970. No less horrific is the realization that during 
the filming the actors were under constant danger of death. In sharp contrast to the filmed images 
and recorded sounds of the people of the revolution, the presence of death escaped the detection 
of the directors and their film in its elusive silence.
 Images and sounds evade silence. Silence is maintained and intensified through images and 
sounds that fail to capture death. The emphasis on silence brings me back to the aforementioned 
questions regarding the six-year gap needed to finalize the film. With respect to all of the above, 
the silence marks an unbridgeable gap between the images of “Elsewhere” especially when they 
are consumed “Here.” The images and sounds filmed and recorded in 1970 “Elsewhere” cannot 
grant the film the title “Victory,” or a resolution of a triumph when watched and heard “Here.” It 
would be too simple, explain the directors, to arrive at quick conclusions, or to pass judgment. It 
is not that the cause of the Palestinian is not just or one that does not deserve attention and 
support, as the footage and sounds in the film clearly indicate. Yet, similar to their request of Jane
Fonda in the film Letter to Jane, the directors argue that one needs to begin his or her journey at 
home/“Here” and not “Elsewhere,” otherwise one ultimately ends up simplifying all matters to a 
division between the good and the bad. This ultimate realization is delivered in the last sentences 
of the film: “Learn to see here, in order to hear elsewhere. Learn to hear yourself speak to see 
what others do. Others are the ‘Elsewhere’ to our ‘Here.’” It is “Here,” in one’s familiar 
surroundings, depicted throughout the film through an incarnation of a typical French family 
sitting in front of the TV, where one has the ability to learn how to see before being able to hear 
“Elsewhere.” The face of the Palestinian woman, just like the face of the man in the frame with 
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Fonda, remains in the shadow of images and sounds that end up only further concealing the 
reality of things. Listen before talking or questioning, suggested the directors to Fonda. In Here 
and Elsewhere, they add to this the importance of the locality, of the space from which one needs 
to start listening in order to eventually be able to see the other.
3.6. Back to Rojava
The impossibility of capturing silence, and the failure to acknowledge the immanent presence of 
death, brings me back to Rojava and to Wes Enzinna's article published in The Times Magazine at
the end of 2015.299 It is a personal account of Enzinna's encounters during his stay in Rojava, 
where he was invited to teach journalism at the newly formed Mesopotamian Social Sciences 
Academy. Enzinna captures daily and academic life entangled with politics, ideology, 
propaganda, and war. Against the backdrop of very limited exposure and a lack of serious 
treatment by Western media and scholars300 of the revolution of Rojava,301 the wide scope of his 
essay finally brings the ideology of the people of the region in their fight for freedom to the 
Western media's attention. As any outsider's perception might be, Enzinna's view is not devoid of 
what can be considered an Orientalist302 perspective, as he admittedly shares the difficulty in 
grasping the breadth and depth of the political and social revolution manifested in Rojava. In 
299 See Wes Enzinna, “A Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard.”
300 The first book on the Rojava revolution was probably published in English in 2016 translated from 
German and revised by Janet Biehl. David Graeber contributed the foreword to the book. Michael Knapp, 
Anja Flach, and Ercan Ayboga, Revolution in Rojava (London: PlutoPress, 2016). 
301  See Graeber, “Why is the world ignoring the revolutionary Kurds in Syria?” 
302 As an Orientalist perspective, this discourse transforms men and women into faceless, voiceless, and a-
historical subjects who lack agency and who are in need of “modernization” to raise them up from their 
“uncivilized” state. For further reading: Lisa Hajjar, “Militarization and Violence against Women in 
Conflict Zones in the Middle East: A Palestinian Case Study Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian,” Journal of 
Middle East Women's Studies 7:1 (2011): 120-123.
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order “to see this strange political experiment for myself,” Enzinna travels to the region and 
produces a thought-provoking essay. Enzinna does not mention Staal or the construction of a 
parliament by the NWS in Rojava, thus allowing me yet another perspective on the Rojava 
revolution.303 Also, his report does not conceal the armed escort he received nor the frequent 
checkpoints he encountered upon his arrival. Enzinna’s skepticism towards the possibility of a 
Rojavan utopia is clearly indicated as he describes flags hanging in memory of hundreds of 
martyrs, some of whom are young adults; the culture of worship of Öcalan; voices of local 
opposition; and the criticism raised by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International regarding
war crimes committed by the Rojava ruling regime. At the same time, Enzinna cannot disregard 
the achievements of the revolution in theory and in practice. Aware of the complexity and 
contradictions posed by a time and place of war, his teaching position informs him of the 
importance placed, even during a time of war, on “the future intellectual leaders of Rojava,”304 
male and female alike. Some presented themselves to him as secular and atheist, while all seem 
to be connected by Öcalan’s philosophy, and the immanent presence of war. For a Yazidi student, 
who was saved by women fighters, the experience of war reshaped his perception of women. 
Studying Öcalan at the academy operating in a refugee camp, he was able to further learn of the 
importance of gender equality to Öcalan and the revolution, which found its official recognition 
as part of the Social Contract of Rojava.305 
303 Unlike other writers and scholars like David Graeber, Dilar Dirik, and Janet Biehl, Enzinna did not take 
part in any NWS or its related projects, as far as I know. 
304 Wes Enzinna, “A Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard.”
305 Article 28 of the Social Contract states: “Men and women are equal in the eyes of the law. The Charter 
guarantees the effective realization of equality of women and mandates public institutions to work towards
the elimination of gender discrimination.” Accessed August 10, 2017, http://kurdstrat.com/2015/03/11/the-
constitution-of-the-rojava-cantons.
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In returning to the issues raised in Here and Elsewhere, I found it intriguing to read how, as 
argued in the film, it is the constant fleeting presence of death, to which neither sound nor image 
can fully give account, which is striking and overwhelming to Enzinna. The unknown future of 
his students easily escapes his thoughts, as death and violence become a routine encounter during
his stay in Rojava. Enzinna is clearly caught between the two extreme ends of life in Rojava. This
is indicated through an early question by a student, “How do you deal with the constant fear of 
dying?”, to an encounter with yet another student who claims no fear, quoted towards the end of 
Enzinna's report. For her, “Being a martyr is the best thing possible. […] Fighting is ugly,’’ she 
added. ‘‘But fighting for this is beautiful. Fear is for your Western women in their kitchens.’’306 
Questions of death and fear come together yet again as a bundle of gender and politics. ‘‘Ideas, 
like people, die if we don’t fight for them,’’ is how Enzinna's essay ends. In comparison, it can be
noted, between listening and death, Staal and the NWS give much less emphasis to the latter. As I
have written earlier, starting from the NWS’s first Summit in Berlin, the act of listening has been 
professed and directed toward those listed as terrorists, and to those who as a consequence are 
denied basic human rights, such as the freedom of speech and movement. From dedicating the 
first day of the two-day Summit in Berlin to listening without questioning, the NWS was a space 
advocating for the need to listen to those identified by the nation-states and the media as a threat. 
However, the development of the NWS makes clear that the interest of it lies beyond the act of 
listening. There is a need, claims Staal, for active artistic and political action in a time of 
emergency. For him, I argue, visual activism in the time of globalization demands that art take 
action. It is an action accomplished by uniting the local with the global, working together with 
local communities in a fight against forgetfulness, and furthermore it is an act of visual-judicial 
306 Ibid.
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activism. In his article for the Reader, Staal identifies the “lack of political memory tied to the 
history of colonialism and military intervention”307 as the source that binds both the international 
community and the Rojava revolution. In Staal's view, this particular revolution goes beyond an 
armed struggle, as he observes how even fighters are obligated to take a month of ideological 
training before joining the armed struggle. It is a revolution rooted in ideology, as even when 
faced by the immediate ongoing threat of ISIS, a shared basic terminology connects all people 
involved. “Democratic confederalism, democratic autonomy, communalism, women’s liberation, 
cooperatives, councils”308 are the forces that drive the revolution beyond a military struggle. 
Hence, Staal's answer to Steyerl’s question is found exactly where Here and Elsewhere suggests 
it would be, as it takes it into action: by listening to local artists and to the themes and subjects 
that motivate and inspire them in their fight against the erasure of a long history, and through the 
creation of a representative space for assembling, as depicted in the construction of a parliament. 
Abdullah Abdul, a local artist, paves the way for Staal through his creation of a museum 
dedicated to the civilization of Mesopotamia. This action, along with many other artists and their 
work that takes place even in times of war and emergency, is a testimony to the importance of 
fighting suppression and of “retrieving the remnants of a colonized history of art and culture.”309
Taking an active part in commemorating, while at the same time re-imagining and re-inventing, 
an identity and culture based on the idea of stateless democracy is the task of art in times of 
emergency, according to Staal.
307 In der Maur et al., Stateless Democracy, p. 234.
308 Ibid., p. 237.
309 Ibid., p. 242.
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But what about photography and the image that, as Susan Sontag writes, contrary to Godard, 
have been holding “company with death”310 since the invention of the camera in 1839? And what 
about art in the name of ideology in face of the lessons offered by the 20th century? Can the 
global political, social, and economic crises be enough to establish a role for the artist as part of a 
new revolution, and a new ideology? Is it not just a phase, and before we know it artists will once
again end up drawn toward totalitarian or fascist regimes? An image, wrote Jean Genet, “is the 
only message from the past that's managed to get itself projected into the present,”311 yet he 
needed more than ten years before he was able to write about his own experience with the 
Palestinian revolution in his book Prisoner of Love. “I am drawn to people in revolt [...] because I
myself have the need to call the whole of society into question,”312 Genet is quoted to have said in
an interview in the 1980s. Genet's spirit can be traced just as much in Staal's actions and writings:
“Rojava’s stateless democracy proposes a political horizon that concerns us all.”313 Yet, perhaps 
we need more time? Perhaps we need further distance and reflection before committing art and 
artists to a revolution? Or maybe, just like Genet, one can only join and support a revolution, 
however, by keeping a sense of non-belonging, thus, ending up eventually betraying it?
3.7. The (Old) New Right of Intervention 
In order to address some of these questions and concerns, I wish to take on Steyerl’s question – 
“What is the task of art in times of emergency?” – and bring it together with the question “What 
310 Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, p. 21.
311 Ahdaf Soueif, “Genet’s Palestinian Revolution,” The Nation, February 6, 2003.
312 Ahdaf Soueif, introduction (edited version), to Jean Genet, Prisoner of Love, trans. Barbara Bray (New 
York: New York Review of Books, 2003), accessed online June 30, 2019, 
http://www.ahdafsoueif.com/Articles/Genet_In_Palestine.pdf.
313 In der Maur, et al., Stateless Democracy, p. 244.
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part should intellectuals play in the revolution?” posed in Letter to Jane. Both the artist and the 
intellectual have been brought into a similar discourse and critique for more than a century. 
Moreover, the rise of modern art and of the modern intellectual can both be traced to the end of 
the nineteenth century. As discussed in Chapter Two, Emile Zola's open letter in defense of 
French Captain Alfred Dreyfus ignited the “birth of the intellectuals.” Zola's public letter was 
followed by the “manifesto of the intellectuals” signed by over a hundred leading French figures 
of that era. The word “intellectual” began to be used as a noun during that time in order to 
describe the willingness of established writers, such as Zola, André Gide, and Marcel Proust, to 
take a stand and make a political intervention.314 It can be said that the notion of intervention 
connects artists and intellectuals as does their being predominantly marginal, independent, and 
critical. Jean Baudrillard pointed out that, at least with respect to France, intellectuals “have 
inherited a great deal from the artists of the nineteenth century.”315 Although Baudrillard himself 
comes down strongly against the politicization of intellectuals, he agrees that there are occasions, 
rare as they might be, in which intellectuals might operate not only in opposition, but in a 
constructive “positivity.” When asked about Jean-Paul Sartre and intellectuals of the “age of 
Enlightenment,” he sees them as “lucky,” for they lived in a time in which a “new system of 
values was there, waiting, about to happen.”316 In his time, as far as he is concerned, no new 
alternatives exist or await, and therefore, intellectuals are doomed to remain in opposition as 
“carriers of negativity.”317 With that in mind, I suggest taking yet another look at our time, thirty 
314 Jeremy Jennings, Tony Kemp-Welch, eds., Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman 
Rushdie (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 7.
315 Mike Gane, ed., Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 75.
316 Ibid., p. 77.
317 Ibid., p. 75.
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years after Baudrillard’s statement. Might there be, in the second decade and onward of the 
twenty-first century, a greater common ground between artists and intellectuals, artists as 
intellectuals?318 What might have changed, and what new values or alternatives might be awaiting
artists as intellectuals nowadays? At a moment in time in which scholars such as Shlomo Sand 
are claiming that the idea of the “French intellectual” seems to have evaporated forever,319 is it 
not worth it now more than ever to pay attention to artists and their research and interventions in 
public affairs? According to Zygmunt Bauman, being an intellectual “is to rise above the partial 
preoccupation of one's own profession or artistic genre and engage with the global issues of truth,
judgment, and taste of the time.”320 The works of artists such as Bartana and Staal represent, time 
and again, an inclination to reformulate the role and position of the artist beyond a given frame in
the quest and commitment to take on urgent global matters. 
As discussed in Chapter One, globalization is unarguably one of the major changes extensively 
shaping behavior and consciousness in the last couple of decades. There is no need to repeat what
was established earlier on in this book, but it is important to recall that globalization and the 
nation-state, according to Sassen and Fraser, should not be understood as binary. Sassen suggests 
seeing the relationship between the nation-state and the global as a continuous process in which 
318 The debate surrounding the relationship between art and research, or art and science, is extensive and 
has proliferated greatly in recent years. For more reading on the subject: Julian Klein, “What Is Artistic 
Research?,” published in German in Gegenworte 23, Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (2010), English version accessed June 30, 2019, 
https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/15292/15293; Efva Lilija, “Art, Research, Empowerment: The 
Artist as Researcher,” Ministry of Education and Research, Sweden, 2015, accessed June 30, 2019, 
http://www.government.se/contentassets/7c02c282af4a43fc9c3623b7d9a9089e/art-research-
empowerment---the-artist-as-researcher.
319 Shlomo Sand, La fin de l’intellectuel français? De Zola à Houllebecq, trans. Michel Bilis (Paris: La 
Découverte, 2016). For an interview with Sand on the recent publication, accessed June 30, 2019, see 
http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2818-shlomo-sand-there-s-no-more-great-thinkers-in-france.
320 Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987), p. 2.
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the global emerges from the nation-state while maintaining strong ties and relations with it, and 
Fraser emphasizes the reshaping of the frame of conduct. In these times, defined and affected by 
a constant state of transition, one might not immediately find new values or a new “glorious 
alternative, a critical and glorious alternative,”321 as suggested by Baudrillard, but tipping points 
leading to a new organizing logic, a new frame of relevancy. This might very well be due to the 
fact that the way globalization structures new transformations beyond local governments, 
international treaties, and civil society and evolves into a new global logic, is complex and yet to 
be fully grasped by us, according to Sassen.322 However, there are capabilities that can originate 
from an early system and be transferred into a new frame. Tracking down a capability allows us 
to observe how a system does not go through a complete change, but rather uses an “old” 
capability that at a certain tipping point creates a new organizing logic as it gains new meanings. 
Based on this and in a reply of sorts to Baudrillard, one can claim that searching for “glorious” 
new values or alternatives is, thus, misleading in our time. Instead of doing so, one should 
carefully observe existing capabilities and the moment in which a tipping point (an 
event/moment/situation) occurs, providing old capabilities with new meaning or function and 
eventually leading to a new order under a new frame.
One capability I now wish to examine more closely is that of “intervention,” previously 
mentioned a couple of times. As mentioned above, it is the capability to intervene that is part of 
what connects both artists and intellectuals beginning from at least the nineteenth century 
321 Gane, ed., Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews, p. 78.
322 Sand also connects his thesis on the end of French intellectuals to globalization. According to him, 
“France is undergoing globalization, and it is reacting awkwardly to it, with a totalitarian image of its 
traditional culture. But it is not producing any new symbiosis.” “Shlomo Sand: ‘There’s no more great 
thinkers in France’,” Verso blog, accessed June 30, 2019,   https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2818-
shlomo-sand-there-s-no-more-great-thinkers-in-france. 
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onward. In the following, I will also refer to it as the “right of intervention,” bringing the legal 
aspect of such a right into the discussion. It will allow me to examine the work of Staal and of the
NWS in Rojava through an alteration of Steyerl’s question, or better yet, by proposing a new 
question – how did the capability of “intervention” transform,323 and how can it be used in a new 
way by artists? The (new) right of intervention was examined by one of the more renowned 
intellectuals in the time of Baudrillard. By this, I am referring to Michel Foucault, who according 
to Baudrillard himself was the most suited for a political intervention, and whom Shlomo Sand 
considers to be the last of the French intellectuals. Baudrillard describes Foucault as wanting to 
become a “political consultant at the highest governmental level,”324 but failed. Baudrillard is not 
alone in criticizing Foucault’s concept of the right of intervention, which came rather late in his 
life and scholarly research. At the UN in Geneva in 1981, he gave a short speech titled 
“Confronting Governments: Human Rights.”325 In this speech, Foucault advocated a new right, 
which Jessica Whyte claims was formulated against the backdrop of millions of Vietnamese 
refugees leaving their country from 1975 on.326 This new right was understood by Foucault as the 
right to intervene in “international policy and strategy,” in which a “right no longer appears as an 
instrument or mask of domination but, rather, as that which enables ‘the will of individuals’ to 
323 In 2004, Nato Thompson curated an exhibition titled The Interventionists: Art in the Social Sphere at 
MASS MoCA. This exhibition and the catalogue edited by Thompson and Gregory Sholette offered a 
survey of artistic practices of interventions in view of the growing use of the term beginning in the 1990s. 
In this chapter, unlike Thompson and Sholette’s view of intervention as a tactical creative disruption, I 
will attempt to position the right of intervention through and in a legal context in order to expand its scope
and judicial-visual potential. 
324 Gane, ed., Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews, p. 77. 
325 Michel Foucault, “The rights and duties of international citizenship,” Open Democracy, accessed June 
30, 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/michel-foucault/rights-and-duties-of-
international-citizenship.
326 Jessica Whyte, Human rights: Confronting Governments? Michal Foucault and the right to intervene, 
Law and the Political, Matthew Stone, Illan rua Wall, Costas Douzinas, eds. (London: Routledge, 2012). 
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wrench from governments the monopolization of the power to effectively intervene.”327 Whyte 
also points out that the new right of intervention suggested by Foucault contradicts an earlier 
lecture he gave in 1976 titled “Right in the West is the King's right.” In this, Foucault previously 
described his research as “an attempt to reverse the mode of analysis of the discourse of right in 
order to show that right is itself an instrument of domination.” If that is the case, then the new 
right proposed by him, as a capability entrusted to organizations and NGOs such as Amnesty 
International, requires further explanation. Considering Foucault's realization that rights and 
discipline operate together and not in opposition, a possible solution can only be found if the new
right to intervene can be both anti-disciplinary and independent of sovereignty. Yet, Whyte does 
not find such a possibility to be at hand, as attempts to save lives and support human rights by 
humanitarian organizations since the 1960s resulted, according to her, in breaching the 
sovereignty of states along with the prolongation of conflicts rather than bringing them to an end. 
Moreover, the right of intervention executed by NGOs has been appropriated and mobilized, 
claims Whyte, by the nation-state. In addition, “Today, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
is a key legitimating discourse for state militarism,”328 emptying the right of intervention of its 
humanitarian origin. 
Nevertheless, and although Whyte states that Foucault cannot, of course, be held responsible for 
these consequences by claiming a right of intervention,329 can we still find a way to defend the 
right to intervene? Can we save this right from being abandoned or simply turned over into the 
hands of the “international community” and the world order and structures that this implies? Can 
327 Ibid, p. 13.
328 Ibid., p. 29.
329 Whyte cites as an example Foucault's refusal to sign a petition in 1983 calling for the French 
government to act against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.
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a right intended to address the suffering of humans be re-envisioned through visual activism and 
not be based on only pity towards bare and sacred life? If we take into account the right of 
intervention as a capability that has been transforming, for the frame of this discussion, from 
Foucault to Staal, from the nation-state into the logic of a new, globalized order and frame, I wish
to claim that one should allow artists to examine, experiment with, and execute this right. The 
tipping point that we might be experiencing now is the one I have identified in Chapter One 
through the change in artistic practice from short-term projects to artists’ political organization. 
This is a new phenomenon, which can fail just as it can also succeed, but the fact that it is new 
requires that we provide it with time and space for experimentation, research, and further 
development. 
Catharine A. MacKinnon's reading of international law after the events of 9/11 also support this. 
According to her, and supported by other scholars since September 11, 2001, a significant shift 
has been made in which non-states are treated as states as part of an international “war against 
terror.”330  This, suggests MacKinnon, as I have shown above, is a radical change in international 
law, which has brought with it tremendous changes in the policies and conduct of the 
international community. Following this change, one can claim that what Staal and the NWS are 
doing is an artistic appropriation of the amendment in international law. In other words, what 
330 “Practice indicates that the influence non-State actors exert in the development of traditional law-
making instruments has been increasing, but also that the degree is still subject-matter dependent. Though 
non-State actors' influence is mostly indirect, they have taken on a significant role. The origins of this 
development can be explained by an ever-increasing awareness of the need for co-ordinated responses to 
global problems. The result however is a development towards a diverse range of actors contributing to a 
decentralized form of law-making within the international community [...]. Furthermore, it remains to be 
seen how the legal system will be able to cope with this added multi-layered complexity and dispersion of 
authority. This may in the long run lead to a transformation vis-à-vis the requirement of legal capacity for 
actors on the international plane, a transformation that international law practice and scholarship has yet to
take full account of.” See: Markus Wagner, Non-State Actors, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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Staal and the NWS are claiming is that if the international community and bodies such as the UN 
and NATO legitimate a fight against non-state actors, let us take this further and be part of such 
non-state actors, i.e., Rojava as an actor claiming to be stateless (or, in MacKinnon's terminology,
a non-state). If the international community recognizes non-state actors in order to fight them, 
why could it not just as well recognize them the other way around in order to make peace? While 
the international community went to war against non-state actors considered terror groups, Staal 
and the NWS require us to ponder – what happens in the case in which a non-state actor exists, 
but not as a terror group? If the logic of the new order played down by the international 
community since 9/11 accepts fighting against non-state actors, should it not accept non-state 
actors as allies in peace in the same way? Here, I must again return to MacKinnon's reading and 
the gender perspective she offers to us regarding the events that followed 9/11. We again need to 
pay attention to her harsh probing questions, one of which I quote in its entirety: 
Why did the condition of Afghan women, imprisoned in their clothes and homes 
for years, whipped if an ankle emerged, prohibited education or employment or 
political office or medical care on the basis of sex, and subjected to who yet knows
what other male violence, not rank with terrorism or rise on the international 
agenda to the level of a threatening conflict? Why were those who sounded the 
alarm about their treatment ignored? Why, with all the violations of international 
law and repeated Security Council resolutions, was their treatment alone not an act
of war or a reason to intervene (including, yes, militarily) on any day up to 
September 10, 2001?331
It is not that the right of intervention does not exist, or has ceased to be executed, as MacKinnon 
meticulously argues, and as I have discussed above. As we are all well aware of by now, the right 
of intervention has been activated since 9/11 on non-state actors based on a gender-based, biased 
logic. Thus, it should come as no surprise that both MacKinnon and Sontag refer to Virginia 
Woolf and her book on war, Three Guineas, published in 1938. It is, points out Sontag, one of 
331 MacKinnon, “Women’s September 11th: Rethinking the International Law of Conflict,” p. 20.
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Woolf 's less read books. This might be due to the fact that Woolf  perceives, as Sontag did until 
her death in 2004, and as MacKinnon continues to do in her writings and women’s rights 
advocacy, “that the killing machine has a gender, and it is male.”332 Staal realizes this as well, 
working in collaboration with the Kurdish Women's Movement from the very first Summit in 
Berlin to the one in 2015 in Rojava. His work is a call for the re-appropriation of democracy from
the hands of the international community, which turns a blind eye to recurrent human rights 
violations under the guise of the “war on terror.” Staal and the NWS tell us that when women 
claim their own equal space and role in a revolution, artists must formulate and execute a 
capability in the format of a right as was advocated by Foucault. Artists, according to this 
position, need to recognize that a tipping point directs us nowadays towards a new global frame 
and logic in which an (old) new right of intervention that has been long shared by intellectuals 
and artists alike calls their attention and demands their action. If not, if artists choose to remain 
outsiders, or mere spectators in their “well-off countries,” as argued by Susan Sontag, they end up
acting with truly “breathtaking provincialism.”333 
An artistic right of intervention as proposed by Staal and the NWS serves as one example of how
artists provide a further step in relation to state intervention and NGOs. In face of globalization,
as discussed in Chapter One, Staal's NWS is to be perceived as part of an ongoing development
in  which  “transnational  coalitions  of  human-rights  activists  are  seeking  to  build  new
cosmopolitan institutions [...].”334 However, unlike such institutions as the International Criminal
Court,  Staal  in  his  judicial-visual  activism,  positions  us  toward  a  new trajectory of  possible
332 Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, p. 5.
333 Ibid., pp. 98-99.
334 Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 14.
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transnational and local institutions, thus rejuvenating our concept of democracy in these times. In
a recent statement composed by a group of 150 Syrian intellectuals, known for opposing the
Assad regime for many years now, they “condemn the Russian and US approach of intervening in
our internal Syrian affairs. At least since 2013, these two powers have been working to co-opt the
Syrian liberation struggle under the rubric of the ‘war against terror.’ This is a war that has failed
to score a single success since its outset, and has led instead to the destruction of a number of
countries.”335 They  disapprove  completely  of  both  American  and  Russian  intervention  and
perceive it as unjust and immoral. Similar to Staal and the NWS, they “see democracy in retreat
around the world, while surveillance, control, and fear are rife and advancing. We do not believe
that our fate is defined by these conditions, but rather that these are a result of dangerous choices
taken by dangerous political elites [...].”336 The devastating destruction of Syria is, according to
them, “a symbol of the state of the world today,” claiming that “This world must change,”337
leading us to need to “make a world,” in the words of Staal. These globally known figures –
democratic and secular writers, artists, scholars, and journalists – do not make a claim against the
right  of  intervention  itself,  but  rather  against  the  international  community  and  its  lack  of
humanity. In the context of violence against women, MacKinnon continues to address us with
vital questions, ones that should spark creativity and imagination also in relation to other causes
ignored  by the  international  community:  “Why does  no  international  model  –  not  war,  not
criminal law, not yet  even human rights – intervene effectively in this anywhere? Why does
335 “Syrian Writers, Artists, and Journalists Speak Out Against US and Russian Policy,” The Nation, 
September 21, 2016, accessed June 30, 2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/syrian-writers-artists-and-
journalists-speak-out-against-us-and-russian-policy/.
336 Ibid.
337 Ibid.
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finding effective modes of intervention raise no international sense of urgency?”338 Any possible
answer, as this chapter indicates, should include and be based on artistic capabilities of models of
interventions.  
338 MacKinnon, “Women’s September 11th: Rethinking the International Law of Conflict,” p. 22. 
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Chapter Four – Art and Law: Disputes, Encounters, and Justice
4.1. Introduction
Following an exploration in the previous chapter on the right of intervention, this chapter seeks to
further investigate the emergence of rights through disputes in the event of an encounter. I begin 
with two cases of artists working as part of governmental institutions, in the attempt to infuse a 
legal reading and underline its implicit, or explicit, effect on their creative work. The influential 
legal essay on how disputes emerge by William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat 
serves as a legal textual source and format through which I will articulate and critically examine 
mainly the work of artists Mierle Laderman Ukeles and Ruti Sela. Ukeles is a renowned example 
of an early interest among artists in governmental and administrative institutions. Sela, along with
the work of Artist Placement Group (APG), to which I will attend as well in this chapter, are 
further attempts at what was called the “Incidental Artist” by APG. Bearing in mind restrictions 
that are part of any artistic residency within a governmental environment, the work of Sela in the 
midst of a legal department is very much related to the overall motivation of my research.
Following that, I will delve into yet another, more recent legal publication by Itamar Mann on the
right of the encounter. This will provide me with further conceptual means to engage with the 
work of artist Lawrence Abu Hamdan.339 By adding the work of Abu Hamdan into the discussion,
I shall examine yet another manner in which a contemporary artist is invested in working with 
legal matters as part of his artistic research and practice. The intersection between law and art, in 
what I have defined in previous chapters as judicial-visual activism, enables art, I will argue, to 
339 Lawrence Abu Hamdan contributed his work “Testimony” (2013) to the OnCurating 28 edition I edited 
(January 2016). I also presented his video “Rubber Coated Steel” (2016) in an exhibition I curated at 
transit.sk Bratislava titled Playing Hide and Law (March-May 2017). 
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claim a political dimension of justice. From Ukeles to Forensic Architecture, I will argue that, 
through an encounter, rights emerge that are constructed in judicial-visual activism. The legal 
component in artistic creation underlined in this chapter allows us to further comprehend how the
three dimensions of justice suggested by Nancy Fraser – recognition, redistribution, and political 
representation – come to fruition.
4.2.  Mierle Laderman Ukeles – Naming Maintenance as Art
Beginning her work in the 1960s, Mierle Laderman Ukeles' artistic œuvre has in recent years 
been receiving much deserved attention and broad recognition by museums worldwide.340 In 
order to fully understand the innovation of Ukeles' work, I must begin by reviewing her own 
biography, as it deliberately stands at the core of her practice and research. Born in Denver, 
Colorado, in 1939 to a Jewish family in which the father was a rabbi,341 she grew up in the US of 
the 1950s. It was a period described by Ukeles as being “a really weird time especially for a 
woman.”342 The constraints and limitations endured by her as a woman during those days proved 
to be the very thing that later nourished her creative work. Wishing to break away from her 
parents’ home and immediate surroundings, she moved to New York City and began her studies 
340 One recent example is the expansive survey conducted in 2016 by the Queens Museum in NYC. See 
“Mierle Laderman Ukeles: Maintenance Art,” Queens Museum, accessed August 11, 2017, 
http://www.queensmuseum.org/2016/04/mierle-laderman-ukeles-maintenance-art. It follows extensive 
solo exhibitions at the Marabouparken Art Gallery in Sweden in 2015; at the Institute of Modern Art 
(IMA) in Australia in 2014; and a large-scale solo exhibition organized by the Grazer Kunstverein and 
Arnolfini Bristol in 2013, curated by Krist Gruijthuijsen.
341 Patricia C. Phillips notes the landscape and weather of Colorado as being influential on Ukeles's art, but 
it is her Jewish family, with its commitment to religion and secular studies alongside a strong connection 
to community work, that had an even greater influence on her. See: Patricia C. Phillips, “Making 
Necessity Art,” in Mierle Laderman Ukeles: Maintenance Art, Patricia C. Phillips, ed. (New York: Queens
Museum, Prestel, 2016), pp. 28-29.
342 “Mierle Laderman Ukeles talks about Maintenance Art,” Artforum Videos, 2016, accessed June 30, 
2019, https://www.artforum.com/video/id=63533&mode=large.
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at the Pratt Institute. Influenced by teachers (all male) such as the artists George McNeil and 
Robert Richenburg, Ukeles recalls Richenburg's lectures at Pratt Institute on art as freedom. “I 
just flipped, that is what I wanted,”343 yet due to conflicts with the institute's administration, 
Richenburg was fired; Ukeles subsequently left to study at NYU.344 
Ukeles’ strong sense of freedom and self-empowerment through art endured within her. They also
came into conflict with her personal life when she became a mother. A feeling of an inner split 
between her love for her daughter and simply being bored by the need to care for her had been 
difficult to overcome. She began to comprehend that she was losing her position as an artist and 
with it her sense of freedom. Moreover, this understanding came along with the recognition that 
she stood in this position alone, without those, such as her teachers, whom she previously 
considered to be her artistic role models and sources of inspiration. Her teachers, just as other 
leading artists whom she names in the interview – such as Jackson Pollock, Marcel Duchamp, 
and Mark Rothko – were all white male figures. In the conflict she experienced between her 
personal and professional life, she began to realize that unlike her they had never needed to attend
to a crying baby. Before giving up and surrendering to the feeling that “my brain is going to blow
out of the top of my head,” she gradually developed a realization that her household work was 
her art.345 As a consequence of that, the pivotal moment arose when she was able to name her 
maintenance work as art. To Ukeles, as she explains in the video interview, it was a matter of 
343 Ibid.
344 "In 1974, after transferring to New York University, Ukeles wrote a 229-page master's thesis titled ‘An 
Analysis of Maintenance Art: Inquiry and Creative Process,’” Lucy R. Lippard, “Never Done,” in Mierle 
Laderman Ukeles: Maintenance Art, p. 16.
345 As Lucy R. Lippard writes: “The origins of Ukeles's Maintenance Art Works (which preceded the West 
Coast's 1972 Womanhouse) were conceptual, private performance pieces in which the artist's children 
were dressed, fed, diapered, and walked.” See: Patricia C. Phillips, Mierle Laderman Ukeles: 
Maintenance Art, p. 15.
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juxtaposing a Western notion of freedom with a non-Western notion of repetitiveness. The 
possibility that occurred to her of combining maintenance with art was a defining moment, as she
achieved personal and artistic freedom through the act of naming. For Ukeles, as she explains it, 
her action is yet another chain in the process of discoveries in the history of modern art. It is 
another chain in the heritage of naming given to us by Duchamp who realized the power to name 
and re-name things.346
Some years later after Ukeles’ actions, the powerful act of naming was also researched and 
recognized as a vital component in the field of law. The essay “The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming…” published in 1980 by William L.F. 
Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat, is one of the most read and cited legal scholarly 
work of recent decades. In referring to this essay in relation to Ukeles and the process of naming 
in art, I aspire to offer a reflection on the evolution of an artistic claim through legal terms in 
order to prompt a critical discussion on the reciprocal relation between law and art. In 
continuation with the case of Jonas Staal, I argue that the legal terminology and formulation 
offered through this sort of reading is particularity vital for a broader perception of the work of 
such artists as Ukeles, whose long-term efforts have been in directing their artistic knowledge and
practice towards a critical examination of the power of the nation-state and its administrative and 
legal institutions. I argue that the exchange between the two fields, often times left unnoticed or 
dismissed, is what allows art to shape and take part in politics.
4.3. Justice and the Evolution of Disputes
346 “In these terms, the ready-made must be considered not only as the recontextualization of a material 
object, but also as an overly linguistic act – specifically, an act of naming.”  Visual Culture in Twentieth-
Century Germany, Text as Spectacle, Gail Finney, ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), p. 
75. On naming and Duchamp in relation to Slavoj Žižek, see Robert Kilroy, The Sublime Object of 
Iconology: Duchampian Appellation as Žižekian Interpellation (Montreal: Seachange, 2015), pp. 129-157.
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I argue that any thorough understanding of the work of Ukeles needs to grasp its quest for justice,
oftentimes also in a legal context. In order to better trace and analyze this in her work, it is worth 
briefly noting the three dimensions of justice as they are argued by Nancy Fraser. According to 
Fraser, in face of globalization, which utterly changes the frame of justice from that of a nation-
state based to that of transnationality,347 we need to reconsider justice as made not only of two 
dimensions – recognition and distribution – but need to also add its third dimension – the 
political.348 By this, Fraser indicates that any theory of justice must include “the political 
dimension of representation alongside the economic dimension of distribution and the cultural 
dimension of recognition.” In the following pages, I will be looking into the work of Ukeles 
through the prism of the theory of disputes, along with underscoring the dimensions of justice 
(and injustice) in the work of Ukeles, bearing in mind Fraser's idea of justice. It is important at 
first to note that, by understanding disputes about injustice as social constructions, Felstiner, 
Abel, and Sarat shifted the research from the institutions in which disputes are conducted and 
settled to the individual, in that they argued that “a significant portion of any dispute exists only 
in the minds of the disputants,”349 which necessitates researching the preliminary stages of 
disputes. In a manner similar to Ukeles, whose groundbreaking work resulted from her own 
347 As discussed in Chapter One, my study takes the position of a non-binary relation between the nation-
state and the global; a relation in which the global stems from the national and for the time being 
continues to hold a reciprocal relation with the nation-state. This formulation allows me to reframe the 
discussion on justice as endorsed by Nancy Fraser, while intertwining it with that of Saskia Sassen.
348 “Of course, distribution and recognition are themselves political in the sense of being contested and 
power-laden; and they have usually been seen as requiring adjudication by the state. But, I mean political 
in a more specific, constitutive sense, which concerns the scope of the state's jurisdiction and the decision 
rules by which it structures contestation. The political in this sense furnishes the stage on which struggles 
over distribution and recognition are played out [...] the political dimension of justice specifies the reach 
of those other dimensions: it tells us who is included in, and who excluded from, the circle of those 
entitled to a just distribution and reciprocal recognition [...] the political dimension of justice is concerned 
chiefly with representation.” Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a 
Globalizing World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 17.
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personal experience, they demonstrated the importance of observing social conditions and 
directing our attention to the individual perception of grievances, injury, conflict, and injustice. 
Instead of beginning with legal institutions (or in the case of Ukeles, with art institutions), 
Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat maintain that, “People make their own law,”350 and therefore, our 
analysis of conflicts and disputes must involve them. If we take Ukeles as an example, then 
according to Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat, what she did first was perceive her problems and distress 
as part of everyday life. They argue that a dispute does not emerge in most of the cases. Even 
when injustice or injury occurs, as human beings we are asked to tolerate them as part of our life 
experience. As such, being a mother and showing love to her child through constant household 
maintenance was at first tolerated by Ukeles and perceived as a force of nature. Ukeles, just as 
generations of women before her, invested her efforts in tolerating a state of mental distress and 
pain. What Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat, began to show is that “any experience that is disvalued by 
the person to whom it occurs”351 might be considered an injurious experience. Yet, one must go 
through a process of transformation from a state of unperceived injurious experience (unPIE) to a
perceived injurious experience (PIE), in order to first claim justice in its two dimensions of 
recognition and redistribution.
Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat also tell us that the feeling of injustice or of injury is not universal; 
thus, the same unperceived injurious experience will be valued and perceived differently by 
different people even when under the same circumstances. The crucial individual change from 
349 William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat, “The Emergence and Transformation of 
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming…,” Law & Society Review Vol. 15, No. 3/4, Special Issue on 
Dispute Processing and Civil Litigation (1980 - 1981): 631-654. 
350 Ibid., p. 633.
351 Ibid., p. 634.
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unPIE to PIE begins with the act of naming. In the case of Ukeles, the realization of her own 
capabilities352 can be perceived in the act of naming her maintenance household work as art. 
Ukeles is aware that her act of naming could be considered “bullshit, but so what,”353 but in terms
of her and Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat’s understanding, she has made the first critical step in the 
process of transforming her own perception. Now that Ukeles is aware of her capabilities and can
name her injury, she experiences what Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat identified as a stage of 
grievance. It is the second step in their theory of disputes in which one is able to perceive a fault 
that was imposed and is then able to direct the grievance towards a specific person or institution. 
“The injured person must feel wronged and believe that something might be done in response to 
the injury, however politically or sociologically improbable such a response might be.”354 They 
call the move from PIE to grievance “blaming,” and it can be perceived in what Ukeles does. If 
before naming her injury – the lack of freedom, being constrained and discriminated against as a 
woman – her feelings were nonspecific and with no identified objective, in her manifesto for 
maintenance art written in 1969, one can trace the development into the step of blaming. 
Someone needs to clean the garbage the day after the revolution,355 Ukeles realizes as a 
consequence of her act of naming. “Maintenance is a drag; it takes all the fucking time,”356 she 
352 I use the term capabilities throughout this work in continuation and in accordance with Saskia Sassen, 
as discussed in Chapter One.
353 “Mierle Laderman Ukeles talks about Maintenance Art.”
354 Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat, “The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, 
Claiming…,” p. 635.
355 In her Manifesto for Maintenance Art (1969), Ukeles wrote under idea B. “Two basic systems: 
Development and Maintenance. The sourball of every revolution: after the revolution, who’s going to pick
up the garbage on Monday morning?” Mierle Laderman Ukeles, M A N I F E S T O! MAINTENANCE 
ART 1969!, accessed June 30, 2019, https://www.arnolfini.org.uk/blog/manifesto-for-maintenance-art-
1969.
356 Ukeles, M A N I F E S T O! MAINTENANCE ART 1969!.
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writes, but no one wants to deal with this fact. Writing a manifesto for maintenance, naming her 
maintenance as art, allows Ukeles to not only transform her own perception in order to regain her
freedom and creativity as an artist, but to also identify those who have treated her unjustly. 
Naming and then blaming opens up new transformational possibilities for Ukeles, as she realizes 
she is not alone, and forms a sense of solidarity with other maintenance workers, which like her 
earn little respect and no money. 
In other words, the naming of her household work as art allows Ukeles to blame society for the 
injustice towards all those who are under the “lousy status of maintenance jobs = minimum 
wages, housewives = no pay.”357 Yet, as Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat state, the blaming requires a 
clear respondent, which can also be traced in the case of Ukeles. She starts her manifesto with 
general abstract ideas of life and death instincts, and of separation versus unification. Before 
identifying those whom she could blame, she points out the systemic failures in our development,
maintenance, and cultural systems. However, soon afterward, with the introduction of art into the 
discussion, Ukeles is able to make her complaint specific by directing it towards the art 
institution. It is, at this stage, not a demand against Western culture, or American society as a 
whole. Rather, it is an articulated demand for justice directed towards existing art institutions and 
against their wrongdoing in repressing and avoiding the importance, relevance, and influence of 
maintenance in and on their institutions just as in everyday life. Ukeles’ naming of maintenance 
as art, hence, allows her to formulate her transformation and blame art institutions for reinforcing 
the marginalization of female artists within the art world, just as of women in society at large.  
The third stage in an emergence of a dispute according to Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat's theory is the
act of claiming – seeking a remedy to one’s grievance or injury. In a legal context, this can lead to
357 Ibid.
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an engagement with the court, and in the art world, at least in the manner Ukeles formed it, to an 
exhibition; already her manifesto encompasses a proposal for an exhibition to be titled: Care. 
Ukeles’ manifesto, in that sense, embodies within it already all three components of a dispute. It 
unites the naming-blaming-claiming into an appeal for a structured exhibition during which all 
levels of maintenance will be brought out of the abyss of oblivion. Ukeles demands to present in 
a museum context and space the daily routine of maintenance in order to retrieve for herself the 
role of an artist and to mark her daily household work as art by the art establishment. In her wish 
to form a coalition with fellow maintenance workers, Ukeles also demands in her manifesto that a
significant part of the exhibition be devoted to interviews exploring the theme of maintenance, 
alongside a space dedicated to containers delivered to the museum with the contents of one 
sanitation truck, to be maintained throughout the duration of the exhibition. Yet, Ukeles does not 
use legal terminology or perceptions of justice. The lack of use of a legal structure, or of a call for
multidimensional justice, as I am suggesting here, is what also prevents her actions from reaching
further fruition. 
In 1971, Ukeles’ manifesto is published in Artforum, which prompts her to send the proposal, her 
claim, for an exhibition to the Whitney Museum of American Art. In a conversation with Tom 
Finkelpearl,358 Ukeles recalls how her approach to the museum was dismissed, as she was advised
that she should first try out her ideas in the context and space of an art gallery.359 Following 
Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat, the museum's rejection of Ukeles is the event in which a dispute can be
fully elevated into a claim, or if, following Fraser, in which the political dimension of justice is 
358 Tom Finkelpearl, Dialogues in Public Art (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001).
359 Patricia C. Phillips writes that Ukeles sent her manifesto also to the American Craft Museum, to no 
avail. Patricia C. Phillips, “Making Necessity Art,” in Mierle Laderman Ukeles: Maintenance Art, Patricia
C. Phillips, ed. (New York: Queens Museum, Prestel, 2016), p. 41.
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being contested. One is also reminded by Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat that only rarely will the action
of naming-blaming-claiming mature into a full-fledged dispute, for this depends much on one’s 
own social and personal background. Ukeles’ education and socioeconomic position, and also the
historical time period of student protests, might explain why the museum's rejection did not deter 
her motivation to elevate maintenance into an art form. According to her, she realized that they 
“misunderstood. You see, I felt that it was the museum that could be the site where the public 
comes to understand itself.”360 In other words, she sees the site of the museum as the place to 
claim justice and her rights. If we compare and use legal terminology, then what happened to 
Ukeles, as often is the case in a legal procedure as well, is that her standing was not recognized.361
Naming maintenance as art, articulating her grief in the form of a complaint, and voicing her 
claim offered Ukeles confirmation of her invisibility in relation to the museum, and her struggle 
for recognition. We can only speculate about what might have happened if she had formulated her
arguments in the form of a legal dispute. However, what is clear is that Ukeles does not translate 
her claim into a struggle for justice, nor does a legal claim emerge. She has lost her freedom, she 
has been discriminated against, and yet her standing, or locus standi in legal terms, is rejected by 
the same museum establishment that has historically and systemically contributed to her injustice.
360 Tom Finkelpearl, Dialogues in Public Art, p. 306.
361 The determination of standing before a court varies in different jurisdictions based on local legislation 
and constitutions. In short, “Litigants must demonstrate they have suffered an injury-in-fact that is caused 
by the defendant’s conduct and is likely redressable by a grant of the plaintiff’s prayed-for relief. Many a 
challenge to government action has been turned away because the plaintiff, though able to demonstrate a 
violation of legal rights, lacked sufficiently ‘imminent’ or ‘concrete’ injury, or failed to convince the court 
in pretrial proceedings that the requested relief would be sufficiently likely to remedy the alleged injury.” 
See: Evan Tsen Lee and Josephine Mason Ellis, “Standing's Dirty Little Secret,” Northwestern University 
Law Review 107: 1 (2012): 170-171.
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Consequently, Ukeles, as she tells Finkelpearl, had decided to embark on other routes while not 
giving up on maintenance art. She arranged for her maintenance work to be shown in the format 
of performances in different exhibitions and locations, giving maintenance work a presence in the
context of art institutions. Finally, in 1976, six years after her manifesto was published, Ukeles 
was invited to show at a satellite branch of the Whitney Museum at 55 Walker Street in NYC.  In 
her conversation, Ukeles talks in detail about the extraordinary opportunity with which she was 
presented, in which she was able to work with 300 maintenance workers. Her agony and refusal 
from being shown previously in the museum seem to have drifted away. Being accepted into the 
realm of the museum does not, at least not consciously, disturb Ukeles, or play a role in her 
work.362 Instead, as the museum's branch was located in a skyscraper that also hosted other 
institutions, it was a chance for Ukeles to engage with a large number of people working on the 
ongoing daily routine of maintaining such a building. In this, Ukeles expressed a wish “to turn 
the tables,”363 by joining forces with the building's maintenance workers in a mutual effort to turn 
their work into art. In other words, she intended for them to experience the act of naming she had 
experienced herself about a decade earlier. Realizing that those workers rarely enter the museum's
exhibition space as viewers, but usually only to execute maintenance tasks, she invited them to 
create an art piece in collaboration with her, to be exhibited as part of the exhibition at the 
Whitney. Ukeles left it to them to decide whether to take part in the piece or not, and to decide 
whether their maintenance work was art, or not. She documented the process with her Polaroid 
camera, and while she claims no one ever refused to be photographed, one cannot go without 
362 According to Patricia C. Phillips, Ukeles’ participation in the exhibition was not through a direct 
invitation by the museum. Rather, Ukeles participated in an exhibition titled Art  < > World arranged by 
the students of the museum's Independent Study Program (ISP), September 16 to October 20, 1976. See 
Phillips, “Making Necessity Art,” p. 80.
363 Tom Finkelpearl, Dialogues in Public Art, p. 308.
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contesting this process on sociological, economic, and political grounds.364 Besides being the one 
initiating the collaboration as expected by the institution, Ukeles is the one naming the piece and 
the one who comes from a privileged position of power that allows her to be able to articulate, 
even if only partially, her injustice in the frame of a dispute. As Ukeles herself attests, she needed 
to gain the trust of her collaborators, many of whom where immigrants worried about their legal 
statuses being exposed, or others being suspicious of whether she might be working on behalf of 
the building's management. Gradually Ukeles gained their trust, and her art piece titled I Make 
Maintenance Art One Hour Every Day became a tapestry of 700 Polaroid pictures.365 
As I have explored above, the dispute emerges by Ukeles gradually, only to be blocked at first by 
the museum. As the years passed, she is recognized and invited into the museum space, but if we 
judge this process only from the representation of her work, we shall end up with a very limited 
story. In the frame of the naming-blaming-claiming dispute theory, we can say that Ukeles might 
have presented her workers/collaborators with a few tools in order to support an act of naming; 
however, the blaming and certainly the claiming are hardly able to be voiced by them in the 
frame she constructed. The lack of formulation by Ukeles of her work as part of a struggle for 
justice in which recognition, distribution, and representation are bound together leaves her work, 
in my opinion, a far distance from the goals she set out to reach in her 1969 manifesto. The 700 
photos hanging on a wall do not emerge into a dispute, or, in other words, it does not entitle her, 
or the maintenance workers/collaborators, to any rights to blame and further claim justice. The 
364 Lucy R. Lippard, in her catalogue essay for Ukeles’ exhibition at Queens Museum, sees the naming by 
the participants of their work as maintenance art or maintenance work as a “voluntarily” act; however, I 
suggest one needs be more critically suspicious of such possibility.
365 Patricia C. Phillips states that, “Almost everyone complied.” She sees the action of Ukeles as almost 
automatically giving the employees the status of “co-creators and decision-makers with agency and 
autonomy to identify their activities as either ‘work’ or ‘art’.” See Phillips, “Making Necessity Art,” p. 82.
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dimension of recognition has been achieved by Ukeles by being invited to show her work at the 
museum. Yet, when justice is perceived as three-dimensional, we can say that the dimensions of 
redistribution and the political have not been reached. Thus, the question of whether there can be 
another way to read or to imagine Ukeles’ work and its contribution to the discourse of rights is 
necessary. Offering a reflection on this may also lead to some new consideration of the role of 
artists in the claiming and the construction of rights. For Ukeles, her naming of maintenance as 
art and the writing of a manifesto allowed an understanding to arise regarding the existing 
relations of power, and her struggle – on the one hand, between her position as a woman and as a 
mother, and on the other, between being a household worker and connecting to other maintenance
workers beyond her private realm. All are part of the same class, as she noted earlier in her 
manifesto. They are all united under the umbrella of no wages, or a minimum-wage, underpaid 
salary. She realized the political dimension by uniting women and service workers, as they are the
majority of the world. Yet, she also witnessed the failure of what she perceived to be “a 
revolution linking up feminism with service workers, crossing gender with economic class.”366 
366 Tom Finkelpearl, Dialogues in Public Art, p. 311.
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4.4. Sanitation Department: First Encounters
After a review on her work at the Whitney was published, suggesting that the NY Sanitation 
Department increase their budget through characterizing it as performance art, Ukeles decided to 
expand the scope of her work and break away from the art institution. Adding the newspaper’s 
review to her letter to the Sanitation Department commissioner, Ukeles was invited over for a 
talk during which she was encouraged by the commissioner to get to know the department by 
talking with the employees. In other words, he offered for her to use the method of an encounter 
– to create a face-to-face event with the workers. Neither he nor Ukeles uses the term 
“encounter,” but I will argue for the necessity to go beyond what Ukeles describes as talking and 
“bumping into people.”367 To begin with, the definition that the Merriam-Webster dictionary 
provides for the term “encounter” is revealing: “To meet an adversary or enemy; to engage in 
conflict with; to come upon face-to-face; to come upon or experience especially 
unexpectedly.”368 When Ukeles embarks on her mission to meet the workers of the department, 
she encounters harsh feelings of neglected people united by a deep feeling of being invisible 
amid their surroundings. She might feel solidarity with the working class, but in too many ways 
she is certainly not part of it. The mistrust already expressed by the workers during the 
preparations for the Whitney exhibition repeats itself here. In that sense, Ukeles and the workers 
stand on two different sides of the barricade. They are adversaries meeting in an unexpected 
space and under particular conditions. According to Ukeles, the working environment she had 
encountered was one of abandonment, taking place in poor and “utterly disgusting places.” The 
workers were doing away with garbage, she recalls, but garbage is the image that sticks with 
367
 Ibid., p. 312.
368 Merriam-Webster online dictionary, s.v. "Encounter," accessed June 30, 2019.
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them. They are in charge of such an important part of the city's life and health, but they are hated 
and looked down on by people. They share with her the fact that people identify them with maids
or mothers, and are dismissive of them. Through this, they also underline both what connects 
them and separates them at the very same time, for they are men perceived as doing a woman's 
job, not to be seen outside the territory of the household. For Ukeles, the feeling of invisibility of
these people whose work is distinguishably done in the public eye – the sense of split between 
inside and outside, between what is spoken and what is denied – made it a perfect ground on 
which to conduct an intervention. Subsequently, Ukeles’ work at the department began with the 
work “Touch Sanitation” – the creation and manifestation of an ongoing encounter. During this, 
Ukeles shook the hands of every one of the thousands of workers of the department, telling them 
“Thank you for keeping New York City alive.” Other works followed, such as “Transfer Station 
Transformation,” which incorporated a ballet choreographed by Ukeles for “six garbage barges 
and two tugs.”369 
Since 1977, and up to this very day, Ukeles remains an artist-in-residence at the Department of 
Sanitation, which remains an unpaid and non-funded position. Tom Finkelpearl argues that this 
position offers Ukeles “the opportunity to chart her own course, to claim the whole city as her 
site,”370 providing her with unbounded artistic freedom. However, is this not the same mechanism
of unequal payment that triggered Ukeles to write her manifesto and name her maintenance 
household work as art at the first place?371 Is it not yet another demonstration of the consistency 
369 Tom Finkelpearl, Dialogues in Public Art, p. 315.
370 Ibid., p. 295.
371 It is worth noting that in Ukeles' first letter to the Sanitation Department Commissioner, she did 
propose a mechanism of payment, which was never implemented. “Perhaps we could work out a 
complete switch with you applying directly to N.E.A. grant for yourselves and me applying directly for a 
federal grant in maintenance-research systems (or some such animal).” See Phillips, “Making Necessity 
Art,” p. 89.
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of injury and injustice as the dimension of redistribution that is overlooked or declared as 
irrelevant? What was missed in the exchange and encounter that her work prompted among 
maintenance workers? What from Ukeles' journey into maintenance as art has been lost, thereby 
hindering a revolution from happening? At this point, returning to current legal research yields 
new ways of re-imagining contemporary artistic interventions woven into legal and political 
actions. Rarely considered as relevant as compared to other scholarly resources, the appeal to the
legal can help suggest means of creating rights and of fighting injustice. As I have demonstrated 
in previous chapters, the intertwining of art with law makes it political, as it allows art to define 
injustice and claims for rights. Interventions based on artistic capabilities activated in the event 
of an encounter can be perceived as standing at the core of Ukeles' work, just as in the work of 
legal scholars of our time. In articulating Ukeles’ work within the framework of legal scholarship
on human rights, I argue for the possibility of positioning it as a source for the creation of rights, 
paving the way for more diverse and firm claims by artists in relation to law. Patricia C. Phillips 
writes that the unpaid position of Ukeles needs to be newly considered.372 Bringing law into the 
discussion, I will argue, is one necessary way to re-think Ukeles’ model in order to invent new 
ones for future judicial and visual activism.  
4.5. The Right of the Encounter in Law and in Art
As stated above, Ukeles embarked on her creative work at the Sanitation Department through 
creating a physical interaction with the employees that I suggest calling an encounter also in the 
sense of meeting an adversary, an enemy, or engaging in direct and unexpected conflict. Meeting 
them at their work location, she was able to experience the poor working conditions and hear 
372 Patricia C. Phillips, “Making Necessity Art,” p. 25.
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their stories of neglect and shame. “It’s a dump. It’s awful here,”373 is what the workers told her, 
as she contemplated how to change their self-esteem and understanding of their power, and to 
instill in them a sense of pride and purpose. According to Ukeles, what seems to be dictating her 
work is a duty, as an artist, to provide them with the visibility that they have been denied. In 
Ukeles’ words, “My job is to take this deep-inside 1:1 exchange and make it public.”374 As such, 
in spite the fact that she is not working in an artist studio, and although her materials are non-
traditional art resources, Ukeles remains firm in the conviction that art serves mainly, if not 
ultimately, as a representation. Needless to say, I do not seek to deny the importance of art as also
being a source of representation. It is, nevertheless, intriguing to ponder how a revolutionary act 
of naming maintenance as art stops at that and does not trigger and develop into a further inquiry 
of the role of art itself in our society as part of a struggle for justice. I argue that leaving art at 
that alone undermines, in the end, the critical overall political dimension that can be found in the 
work of Ukeles. Challenging Ukeles’ critical act of naming with the support of legal 
constructions of disputes and struggle for justice allows me to delve into the sort of blindness she
possesses in the event of the encounter. I will demonstrate how, on the one hand, she wishes to 
share with the workers the possibility of naming that she has herself achieved, while on the other 
hand she does not find the manner in which to assist or support them in the next two steps in the 
transformation of a dispute (blaming and claiming), and in helping to develop the emergence of 
rights.
In a recently published book titled Humanity at Sea: Maritime Migration and the Foundations of
International Law, Itamar Mann brings the right of the encounter into the forefront in the 
framework of international law. While he discusses the concept of the encounter in relation to 
373 Tom Finkelpearl, Dialogues in Public Art, p. 315.
374 Ibid., p. 318. 
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maritime migration, he nevertheless gives us a vivid tale of how advocating for representation as 
an outcome of an encounter is oftentimes a limiting and unsatisfactory response.375 In my 
forthcoming analysis, I do not attempt to, nor do I have a wish to, indicate a correlation between 
maritime migrants and sanitation workers, which for evident reasons face different 
circumstances.376 My intention is to enlarge our perception of what an encounter is between 
differing unequal sides, learning from developments in contemporary legal scholarship. The 
undertaking I propose is done with the awareness of the evolving interest and research in the art 
field regarding the notion of the encounter.377 In her book, New Encounters: Arts, Cultures, 
375 It is worth noting that, the notion of the “encounter” can be found also in the later writings of Louis 
Althusser. Although not to be found previously in his writings, and still being evaluated by scholars, 
according to Althusser “before the formation of the world” two basic items existed – atoms and a void. In 
this basic stage, in which no meaning, nor cause, nor end, nor reason, nor unreason exists; a “swerve” 
may occur “producing an 'encounter' between an atom and its neighboring atom. As a consequence a 
'world' may arise.” The creation of this world “depends on whether the encounter 'lasts' […] it endows the
atoms themselves with their reality, which without swerve and encounter, would be nothing but abstract 
elements lacking substantiality and existence […]”. See Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter: 
Later Writings, 1978-87, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 169, 260-261. According to 
Wal Suchting, in Althusser's theory, “Atoms have properties prior to their encounters with one another,” 
and that these properties delimit or constrain the possible outcomes of encounters. Suchting explains this 
seemingly contradictory realization by using the example of letters of the alphabet, "which have their 
primary existence only in the words which they make up, though they may be, for certain purposes, 
considered in isolation from those words. That is, letters may be regarded, metaphorically, as linguistic 
atoms.” See Wal Suchting, Althusser’s Late Thinking About Materialism, Historical Materialism (Leiden: 
Koninklijke Brill, NV), volume 12:1, pp. 3-70.
376 Ukeles is aware that many of the maintenance workers at the downtown Whitney had a migration 
background and were suspicious of her due to unclear statuses. However, the link to the right of the 
encounter does not necessarily rest on this fact, as it is also not a major focus for Ukeles. 
377 The inclination towards the use of the concept of the “encounter” can be also perceived in other fields 
of research and practice in addition to those of law and art. One example can be found in Human-Animal 
Studies for which the encounter, or rather the diminishing of encounter, serves as a mechanism through 
which relations between humans and non-humans is examined and contested. “Animal Encounters” was 
the title of an international conference on Human-Animal contacts held in November 2016. Animal 
Encounters: Human-Animal Contacts in the Arts, Literature, Culture, And the Sciences, International 
Conference at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Department for German and Comparative Studies, 
accessed August 11, 2017, http://animal-encounters.de/en/home/.
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Concepts, Griselda Pollock brings to the forefront the idea of the “encounter.” After the 
“theoretical turn” of the 1970s-1990s, Pollock argues that it is not that the need for theory has 
ceased to exist, but rather what is needed instead is finding ways to engage anew in 
transdisciplinary encounters.378 To this end, she gives as an example the establishment of the 
Centre for Cultural Analysis, Theory, and History in 2001 at Leeds University, which initiated a 
series of encounters. From artists to historians, from architects to psychologists and sociologists, 
all mentioned by Pollock as invitees, law practitioners and legal scholars have been absent, as is 
often the case. The study offered in these pages, thus, suggests filling the gap in transdisciplinary
encounters and theory with Mann's ambitious goal to construct a new theory of human rights 
based on the right of the encounter. As such, it provides me with a framework to further ponder 
the work of Ukeles and other artists such as Ruti Sela and Lawrence Abu Hamdan who will be 
discussed in this chapter, who are contributing to the discourse on what I formulate as judicial-
visual activism. 
Mann's exploration of the encounter in the frame of international law and human rights is, in 
many ways, rooted in Emmanuel Levinas' theory of the face-to-face experience.379 The unique 
ethical event that emerges in the moment when human beings are facing each other is understood
by Mann as the backbone of human rights. As such, “Being bound by human rights means 
experiencing this presence of other persons as projecting a certain kind of imperative.”380 Mann 
will proceed to show us that this imperative, thus, represents a quality within the other that 
378 Griselda Pollock, New Encounters: Arts, Cultures, Concepts (London: I.B Tauris & Co, 2013).
379 Mann acknowledges Levinas' influence on the right of the encounter, but argues in difference with him 
on the ground that refugees or migrants possess agency, which Levinas' “Other” does not. Itamar Mann, 
Humanity at Sea: Maritime Migration and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2016), p. 159.
380 Ibid., p. 12.
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demands our attention and recognition. It requires us to shift our perception of the other as being 
weak and powerless, and to be receptive to the demands the other person conveys to us through 
the encounter. In the discussion on law and the origin of human rights, Mann identifies 
circumstances in which an encounter forces us to acknowledge possible duties towards the other 
that are derived neither from nation-state governments nor from transnational organizations.381 In
applying Mann's ideas to Ukeles and her work with maintenance workers (applicable, in my 
opinion, to many other art projects involving underprivileged persons and environments), we 
need to identify the demand of the other, and the capabilities brought by the other to the 
encounter. In the context of Mann's research, migrants are reaching the shores of Europe and 
bringing our legal system into a state of bafflement, and as Mann identifies it, a state of 
embarrassment. In risking their lives and sacrificing their most treasured and beloved 
possessions, migrants challenge both nation-state sovereignty and transnational powers. Mann 
argues that we need stop portraying migrants only as bare life, and instead begin to realize the 
strength and revolutionary capabilities with which they are equipped. Unwilling, or unable, to 
live in their countries of origin, migrants and refugees demand that we re-think and re-imagine 
our deepest convictions regarding nation-state sovereignty, transnational frameworks, and 
international law. Boats cramped with people escaping their homelands, or the lines of human 
beings dangerously crossing national borders, attest to the failure and the breakdown of existing 
national and legal systems of sovereignty and power. Mann's research begins with Jewish 
refugees on board the boat of the Exodus. The Exodus, which gained stardom when in 1960 the 
381 This is also in line with Nancy Fraser’s idea of justice. In the time of globalization, our concept of 
justice changes and we can no longer talk only about citizens bound by a modern territorial state (the 
Keynesian-Westphalian frame, in Fraser's words). This fact also changes the two main claims of justice – 
redistribution and recognition. In a post-Cold War globalized world, claims Fraser, actions and decisions 
taken by states and international corporations and organizations change the frame of justice as we have 
known it. As a result, we need a new theory of justice that needs to be three-dimensional, as discussed in 
this chapter.
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story was adapted into a Hollywood film starring Paul Newman, is only one example out of 
many of the struggle of stateless people in search of a safe haven. Mann examines the story of 
the Exodus from the perception of an encounter going beyond the customary reading as a tale 
about the protection of international organizations, the creation of the Jewish state, and of the 
power of sovereignty. Instead, Mann emphasizes the moral and political dilemmas cultivated by 
the encounter forced upon the nation-state and its legal system by refugees and migrants from the
Exodus to our time. The critical point, according to Mann, is in the fact that the encounter with 
migrants and refugees embarrasses our legal systems.
In the encounter between Ukeles and the workers, the power relations are fairly clear. Although 
Ukeles’ act of naming begins with her own identification as a mother and a housewife, and thus 
with the working class as mentioned in the outset of this chapter, her background and 
socioeconomic status differ from that of the workers whom she encounters and collaborates with 
in her exhibitions, performances, or at the Sanitation Department residency. As elaborated above,
she articulated her injurious experience, and the injustice she suffered in a manner that the 
collaborating workers could not achieve. In this sense, the encounter that is experienced between 
Ukeles and the workers is one between the powerful and the powerless. Thus, and in accordance 
with Mann's theory, we need to ask: what is the agency of the maintenance workers? What might
there be in their presence that demands our recognition? And through these questions – what 
rights are involved in the encounter between the powerful and the powerless? Can a dispute 
emerge – the act of naming and transforming into a grievance, which is elevated into a claim? 
And how can all dimensions of justice be reached? One must be attentive to the details of the 
first encounter between Ukeles and the workers, and especially to the working conditions and 
environment that Ukeles encounters for the very first time in her life. The Sanitation Department 
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commissioner, as I mentioned above, encouraged Ukeles to go and talk with the workers as a 
starting point for her residency at the department. One of the pivotal realizations by Ukeles 
following these meetings and encounters was that she was the only woman around. The other 
women who shared the space of her encounter with the workers were of a pornographic nature – 
images of women covering the walls of the sanitation garage. Ukeles tells Finkelpearl that she 
experienced this as “a very hard, ugly environment, very unforgiving, so that these men would 
fill up entire walls with images of women who were soft, yielding, and available.”382 Demeaning 
images of women, notes Finkelpearl, as Ukeles goes on to explain how the sanitation facilities at 
that time were located in abandoned city jails and firehouses. Ukeles interpreted these conditions
as intentional by the city in order to position the workers as nothing more than the garbage they 
were collecting. Identifying herself as a feminist, the environment put her into a conflict. Even 
more perplexing for Ukeles was the realization that, for the men she encountered, the thought 
that she might be insulted or embarrassed by the pornographic images seemed to be utterly 
irrelevant. “It was so split, Tom, so alienated, so sick,”383 and yet she felt determined to take on 
the residency, and to make the encounter with the workers the basis of her first performance and 
project. Reading Ukeles’ action of touching, shaking hands, and facing the sanitation workers, 
one cannot underestimate the correlation to Mann's reading of the right of the encounter based on
the writings of Levinas regarding the face-to-face encounter. In the midst of an inner conflict of 
her own identity and values, Ukeles recognized the demand brought upon her by the encounter 
with the workers, which led to acknowledging her duty. Emphasizing the need to meet each and 
every one of the workers, she was determined to create again and again a face-to-face encounter 
382 Tom Finkelpearl, Dialogues in Public Art, p. 312.
383 Ibid., p. 312.
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with those with whom she could at first find little in common, those treated by their own society 
as waste. 
In a sense, it is the feeling of unease with her own convictions as a feminist that also brought 
Ukeles into a state of an embarrassment of sorts. It triggered her to take on the residency at the 
sanitation department, and to perform the ongoing act of an encounter. In doing so, she 
manifested the need to talk about the human rights of the sanitation workers. She did not wait for
the employer (the sovereign) or another national (or international) intervention and support. Her 
ongoing “Touch Sanitation” action encompasses all that is problematic when we are facing a 
state of emergency. “What is the task of art in times of emergency?” was the question brought to 
us by Hito Steyerl discussed in Chapter Three. Positioning Ukeles work in relation to Mann's 
analysis of the right of the encounter suggests that further understanding and action is needed by 
artists, just as by legal practitioners. What Mann encourages us to further realize is the power and
capabilities that migrants and refugees possess even at their most vulnerable level of existence. 
Just as the sanitation workers are more than the garbage they collect, or the garbage they are 
perceived to be by their employers and the rest of society, so are refugees and migrants more 
than only bare life. Expanding our understanding of the moral and operational demands brought 
upon us by migrants and refugees as shown to us by Mann, sheds light just as much on other 
encounters as presented to us in the art world. Mann advances from the state of embarrassment to
political and legal action, advocating for the power of the encounter even when it takes place 
between two very unequal persons or entities. In other words, by recognizing the agency of the 
powerless, the encounter accelerates a representation of the powerless and affirms the political 
dimension of justice. It is an encounter which brings with it new legal resources and tools that 
are neither derived from sovereignty, nor from transnational governance. 
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The inability to recognize or give space to the agency of those she encountered led Ukeles to 
remain in the realm of artistic representation, without a political dimension. The ability to unite 
law and art exposes, as a result, what was missing in the work of Ukeles, in my view. By 
bridging legal and scholarly research with that of art, we do not eliminate art from the equation 
but rather propose a political stratum that enhances artistic intervention based on artistic 
capabilities: judicial-visual activism. In order to make this point even clearer, let us remain for a 
while with Mann and with the rights of the encounter. What Mann requires of us is to not to 
disavow rights rooted in sovereignty and transnational governance, but rather to position the 
rights of the encounter as primary to any other rights.384 The encounter between the powerful and
the powerless embarrasses the powerful exactly because of the “existential challenge it 
presents,”385 caused by the creation of a presence in the form of an encounter. This presence, 
which does not always have to be in the form of a body, testifies, according to Mann, that human 
rights “originate from outside of the state” and “stem from the existence Hannah Arendt labeled 
bare life.”386 But where Mann differs from Arendt lies in his argument that bare life existence 
also holds within it legal rights and political power. Mann gives an example for this with respect 
to illegal migration of Southeast Asians – known as the “boat people” of the post-Vietnam war 
period. Their claim for human rights and their struggle for survival and freedom ended with 
384 In a sense, Mann is hinting against structures such as a radical democracy as advocated by Laclau and 
Mouffe, in which all conflicts or struggles are part of a chain of equivalence. There is, he tells us, a need 
to prioritize rights. Other scholars, such as Drucilla Cornell, maintain a similar argument. According to 
Cornell, Laclau and Mouffe moved away from socialism in the name of radical democracy, and with it 
lost their criticality in the struggle to overcome capitalism due to its antithetical base. “At the very least, 
we need to set up a profound tension between the right to private property and other socio-economic 
rights, such as the right to housing, education, and so on.” Drucilla Cornell, “Law and Revolution,” in 
South Africa: uBuntu, Dignity, and the Struggle for Constitutional Transformation (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2014), p. 37.
385 Itamar Mann, Humanity at Sea: Maritime Migration and the Foundations of International Law, p. 54.
386 Ibid., p. 59. 
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many of them being resettled in such countries as the US, Canada, and Australia. This 
achievement must be seen, according to Mann, as a direct outcome of their struggle. Without the 
encounter they initiated, no sovereignty or transnational governance would have offered them an 
alternative political membership. Moreover, the “boat people” demand of us something that is 
beyond their mere survival. For them, it not only a wish to remain alive, but it is a claim “rooted 
in their own agency and in a demand for freedom.”387 According to Mann, it is the agency 
expressed by the powerless in the event of an encounter that we tend to overlook. In line with 
Arendt, Mann recognizes human rights as stemming from a bare life condition, but unlike 
Arendt, he argues that they cannot be formulated and claimed without the claim of agency by the
powerless.388 Just as in the case of obtaining political membership,389 the actions of migrants – 
whether by forming an encounter at sea or by crossing ground borders – are those that trigger 
action and influence a change on transnational level as well. We are, thus, called upon by Mann 
to reverse our view of those seeking the protection of human rights as passive victims to those 
having an active role in changing laws of sovereignty and of transnational governance.  
Establishing the right of the encounter and the agency of the powerless, does not, however, 
guarantee that we fully capture the significance of the event, as we witness in the case of Ukeles. 
As Mann states, “The place where we stand when the human rights encounter occurs is not 
naturally given. It is manufactured by political and economic power, history, culture, and 
387 Ibid., p. 79.
388 According to Mann, Arendt's essay “We Refugees” holds that refugees hold no political power. Yet, the 
end of the essay, in which Arendt suggests that refugees should not conceal their identity, signals some 
entry for the refugees into the political sphere. 
389 In the context of my argument, it is sufficient to just note that by placing Arendt into a contrasting 
position with Thomas Hobbes, Mann claims that: “The moment of passage from the state of nature to 
civil society allows us to conceptualize bare life as a political category that encapsulates a fundamental 
form of political action.” Mann, Humanity at Sea: Maritime Migration and the Foundations of 
International Law, p. 90. 
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technology [...]. Addressing these structural conditions requires a shift in focus.”390 He suggests 
adopting an external position in which we pay considerable attention also to those encounters 
that did not take place.391 It is a position that does not see a commitment to the powerless only 
derived from positive law, but also by stressing that, “The human rights encounter is a fruit of the
political imagination.”392 Through this, Mann argues, we can expand our notion of positive law, 
and thrive for the creation of a duty towards those in need. 
Bringing the work of Ukeles back into the discussion, there is no doubt that she acted to the best 
of her knowledge and awareness when encountering the workers of the Sanitation Department. 
However, when contrasting Ukeles’ actions with Mann's arguments, I cannot but suggest that 
what is missing is an understanding by Ukeles of the agency of the workers. As Finkelpearl 
suggests, “Ukeles’s presence at Sanitation is a complex fusion of outsider (independent artist) 
and insider (long-term fixture in the Department).”393 However, only through a union with law 
could Ukeles achieve a political dimension in her work, and by this I mean justice based on 
recognition, distribution, and representation through the agency of the workers. There is no doubt
that Ukeles established a unique model for artistic operation from within a municipal 
bureaucratic/administrative system. If articulated through the theory of naming-blaming-
claiming, one can say that investing a great deal of time and creativity in learning about the work
of the department and meeting personally with each of the workers must have contributed to her 
sense of naming and, to a lesser degree, to that of the workers as well. Yet, an early vital 
390 Itamar Mann, Humanity at Sea: Maritime Migration and the Foundations of International Law, p. 163.
391 This is especially important nowadays, due to advanced technology often making a physical human 
rights encounter impossible. 
392 Itamar Mann, Humanity at Sea: Maritime Migration and the Foundations of International Law, p. 188.
393 Tom Finkelpearl, Dialogues in Public Art, p. 298. 
167
contradiction arises from the fact that Ukeles remains an unpaid functionary for almost four 
decades. In many ways, it seems that her unpaid position is celebrated in publications and 
interviews as part of her invaluable dedication.394 A sanitation officer is quoted by Finkerpearl as 
perceiving Ukeles as “a pain in the ass,”395 however, when reading further one cannot ignore the 
conclusion that, more than anything, Ukeles has contributed to the status quo of the department 
and its workers, and less to a cause of justice. In her conversation with Finkelpearl, Ukeles gives 
a heartfelt monologue on the background motivations to her manifesto, and on the failures she 
found in the feminist movement of the 1960s. She concludes by agreeing that although things did
improve, the revolution failed due to its inability to make the connection between feminists and 
service workers, between gender and economics: “Instead we got partial and mainly middle-class
measures: health clubs, preventive maintenance, flextime. There was no major reorganizing.”396 
Again, without diminishing the achievements of Ukeles, when reading these lines, I cannot but 
bring them into relation with her work at the department and argue that by not transforming her 
work and relation with the workers further in the direction of formulating a blame and a claim, 
she directly and indirectly contributed to dampening dissemination and the partial obliterating of 
her own cause. Her ongoing focus on representation and visibility, obtaining funds from outside 
the department to support her projects, and improving the furnishings of the department’s offices 
and maintaining new bathrooms cannot but end up sounding like the same “middle-class 
394 One, of course, can argue that she has gained substantial financial means from her work in the 
department through exhibiting her work in art institutions, and by being represented by a renowned art 
gallery. In the PDF found on the website of the Ronald Feldman Gallery, who has been representing 
Ukeles for decades now, one finds 58 pages of group and solo exhibitions, artist’s texts, honorary 
doctorates from two universities, grants, fellowships, and awards from the early 1970s, and so on. 
Accessed June 30, 2019, https://feldmangallery.com/assets/pdfs/artistCV/Ukeles-current-bio-letterhead-
use-this_190406_190141.pdf.
395 Tom Finkelpearl, Dialogues in Public Art, p. 298.
396 Ibid., p. 311.
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measures” she herself criticized as denying the possibility of a revolution. It might very much be 
that the tireless efforts to get better sanitation facilities for the sanitation workers for which she 
“sweated blood [...] The bureaucracy was dragging its heels on this one,” Ukeles intended to 
provide the workers with the possible ground for naming their condition of injury and injustice. 
It could also be that in the process of becoming part of the bureaucratic system, Ukeles ceased to 
maintain the position and endurance needed for the formulation of a next step towards justice, in 
the formulation of blame. 
4.6. From the Sanitation Department to the Legal Department
Now, I wish to further extend my argument on the use of a legal frame in relation to artistic 
practice and research, and to use this to illuminate a more recent project that also took place 
within a governmental institution. “The City Artist” project was a short-lived curatorial endeavor
to bring artists to work within the Jerusalem Municipality in 2012. The main outcomes of this 
curatorial project were two separate video works by artists Tali Keren and Ruti Sela. From the 
two, I will discuss the one created by Sela in detail, as it took place at the municipality’s legal 
department and therefore sheds light on the administrative work of legal practitioners. My view 
shall be articulated through an analysis of the video For the Record (2013) presented by Sela as 
the outcome of her residency. Giving an account of the work of Sela in the offices of the legal 
department, I wish to begin by noting the differing translation between the video's Hebrew and 
English opening disclaimer. According to the English translation, the video “is the result of a 
painting commission by the municipality of Jerusalem,” while in the Hebrew version the same 
sentence states that “the video was created in the frame of a residency for painters at the 
Jerusalem Municipality.” The rest of the translation is more or less similar; however, these 
differences in the translation provide us with a first clue into the complicated relation depicted in 
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the video still to come. Whether the video is a result of a painting commission or a residency for 
painters at the municipality is yet to be clear at this stage. Keeping in mind Mann's exploration 
of an encounter, these differing translations provide a preliminary perspective into a state in 
which one is confronted with an uneasy or unclear situation. What is agreed upon in both 
Hebrew and English is that the video is a result of an engagement with the Jerusalem 
Municipality as part of the “The City Artist” umbrella project. Nevertheless, the artist does not 
inform us about the nature of the project, who initiated it (the artist? the municipality? a 
museum? a curator?), or in which circumstances and context it has been executed. The 
uncertainty affixed to the making of the video can also be traced in the differences expressed in 
its title. “For The Record” is the title in English, while in Hebrew the title “  ןעמל  םושירה ” 
indicates a double meaning, and an inclination of the artist towards what can be translated as 
“For the Drawing,” and also “For the Registration” (in Hebrew the word for drawing and for 
registration are written similarly and sound alike). The title appears in both languages following 
a short exposition in which we see the artist drawing a portrait of a lawyer working at the 
Attorney General Department.397 Both Hebrew and English readers can make the assumption that
the video is dealing with both the act of drawing and of a possible registration. Yet, the English 
title certainly draws attention to a more official or even legal procedure in which “facts must be 
known and made public,” while the Hebrew title sends a notion of a sort of a struggle between 
the artistic act of drawing and the idea that something needs to be registered in memory. This is 
also due to the fact that the phrase “for the record” in its Hebrew translation as suggested by Sela
is seldom used, unlike the English phrase, which is common and is customarily used. Hence, on 
the one side a multitude of meanings, while on the other side vagueness and obscurity, which 
397 It is declared in the opening captions that all participants are lawyers at this department.
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might be an indication of the difficulties or possible embarrassment attached to an event of Sela's
encounter with the lawyers of the department. 
The video For The Record takes place solemnly in the spaces of the offices of the Attorney 
General’s Department in Jerusalem. The lawyers are seated in their everyday workspace behind 
their desks, computers, and pile of files. On the other side sits the artist, directing her observing 
gaze at the lawyers as she draws their portraits on a white block of paper attached to a pedestal. 
The setting of the office seems to be left untouched; natural daylight enters through the building 
windows, and sound is heard coming from neighboring offices. Aware of these surroundings, we 
are able to observe both the lawyer and the artist in action through a camera located behind and 
on the side of the artist. The use of basic elements and a direct and unapologetic camera has 
characterized Sela’s method of working since an early stage of her artistic career. In situations 
described as social antagonism, she creates everyday interactions, of which she and her camera 
form an almost single unit.398 In For the Record, Sela continues to use the format of a 
documentary used by her in the past as she follows the daily routine of the lawyers in their 
offices. Simultaneously with her own presence, along with her painter’s pedestal and video 
camera, Sela manages to create an unsettling intervention into the space. Unlike the more active 
role usually played by Sela in her earlier videos, where she is known to be creating “constructed 
situations, i.e. moments of life, a concretely and deliberately constructed game of events,”399 in 
For The Record the game of events, i.e. the work of the lawyers, is left untouched by the artist, 
398 Ruti Sela, together with Maayan Amir, gained international acclaim with video works such as the 
trilogy Beyond Guilt (2003-5). Taking place in the bathrooms of a nightclub or in a hotel room, both the 
artists and their protagonists often address the camera directly as it documents an environment of 
intensive verbal and interactive encounters. 
399 “‘Ruti Sela: For the Record’ – at tranzitdisplay,” ERSTE Stiftung, accessed June 30, 2019, 
http://cz.tranzit.org/en/exhibition/0/2013-06-20/ruti-sela-to-the-recorded-pro-zznam.
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as Sela's presence remains mainly detached. Also, unlike previous works by Sela, in which she 
directs and stages situations, here she plays a much more passive role. 
4.7. The City Artist and The Artists Placement Group (APG)
As mentioned above, Sela’s video was a result of “The City Artist” project, an endeavor arranged
under the auspices of the Jerusalem Season of Culture 2012. It was a curatorial project curated 
by Israeli curator Gilly Karjevsky and co-curator Hila Cohen-Schneiderman.400 In their 
introduction, the curators describe “The City Artist” as "a project that introduces artists into the 
work of the municipality. For the first time in the history of art and local government in the State 
of Israel, artists took up residency in various departments of the municipality for three months 
(May-July 2012). They got to know the employees, how the departments function and 
developed, together with the employees and the management, works that draw on the 
municipality's functional infrastructure."401 The motivation to have artists residing in local 
governmental institutions brings to mind the work of Ukeles, but also the work of the Artist 
Placement Group (APG). Established in 1966 by John Latham and Barbara Steveni, APG was 
seeking to “rethink the artist's role in society.”402 Creating platforms through which artists are 
invited to work from within and as part of industrial and governmental institutions, APG held 
that art-making in those cases is secondary to the human interaction propelled by the artists 
during their period of residency.403 Contacting organizations to have them invite artists for 
400 For more about the project, see Hila Cohen-Schneiderman, “Along the Law,” OnCurating 28 (2016).
401“The City Artist 2012: Under the Mountain,” accessed June 30, 2019, 
http://en.mekudeshet.com/archive/2012-season/the-city-artist/.
402 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 163.
403 Trained and active as artists, it is interesting to point out that Latham and Steveni’s artistic work in the 
constellation of APG can also be perceived as those of curators, perhaps an early sign and stage in a 
curatorial practice as it is known to us nowadays. For more on the position of the curator, also in relation 
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placements, Latham and Steveni advised the companies to see the process of the residency as 
"having the benefit of a creative outsider in their midst,”404 or, as it was subsequently coined, an 
“Incidental Person.” Aiming to bridge and promote a mutual exchange, APG embarked on a 
complex engagement in which they conducted research on interested companies, negotiated 
artists’ fees, arranged contracts and legal matters between the parties, and also curated 
exhibitions as part of the last phase of the artists' placement. From 1969 onward, placements of 
British artists (all male, as noted by Bishop, working in typically male-dominated organizations) 
took place in companies such as British European Airways, Scottish Television, the National 
Coal Board, the British Steel Corporation, and others.
With this in mind, and returning to Sela's work as part of the City Artist Project at the Jerusalem 
municipality, it is worth mentioning that although the project in Israel was short-lived and only 
engaged two artists, both were female, and instead of working with industry or national 
companies, it shared its goal with APG regarding the role and position of the artists in relation to 
governmental institutions. The intentions of the curators in Jerusalem were in line with those of 
APG and Ukeles by emphasizing the potential of facilitating collaborations and exchange among
artists and civil service employees.405 The curators of the Jerusalem project aspired to initiate a 
permanent position for a “city artist” based on and functioning in the same manner of other 
governmental positions such as city geographers or city planners. Yet, as with other previous 
projects sharing similar aspirations, it seems that the idea of having a fully paid and well-
to Ukeles work, see Hila Cohen-Schneiderman, “Along the Law.”
404 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 164.
405 In a text published only in Hebrew that I presented as part of an exhibition I curated at FKSE Budapest 
in 2013, they further align their work with that of APG just as with Ukeles, Jill Magid, and Olafur 
Eliasson, whose Institut für Raumexperimente offered a fellowship to a politician from Berlin for a period
of six months as part of the 7th Berlin Biennale in 2012. 
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acknowledged position for an artist in the public service is far from being attained. As noted 
above, even the work of Ukeles, which began in 1977, remains an unpaid position unlike, of 
course, the municipality’s lawyers, city planners, and other office workers, and she also remains 
the only artist in residence in the history of the New York City Department of Sanitation.406 
However, this is not revealed or discussed during the video, and so I wish to go back again to the
encounter between Sela and the lawyers of the legal department. In one of the more elaborated 
scenes, one of the lawyers seems to be genuinely interested in Sela's opinion as he reads aloud to 
her paragraphs from the municipality’s book of regulations concerning opening hours during 
religious holidays. It is a unique event in the video, as previously no dialogue or conversation 
between the artist and any of the lawyers is established. From the first lawyer filmed typing on 
his computer, avoiding eye contact with Sela, to the next lawyer who seems to feel obliged to 
inform Sela briefly of the passing of a file to a colleague, Sela's presence is mostly ignored or 
politely tolerated. Although the work of Sela does not intend to be a “true” representation of the 
encounter she has had with the lawyers, the narrative of the video suggests a gradual growing 
interest from the side of the lawyers towards the artist, with an emphasis on her presence as 
partly shifting between transparency to elevated recognition. Through a little verbal interaction, 
Sela draws us into her encounter with the manager of the department, dedicating most of the 
video to it. At first, just like in earlier parts of the video, the artist is seated in front of a lawyer 
406 In 2015, it was announced that artist Tania Bruguera would be the first artist in residence at the New 
York City Mayor's Office of Immigrant Affairs (MOIA). The press announcement stated that, unlike 
Ukeles, Bruguera's residence would be paid not by the city, but by funding of the Shelley & Donald 
Rubin Foundation. The press release mentions Ukeles’ residency as a successful model for the new 
planned residency. Press Release, New York City Mayor's Office of Immigrant Affairs, July 14, 2015, 
accessed June 30, 2019, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcla/downloads/pdf/dcla_moia_air_annct_july_2015.pdf?epi-
content=GENERIC. In the scope of my research I did not have the means to sufficiently investigate this 
process and possible outcomes.
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who wishes to go on with his daily routine. The manager, whose name remains anonymous just 
like the rest of the workers, begins by saying, "I'll keep working and you do what you have to," 
but this time around it is not what Sela is aiming for. Unlike before, Sela directs her gaze towards
him. In this particular encounter, she is interested in learning more about his incentive in taking 
part in the project, what was intriguing about it for him, and why he agreed to it (this is also how 
we learn that he holds a managing position). And through this, while she goes on drawing his 
portrait, i.e. continues with her “classic” role of the painting artist, she is able to ask questions 
and share more details with the viewers regarding his thoughts on both the fields of art and law.
The exchange between the two exposes mostly the basic assumptions that most of us share when 
it comes to the law and its practitioners. The lawyer wishes to gain something “practical” from 
the collaboration with the artist; something that can be translated into a sort of a value to the 
department, while he also acknowledges that, "Art is valuable in itself." Law is like magic, he 
tells her, and she responds intriguingly by saying that "magic is an illusion." Law is “the art of 
the impossible,” he retorts, accompanied with a grin. He emphasizes the limit of the law and the 
need to work inside a regulated frame, which also restricts the ability to be truly creative. The 
collaboration with the arts, he claims, can bring the possibility of a new interest in the field of 
law, but he does not elaborate on this further. The conversation goes on between the two, 
demonstrating the differences between them, the artist's perception of the law as a fictive 
construction, while all along a clear and inherent mutual suspicion divides them. "Can they (the 
lawyers) sue me later?" asks Sela, while he on his side has allowed the video documentation of 
the project, but is worried about the consequences of such an act. He is obviously careful with 
his words, while she admits to her feelings of entering a new unknown territory and "almost 
opposite'' field. She sees the role of the artist as negating the law: "Being an artist means wanting
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to be beyond the law or not to believe that there is a law," she says to him. In other words, and as 
it is boldly presented in Sela’s video, the encounter between the artist and the lawyer is one 
based on unequal terms, a meeting of adversaries. Suspicion, fear, and differences based on 
status and differing backgrounds feed into it. 
The unequal terms of conduct have also been the subject of criticism towards the work of the 
APG. As such, the “Incidental Person” is the artist who enters the unknown terrain of the 
industry, while not much attention is given to the process of change or development of the people
working in the industry. It is, of course, declared by APG on several occasions that, “APG exist 
to create mutually beneficial associations between artists and organizations…an attempt to 
bridge the gap between artists and people at work,”407 but as the critic Peter Fuller has pointed 
out, “The system of collaboration proposed between APG and corporations was flawed from the 
start since power relations were stacked against the artist.”408 Fuller argues against APG's 
management-level approach and their contractual promise not to harm the host companies, 
“which removed the artist's right to find fault.”409 On the other hand, trying to rescue APG from 
its own weakness, Claire Bishop claims that while Fuller's criticism is warranted to a certain 
extent, it “completely misunderstands Latham's idiosyncratic artistic thinking […]. For Latham, 
the artist as Incidental Person transcends party politics and 'takes the stand of a third ideological 
position which is off the plane of their obvious collision areas.'”410  According to this, a “third 
ideological position” will be achieved through practical artistic imagination and verbal 
interactions in the context of institutions and organizations. Bishop, in her summary of the 
407 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 170.
408 Ibid.
409 Ibid..
410 Ibid., p. 171.  
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achievements of APG, finds that although many times elusive and drenched with gray 
administrative and bureaucratic construction, “Its achievements were primarily discursive and 
theoretical,” and notes favorably APG's “desire to put two different ideological value systems 
into constant tension.”411 
As I have discussed with regard to Ukeles, maintaining only a discursive and theoretical position 
undermines the agency of the powerless party in the encounter. In the case of Sela, she is 
admittedly the weaker party in the event, if we go by the rule of the encounter. Yet, the right of 
the encounter was not the frame through which the residency at the municipally was perceived. 
In the essay by the project’s co-curator, Hila Cohen-Schneiderman for the journal OnCurating,412
one realizes that for her the presence of an artist in the legal department can be better described 
as a Trojan horse. She marks Sela's position as one that began with a lie (is she a painter or rather
a video artist?), and continues with Sela being interested mostly in the wrongdoing of the 
department, such as in the “cracks and contradictions within the system itself, alongside the 
loopholes through which one could promote a different agenda.”413 Cohen-Schneiderman takes 
pride in Sela's involvement with the lawyers, which almost “amounted to proposing a bill or an 
amendment that she herself formulated”414 only to be prevented by the limited timeframe of the 
residency. As long as there is no long-term position for artists and curators within government 
institutions, she tells us, they will remain inclined to work against it and not in terms of re-
formulating it. Overlooking the agency shown to us by Sela, the curator proves how difficult it is
for one to name her own injustice. Even less than the artist who was an active part of the 
411 Ibid., pp. 175-176.
412 I invited Hila Cohen-Schneiderman to contribute a text for the issue I edited of OnCurating (No. 28).
413 Hila Cohen-Schneiderman, “Along the Law,” p. 58.
414 Ibid.
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encounter, the curator struggles to formulate her own agency, which cannot demand its place as 
long as what troubles her is in curating the project, i.e., will “we destroy his trust in artists? Will 
he, once again agree, to host another artist?”415 In such situations, artists and curators remain 
powerless with respect to their capability to challenge the existing hegemony. Leaving the artist, 
be it Sela or Ukeles or APG, to possess only an “incidental” position underestimates and halts 
any true possibility for exchange or for long-term change. It denies the agency of the artist, 
blocking his or her way in formulating a possible claim, recognition, redistribution, and hence 
also a possible judicial-visual dimension. Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat show us the significance of 
learning and observing the preliminary stages of a dispute, as most cases of injustice or injury do 
not evolve into a full dispute due to personal, social, and institutional constructions that limit the 
possibility of agency for those who are only considered powerless in the event of an encounter.
The scene in Sela's video in which the lawyer is reading to her from paragraph five of the old 
bylaws is perhaps the most revealing when read through the lens of the encounter as suggested 
by Mann. The lawyer is facing Sela, who might have sat in front of him for quite some time as 
indicated when she flips her drawing notebook and we get a glimpse of a finished portrait of the 
lawyer. Sela seems undisturbed as she prepares to begin a new drawing, but she is obliged to face
him since he continues reading her lines regarding regulations of opening and closing hours of 
places of business. The question, which at first might seem insignificant, touches upon the 
differences and tension in Jerusalem regarding differing regulations for Jews and non-Jews. The 
matter can be of marginal interest to Sela's research and work, or not; however, the short 
encounter – only forty seconds long in the video – manifests the power within an encounter. Here
we are witnessing a face-to-face exchange of knowledge when the powerful side demonstrates an
415 Ibid.
178
interest in the other side, in her knowledge, in her power of creativity and imagination. The 
lawyer does not act out of fear or suspicion but shows interest in a fellow human being with him 
– he is sharing the event of an encounter. It is very brief and cut short abruptly by Sela as she 
goes from this to the long conversation she has with the department's manager. We do not know 
the exact reason for this artistic decision, but we can assume that the transformation of the 
encounter to the agency of the artist has shifted the embarrassment onto her side. Being 
unprepared and caught off-guard and with no legal knowledge might have been the reasons 
behind Sela's decision to divert the video into a territory with which she is more familiar – the 
artist as an outsider, the artist as negating the law. This is also the manner in which this encounter
has been perceived by Cohen-Schneiderman – a noteworthy experience that is more of the 
exception than the rule. It might be, however, that as legal scholars have begun to show us, the 
department’s lawyer perceives the law as “an ongoing activity which depends on particular kinds
of practices.”416 As scholars such as Sundhya Pahuja and Itamar Mann demonstrate in cases of an
encounter of differing practices, “We must choose our law, rather than assuming any one law is 
simply already there before we arrive.”417 Yet, the premise of the curatorial platform has allowed 
little consideration of the possibility for a shared common ground between the artist and the 
lawyers. It might be, though never elaborated upon, that by entering into the encounter the 
lawyers declare their doubt in the power of law, and the artist rather declares her commitment to 
it. The encounter between the artist and the lawyer in the offices of a legal department is a priori 
a position of “breaking the rules,” or at least a partial suspension of them. And breaking the rules 
416 Sundhya Pahuja, “Laws of Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account of International Law,” London Review 
of International Law 1:1 (2013): 65.
417 Ibid., p. 92.
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is the source of creation, as Zygmunt Bauman tells us,418 for keeping with them means following 
a routine rather than creating something new. Perhaps this is what the department's leader means 
when he talks about magic? Creating something magical, outstanding, different out of existing 
law? Perhaps by working within the legal department, the artist had the desire to break from the 
conceptual routine of what she considers to be the law? Perhaps if we reshuffle preexisting 
conditions, Sela would have been able to further grasp the potentiality of creating a “judicial-
visual activism” claim rather than putting it aside. 
4.8. The Case of Forensic Listening
A third paradigm I wish to elaborate upon will further expand the argument to ways that artists, 
when engaged with the law, provide through an encounter a possibility for the recognition and 
formulation of a demand, of a dispute, and of a political dimension of justice. This time around, 
by bringing the work of artist Lawrence Abu Hamdan into the discussion, I will demonstrate how
an artistic mechanism of working with the law while challenging our conception of it culminated
in an artist serving as an expert witness. In my essay that accompanied image documentation of 
the work of Abu Hamdan for OnCurating issue 28,419 I explored the historical progress of 
evidence in the courtroom since the end of the eighteenth century, and consequently on the role 
of the expert witness. Without wishing to go into details here, suffice it to say that it was a 
lengthy development during which the courts in Anglo-American legal systems learned to accept
evidence based on technological discoveries and advancements in photography, and with these 
the need to invite experts with knowledge not held by the court in order to give testimony on 
their behalf. The work of Abu Hamdan, developed by him independently and as part of his PhD 
418 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2000), p. 208.
419 Avi Feldman, “The Artist as Expert Witness,” OnCurating 28 (January 2016): 45-9, accessed June 30, 
2019, http://www.on-curating.org/issue-28-reader/the-artist-as-an-expert-witness.html#.WFqrpVw5MRY.
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research at the Forensic Architecture agency,420 contributes, as I shall argue, to these 
developments in our time. In the realm of Forensic Architecture, Abu Hamdan's work follows the
notion of Forensis, a Latin term reintroduced by Eyal Weizman in order to reunite law and 
science and give it political agency. If in the past we experienced a shift in evidence with the 
introduction of radiology, x-rays, and photography, and if we have more recently experienced the
growing influence of the witness described by some scholars as the age, or era, of the witness,421 
Weizman claims that what we are experiencing nowadays is the “forensic turn.”422 The turn to the
forensic – “an emergent sensibility attuned to material investigation”423 – can be understood as a 
reaction to the era of the witness as we shift from human testimony to technological means of 
interpretation. Aware of the ambivalent use of forensics by the state apparatus, Weizman and the 
agency advocate for forensics as a “counter-hegemonic”424 practice. It sets out to provide 
evidence for claims and disputes for a wide variety of transnational and political organizations, 
while being at the same time a forum for the investigation of the production of evidence itself. In
the frame of the dispute theory of Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat, I argue that Forensic Architecture 
provides means for the formulation of the act of naming by researching and creating evidence 
based on spatial analysis, which can later be used in the act of claiming.425 In the sense of the 
420 Forensic Architecture is a research agency at Goldsmiths, University of London, led by Prof. Eyal 
Weizman. See: http://www.forensic-architecture.org/.
421 Shoshana Feldman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and 
History (New York and London: Routledge, 1991).
422 Eyal Weizman, introduction to Forensis: The Architecture of Public Truth (Berlin: Sternberg Press and 
Forensic Architecture, 2014), p. 10. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Ibid., p. 11.
425 The video titled 77sqm_9:26min (2017) is the most recent example of evidence provided by the 
Forensic Architecture agency that supports a claim for legal justice. It is a forensic analysis of the murder 
of Halit Yozgat in an internet café in Kassel in 2006. Hili Perlson wrote: “The Most Important Piece at 
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right of the encounter, the agency of Forensic Architecture perceives itself as an active source 
aiming beyond a mere artistic/architectural presentation of injury or injustice. The material 
sensitivity advocated by the agency is the same position Mann discusses that one must hold in an
event of an encounter towards the weak and the powerless. Transformations in materials, spaces, 
and humans are detected by the agency in order to support claims otherwise left unnoticed in the 
era, or post-era, of human witnessing.  
Against this backdrop, I wish to delve into the work of Abu Hamdan and observe how his audio 
documentaries contribute to the process of establishing a dispute as part of an encounter. Works 
by Abu Hamdan such as The Freedom of Speech Itself and The Whole Truth (both from 2012 and
part of his aural contract project),426 explore the vital role of sound and voice in Anglo-American 
legal systems. Editing an issue of OnCurating was an opportunity for me to add to the discussion
an essay not previously translated into English, by Avigdor Feldman, an Israeli lawyer and 
activist. “The legal space is the sound box of legal speech,” claims Feldman in his 1991 essay, 
which is denoted in Abu Hamdan's attention to the etymology of the term “jurisdiction.” 
Dividing the term into “juris” and “diction,” Abu Hamdan affirms Feldman essay’s declarative 
opening sentence: “Law is composed of space and speech.”427 The exploration of the topic leads 
Feldman to explore the mechanisms in which law silences certain forms of speech and evidence, 
such as in the case of hearsay testimony. According to him, by doing so the court appears to be 
seeking truth, but in practice it is a legal instrument of control against “the voice of subversive 
documenta 14 in Kassel Is Not an Artwork. It’s Evidence,” Artnet, June 8, 2017, accessed June 30, 2019, 
https://news.artnet.com/exhibitions/documenta-14-kassel-forensic-nsu-trial-984701.
426 Abu Hamdan began the aural contract archive in 2010, and it is an ongoing research project in which – 
through exhibitions, performances, events, and workshops – he continually examines the role of listening 
and the voice in law. 
427 Avigdor Feldman, “The Sirens’ Song: Speech and Space in the Courthouse,” OnCurating 28 (January 
2016): 64.
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speech groups located on the margins of the world of law, with their wonderful and terrible 
stories about what takes place in the courtroom and their gossip about judges, prisons, and 
jails.”428 Their voices and the knowledge they carry with them are determined to be foreign and 
unreliable to the courtroom and its inner circles, and thus must be blocked and eliminated by the 
rule of law. 
Abu Hamdan marks the beginning of his research with a rather more concrete development. His 
Archimedean point is in the British 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). What may 
seem at first glance like minor criminal legislation is recognized by Abu Hamdan as “a crucial 
and forensic shift in the conventions of testimony.”429 According to this new British legislation, 
which was later introduced into other legal systems, it required police interviews not to be 
textually transcribed but to be audio recorded. According to Abu Hamdan, the unperceived 
outcome was the birth of a new kind of evidence derived from the possibility of “actively 
listening to the process of speaking.”430 Feldman's argument regarding the guise of truth and 
objectivity under which the law operates in order to maintain further power and control can be 
noted just as much in the almost unnoticeable legislation of PACE. As Abu Hamdan tells us, the 
change from writing down statements during police interviews to audio recording them was 
deliberated as keeping with the truth, and as standing against falsification and alteration. Yet, as 
Feldman shows us, and as Abu Hamdan will further interrogate in his work, the end result 
“increased the use of speaker profiling, voice identification, and voice prints,” thus, further 
alienating social groups already suffering marginalization under the rule of law. The seemingly 
428 Ibid., p. 64.
429 Lawrence Abu Hamdan, “Aural Contract: Forensic Listening and the Reorganization of the Speaking 
Subject,” in Forensis: The Architecture of Public Truth, p. 65.  
430 Ibid., p. 66.
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marginal technological shift from writing to recording goes hand-in-hand with what Weizman 
sees as the transformation of our legal system into the era of the forensic. Now, new methods of 
listening and of forensic voice analysis gain more influence and play a vital role in any legal and 
political system. In the case of forensic listening, voice analysis holds a unique position, as “the 
voice is at once the means of testimony and the object of forensic analysis,”431 blurring borders 
between the witness and the expert, and between the witness and the object. 
And it is the space where once again the right of the encounter comes to the forefront. Through 
his research, culminating in the audio documentary The Freedom of Speech Itself, Abu Hamdan 
exposes how voice evaluation of asylum seekers is used as a measure to deny the emergence of 
an encounter. Abu Hamdan invites us to learn about how nation-states, such as the UK, Australia,
and Germany, use voice profiling in order to determine the futures of migrants. In what may 
seem like a harmless simple procedure, refugees and asylum seekers with no documents of 
identification are requested to call a private Swedish company of forensic phoneticians to 
determine their country of origin. It is a first step, as described by Abu Hamdan in his work and 
writings, in impeding the possibility of the refugees or asylum seekers to have a physical 
encounter with the nation-state, its territory, and its institutions. As a consequence, the demand 
and duty that Itamar Mann advocated through the right of the encounter is severely jeopardized, 
leaving the powerless in the state of bare life more than ever. This is the result, as Abu Hamdan 
argues, when the analysis of an accent of a person is done without the context of his or her life 
story. Voice profiling, Abu Hamdan shows us, empties the voice from all meaning, and often 
results in false calculations and injustice. It bars the refugee or asylum seeker from any 
possibility of a claim and of representation. “Since antiquity, political membership and political 
431 Ibid., p. 67.
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freedom have been associated with the capacity for discourse,”432 Mann tells us. However, with 
the development of voice profiling and surveillance technology, forensic listening is gradually 
being utilized by states in order to eliminate both the possibility of an encounter and the right to 
be heard. Lawrence Abu Hamdan goes further, to forcefully claim that the right of free speech is 
losing ground, as now it is not only what you say, but how you say it.
It is the body of the migrant nowadays that makes the demand for human rights, argues Mann. 
With the ever-growing numbers of migrants seeking a safe haven in Europe, we are more than 
ever aware that without any documents their body serves as the only platform carrying their 
claims for rights. In The Freedom of Speech Itself, described by Abu Hamdan as “a documentary 
about the politics of listening,” we are confronted with the fact that the human body, along with 
its voice and accent are shed of their agency through voice profiling. In a blunt, at times quirky, 
voiceover accompanied by sounds proclaiming an atmosphere of the early days of radio sketch, 
the first character we are introduced to by Abu Hamdan is Prof. Peter French. A forensic speech 
analyst, French is asked by Abu Hamdan to observe his own fluctuations of vowels and 
consonants. Putting himself in the place of the asylum seeker, Abu Hamdan emphasizes the need 
to see ourselves as the other, “The other who can also be myself,”433 in the words of Mann; the 
other, in the case of Abu Hamdan, is anyone of us who cannot be heard due to new developments
in forensic listening. Talking over the background of disturbing sounds, Abu Hamdan confronts 
us with the fact that flourishing forensic listening has brought us to “a sorry phase where bad 
432 Itamar Mann, Humanity at Sea: Maritime Migration and the Foundations of International Law, p. 161.
433 “The migrants' strategy to is to push state agents to decided which task reflects a more fundamental 
commitment. Such a strategy is absolutely absent from Levinas's work. The actions of the Other (now 
capitalized) are strangely not accounted for. To amend this shortcoming in Levinas's philosophy, I have 
proposed to talk about the universal boatperson (who is an agent) as opposed to the Other (who is not).” 
Mann, Humanity at Sea: Maritime Migration and the Foundations of International Law, p. 159.
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listening (and therefore bad evidence) is flooding the forum.”434 Abu Hamdan continuously plays
with the distortion of sounds and voices in his work as a way of manipulating forensic listening, 
emphasizing its power and malfunctioning. He meticulously plays on both levels – on the one 
hand he is a knowledgeable forensic researcher, and on the other hand his own expertise enables 
him to damage and shatter the perceived scientific objectivity and reliability of forensic listening,
as he does in the matter of voice listening. The vulnerability of migrants and the diversity of their
accents is manifested by Abu Hamdan through the analysis of his own voice, and by proclaiming
the history of voice analysis by researchers from other English-speaking countries all agreeably 
sharing the same language, even though differing heavily in accents and pronunciations. 
When we come to hear the voice of Muhammad, the Palestinian asylum seeker who is the 
protagonist of the piece, it is only about ten minutes into the documentary, as Abu Hamdan 
emphasizes the need to listen first, and always within the context of historical and personal 
events and stories. The conversation between Abu Hamdan and Muhammad allows us to hear, in 
his own words, in English and in Arabic, his life circumstances in Palestine, leading to his voice 
profiling interview by the Swedish company of Sprakab conducted for the British immigration 
authorities. As Muhammad explains, his interviewer, whom he could not see but only hear his 
voice since they did not share a physical location, spoke Iraqi Arabic. This led to them not 
understanding each other, since just as the English-speaking world is vast and varied as presented
by Abu Hamdan's documentary, so is the Arab world. However, this did not prevent the state 
from using the method for scrutinizing Muhammad's claim for asylum. The end report declared 
Muhammad to be Syrian and not Palestinian due to the way he pronounced the word “tomato” in 
Arabic. What sounds like a joke is a reality for many migrants, who are coming from areas in 
434 Abu Hamdan, “Aural Contract: Forensic Listening and the Reorganization of the Speaking Subject,” p. 
71.
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which migration has been the rule for decades, and movement between countries is engraved in 
their different accents, personal biographies, and geopolitical events.435
In his audio documentary, Lawrence Abu Hamdan exposes us to the failure and injustice of the 
law when relying on voice analysis. It demonstrates through artistic research how the voice is 
used by the law as a mechanism of power and control in order to eliminate the agency of the 
powerless, just like any claim for recognition, redistribution, and political representation.  In 
defiance of this, Abu Hamdan reimagines the possibility of an encounter even when the nation-
state seeks to eliminate it. By demonstrating how one cannot come to make a judgment, Abu 
Hamdan forces the unruly need of the encounter back into the frame of human rights. Even when
the event of the encounter is imagined “in the absence of physical proximity,”436 it always takes 
into account to the bodily sound of the powerless. In his audio work, Abu Hamdan makes a 
connection between law and art, as he demands that we recognize and give representation to the 
life story of Muhammad. In so doing, he fosters a three-dimensional structure of justice, and the 
possibility of maintaining a state of judicial-visual activism. He demands that we listen to what 
Avigdor Feldman called “the voice of subversive speech groups located on the margins of the 
world of law, with their wonderful and terrible stories.”437 Throughout his research, Abu Hamdan
demonstrates time and again how the knowledge and expertise of an artist intertwined with law 
allow his work to have a political dimension. He uses his capabilities as an artist to formulate, in 
tandem with Muhammad, a dispute as part of a struggle for justice. The stages of naming-
435 On the concept of accents since biblical times as expressed by the term Shibboleth in relation to Abu 
Hamdan's work, see: Lawrence Abu Hamdan, Emily Apter, Shibboleth: Policing By Ear and Forensic 
Listening in Projects (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2016). 
436 Chantal Thomas, “Encounters and Their Consequences: A Review of Itamar Mann’s ‘Humanity at 
Sea,’ EJIL: Talk!,” August 3, 2017, accessed June 30, 2019, https://www.ejiltalk.org/encounters-and-their-
consequences-a-review-of-itamar-manns-humanity-at-sea/.
437 Avigdor Feldman, “The Sirens’ Song: Speech and Space in the Courthouse,” p. 64.
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blaming-claiming come to fruition in recognition of the agency of the powerless demanding an 
immediate action on our part. As Itamar Mann tells us, “When the encounter fails to appear, 
migrants and activists may press it back into experience.”438 This is becoming ever more acute 
due to enhanced technology used to by the nation-state to eliminate any physical encounter. 
In 2013, Abu Hamdan was asked by a UK immigration and asylum tribunal to submit his audio 
documentary and testify as an expert witness.439 One way of contesting the elimination of the 
encounter by the nation-state is via the courts. Another way is through subversive use of the 
same technology used by the state and security agencies, as is manifested by Forensic 
Architecture as an agency engaged in creating and providing new means of evidence. Abu 
Hamdan serves as an example of how artistic knowledge and practice are capabilities that mark 
new opportunities for artists to counter hegemonic legal regimes of knowledge and expertise by 
working with the law. “The role of an expert or of a specialist may only arise under conditions 
where a permanent asymmetry of power aims at shaping or modifying human conduct,”440 
Zygmunt Bauman tells us.  In these times, as Abu Hamdan demonstrates in his artistic work, and 
as legal scholars such as David Kennedy propel us to realize, we need to devote further thinking 
to expanding our vision of what “expertise” is and to who is an expert. Kennedy urges us to not 
abandon decision-making to an “exclusive province of specialists or professionals.”441 His 
research on the current regime of the expert is also in line with my earlier discussion of Saskia 
Sassen's reading of capabilities, as she recognizes the power and influence experts are having on 
438 Itamar Mann, Humanity at Sea, p. 181.
439 Avi Feldman, “The Artist as Expert Witness,” pp. 45-9.
440 Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987), p. 48. 
441 David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 3.
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the nation-state in its current global conduct. Kennedy can be perceived as supporting Sassen 
regarding the complex relation between the nation-state and the global, which according to him 
is “managed, struggled over, and adjusted by experts.”442 I agree with those who argue that 
“managerialism” fails especially when considered in the face of recent migration.443 Yet, 
managerialism, or “rule by experts,”444 which is already heavily supported by legislation, never 
stopped to consider new forms of expertise, or alternative bodies of knowledge and practice such
as those offered by artists and curators. Mann begins to point to a possibility of reforming 
managerialism and the rule of experts by suggesting incorporating new forms of imagination into
it. Stating that a “human rights encounter is not only a physical encounter but also an imaginary 
construct at the normative basis of legality,”445 Mann endorses to a certain extent the work of 
artists and curators as agents of artistic imagination, as it is embedded in their long-earned 
capabilities which I framed as judicial-visual activism. 
In the next chapter, I shall elaborate on encounters I have facilitated during the last two years 
between law and art practitioners. The practice, part of my thesis, will serve, hence, as a form of 
conclusion, and as a call for further research and reflection on the reciprocal relation between art 
and law, and on the political dimension of justice embedded in this sort of a relation. The 
encounters to be illuminated in Chapter Five display judicial-visual practice as a space in 
between the forensic and the fragility of witnessing. It exposes and lingers on the complexity of 
language through performances dealing often with the rights of migrants. But, beforehand, I wish
to conclude this chapter with the words of a visual artist, philosopher, and psychoanalyst, Bracha
442 Ibid., p. 6.
443 Itamar Mann, Humanity at Sea, p. 192.
444 David Kennedy, A World of Struggle, p. 4.
445 Itamar Mann, Humanity at Sea, p. 194.
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L. Ettinger who leads us to the intimate space of the encounter. Her words seem to elevate the 
concept of the encounter, which she has researched through the work of Emmanuel Levinas and 
The Matrixial Gaze.446 According to her, “The matrixial borderspace is a sphere of encounter-
events...to become creative, the aesthetical transgression of individual borderlines, which occurs 
in any case with or without our awareness or intention, calls for the awakening of a specific 
ethical attention, responsibility and extention. In artworking it calls for generous self-
relinquishment. In art, the aesthetical working-through bends towards the ethical with matrixial  
co-response-ability and wit(h)nessing.”447 Ettinger perceives art as a space of trust through 
“connections of ‘co-emergence’: ‘I feel in you,’ ‘you think in me,’ ‘I know in you,’ and so on, in 
which subjective existence is articulated through one another. Art alone can achieve such an 
encounter.”448 In words echoing Abu Hamdan and Mann, Ettinger states: “Breaking with the 
violent past demands paying intimate attention to its often erased figures. To not sacrifice 
yourself while not sacrificing the other — this is the challenge. And today we must take care of 
the other, the refugee. It doesn’t matter why and where; the refugee is your sister. She could be 
your mother; she can one day be you.”449 This is the essence of the right of the encounter, and the
446 Griselda Pollock describes Ettinger's theory as a “radical psychoanalytical thesis of the Matrix and its 
indirect but pertinent perspectives on how we might move from the aesthetics of connectivity to the ethics
of responsibility and thence to the decisions and agency of political action.” Griselda Pollock, New 
Encounters: Arts, Cultures, Concepts (London: I.B Tauris & Co, 2013), p. 15.
447 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Matrixial Trans-subjectivity in Problematizing Global Knowledge,” Theory, 
Culture and Society 23, Issue 2-3 (May 2006): 219.
448 In words evoking the right of the encounter as perceived by Itamar Mann and elaborated upon in this 
chapter, Griselda Pollock tells us that Ettinger “asks: what are the conditions, perhaps already engendered 
within subjectivity, that might make us able not only able to respond, but yearning to respond to the call 
of the other in their suffering as if this responsiveness were an originary condition of an already intimated 
co-human-subjectivity and not something to be fabricated through philosophical gymnastics?” Griselda 
Pollock, New Encounters: Arts, Cultures, Concepts, p. 16.
449 Brad Evans and Bracha L. Ettinger, “Art in a Time of Atrocity,” New York Times, December 16, 2016.
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essence of art in our time when it comes to be realized as the political working with the legal. 
There is no immediate act in which art influences politics and law, Ettinger tells us, but by 
insisting on the right of the encounter; on the right of intervention, by insisting on artistic 
capabilities in a time of transition between the nation-state and globalization, art when 
intertwined with, before, beyond, and after the law demands a shift into judicial-visual activism, 
creating a new formulation and new spaces for disputes, rights, and justice to emerge.
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Chapter Five: Between Legal Imagination and Motions for the Agenda
5.1. Towards Legal Imagination: An Introduction
“Towards legal imagination is a series of planned encounters aimed at the creation of a space for 
critical thinking and action amongst curators, artists, and jurists concerning the relations between
the field of art and the field of law. At its premise lies a realization that the legal system holds a 
wide and significant influence on all aspects of our lives; thus, it may serve as a fruitful ground 
for research and creation for curators, artists, and jurists alike. During the first encounter we will 
present and discuss a number of artistic research-based projects that provoke our immediate 
understanding of the legal system in relation to artistic imagination. Some of the themes on the 
agenda: creating legal alternatives through artistic imagination; artists and curators as expert 
witnesses; artworks as legal evidence; the statutory role of artists and curators. At the same time, 
the encounters are an open call to propose and suggest themes for further investigation, 
deliberation, and collaboration.”
With this short introduction, a professional and personal engagement began in which I invited a 
group of about twenty professionals to join me in law and art-themed encounters. In close 
collaboration with Vardit Gross, director of Artport Tel-Aviv,450 who invited me to conduct my 
research as part of Artport's annual activities, we embarked on personal and group meetings, 
phone calls, and extensive email correspondence with Israeli experts working in both fields. In 
the first meeting held in June 2015, we were able to assemble sixteen emerging and established 
artists, curators, and visual culture researchers, along with law professors, lawyers, and legal 
activists. I mention here only briefly the long weeks of preparations that led to a rather 
450 Artport Tel-Aviv is a nonprofit art organization promoting and supporting Israeli and international 
artists and curators since 2011 through residencies and educational programs often in collaboration with 
local and international institutions. 
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enthusiastic gathering at Artport's offices, as it became clear to us that our task was anything but 
easy or obvious. Encounters, as I remarked in the previous chapter, by definition bring together 
the familiar with the unexpected, a sense of closeness with the hostile. Very early on, it became 
apparent to us that while artists and curators seemed eagerly inclined to come on board, legal 
practitioners were far more skeptical and reluctant to give their consent to take part in such 
encounters. We realized how much of a challenge it would be to find people both passionate and 
committed to a long-term, interdisciplinary project like the one we envisioned. From legal 
practitioners’ work overload to their busy schedules, some have straightforwardly explained that,
while heavily engaged in pro bono activism concerning social issues, art is just too far-fetched in 
the hierarchy of contributions one can make as a law professor. Overall, we had the impression 
that it would be more difficult to rely on the openness, collaboration, and support of the legal 
practitioners than on that of artists and curators. Given that both Vardit Gross and I studied law (I
also practiced law for several years before diverting my path towards the art world), we were not 
fully surprised. Nevertheless, our shared background provided us with enough knowledge and 
experience to not give up, but instead to newly cultivate our personal contacts with former law 
professors and colleagues.   
In the following pages, I do not intend to focus or linger much on the process leading to the 
encounters, nor on the methodology or structure according to which they were developed. While 
acknowledging the potential of analyzing the participants and the outline of the encounters, I 
have opted here to concentrate on the artistic and curatorial content of the encounters, rather than
attempt to embark on what may be a sociological, psychological, or cultural investigation. I will 
be discussing some essential ideas that developed during the encounters in the following pages, 
but I will insist on a limited discussion of these, as otherwise I would need to divert my overall 
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research from its core structure. Furthermore, the encounters and the assembly of a group of law 
and art practitioners were not intended to form or resemble an academic think tank. My 
emphasis, thus, in this chapter, shall be on the accumulative nature of the informal meetings and 
exchange that eventually led to an exhibition and series of events. I will be mentioning the topics
and discussions that took place during the encounters, but I will not be expanding on specific 
issues at length. Nor will I be critically analyzing the themes that were shared during the long 
conversations. My main intention was to allow an encounter, a face-to-face close exchange 
between people possessing different theoretical knowledge and practices, and to foster a space 
for a reciprocal discussion and possible collaboration. The following chapter will be devoted to 
some aspects of the preliminary encounters that led to an exhibition framed as part of a 
theoretical discussion of law and exhibitions as an archive. The space of law and the space of the 
exhibition will be juxtaposed in this chapter. If law is the archive, as suggested by Renisa 
Mawani and explored below, and if an exhibition space can be a place of political imagination 
similar to legal constitutions, as stated by Stacy Douglas and also to be discussed in the 
following pages, I will attempt to demonstrate ways in which the linking of the judicial with the 
visual, the law with the exhibition, can contribute to the creation of law's counter-archive. 
5.2. Towards Legal Imagination: On Legal and Artistic Imagination
The first encounter of the “Towards Legal Imagination” group was structured around two talks – 
one by human rights lawyer and activist Michael Sfard, and the second by visual culture 
researcher Dr. Ruth Ginsburg. Sfard was invited to discuss two cases in which he collaborated 
with the Forensic Architecture agency, while in a preliminary private meeting Ginsburg 
suggested sharing her new research concerning the role of amateur civilian photography in the 
current Syrian civil war with the group. Interestingly enough, since the work of Sfard with the 
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agency is relatively unknown in Israel, both speakers brought new streams of thought and 
methods of action to the group. This proved to be captivating, since following each talk (about 
thirty minutes long) a lengthy and lively discussion emerged among the participants. The 
exchange between the group members went past the time frame planned for each talk, and 
continued way into the break. All talks and discussions, from the first encounter to the last, were 
planned to be as informal and intimate as possible in an environment that encouraged open and 
casual exchange, as all participants were seated around one shared table. After each talk, we 
would assemble around a large pot of homemade soup. There, everyone seemed to have gathered
to agree or disagree on subject matters concerning the relationship between art and law, exposure
and witnessing, evidence and the forensic. At the end of the first encounter, it became clear that, 
beyond the exchange of knowledge, it was the possibility of engaging in a passionate dialogue 
between art and legal practitioners that defined the added value of such meetings. After about 
five hours of heated debates, whether around a large table, in the courtyard, or in Artport's 
kitchen, there was unanimous agreement during the final summary session on the need to foster 
further encounters and discussions.   
Following private one-on-one meetings that Vardit and I had with the different participants, a 
second event was scheduled. This time around, as a new exhibition Decolonized Skies451 was 
planned to open at Artport, we invited one of the exhibition's curators – Yael Messer – to open 
the meeting with a “behind the scenes” tour. Taking advantage of the fact that the exhibition was 
still under construction and being installed, it allowed the legal practitioner in particular a peek 
451 The exhibition Decolonized Skies was curated by Yael Messer in collaboration with Gilad Reich as part
of the High&Low Bureau. Reich was a regular participant in the group meetings of “Towards Legal 
Imagination.” Decolonized Skies, Curators: Yael Messer and Gilad Reich (High&Low Bureau). October 
22, 2015 – January 16, 2016. Exhibition website, accessed June 30, 2019: https://www.artportlv.org/blog/
%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%9E
%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%97%D7%A8%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D-decolonized-skies. 
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into the process of exhibition-making. The artist Miki Kratsman, who participated in both the 
exhibition and in the first group meeting, was subsequently invited to give the main talk in order 
to further connect the exhibition to the themes of legal and artistic imagination. The exhibition 
and Kratsman's work, both dealing with methods of demilitarization of aerial views challenging 
the power of the state and large corporations through the use of cameras and new technology, 
inspired the participants to question and direct possible efforts towards mutual artistic and 
scientific tactics and measures of collaboration with regard to ethical and visual matters alike.     
For the third encounter, I decided to go with the same format and once again invite a guest to 
open the meeting. Moish Goldberg, a filmmaker who created a television series titled Files from 
the Public Defense, was invited to share his personal experience working for five years 
documenting court trials from the point of view of the accused rather than that of the jurists. The 
decision to invite Goldberg was made together with the head of the Public Defense who was an 
active participant of our group. Established by the Israeli Ministry of Justice in 1996, the Public 
Defense provides legal representation in criminal proceedings to defendants and detainees 
without economic means. Since the statutory status of the head of the Public Defense is equal to 
that of the State Attorney, we were asked by him in advance not to record any of the discussions 
that took place during the meetings. This, of course, limited my access to the exchange between 
the participants, which was oftentimes very intense during the talks themselves. Nevertheless, I 
decided to agree to this in order to have him as part of the group, since he was the only civil 
servant agreeing to take part in our encounters. The opportunity to present and discuss footage of
the daily routine of the Public Defense followed by a talk by the head of the department was a 
rare opportunity to have a close-up look into the legal apparatus of the state. If the previous 
meeting was constructed around an intimate visit behind the scenes of an exhibition linked with 
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artistic tactics of visualizing that which is hidden by the power of the state and global 
corporations, this time around it was the attorneys’ offices, the corridors of the courts, the off-
the-record chats between lawyers and their clients, and the personal stories of the life and legal 
experiences of the mostly unheard voices of defendants and detainees that took center stage.
The screening and discussion with the head of the Public Defense prompted us to seek further 
insight into the structures of the courts, and into spaces usually undocumented or unavailable to 
most members of our group. Therefore, Vardit Gross and I began to arrange for a tour for the 
group at the District Court of Tel-Aviv with the help of Ruti Direktor, curator of contemporary 
art at the Tel-Aviv Museum of Art. As a result, we managed to invite architect Amnon Rechter, 
who was in charge of the architectural plans of the court's new wing that opened in 2014. The 
son of Yaakov Rechter, one of the three architects who planned the original court building in 
1966, the tour with Rechter afforded the participants both a historical overview and entry into 
judges’ chambers and offices normally out of reach and out of sight. Together with the museum's 
curator, an emphasis was directed towards the geographical proximity between the court and the 
museum, as they both are connected by a public square designed by Yaakov Rechter. It was 
further discussed how the square is shared by two other major buildings – Beit Ariela Shaar Zion
Library, Tel Aviv's central public library, and HaKirya, the headquarters of Israel Defense Forces 
(IDF). The group noted and contemplated how this strategic location, which connects culture, 
politics, and power, had been mostly overlooked by Israeli artists and legal experts alike.452 
452 One notable exception can be found in the video Marganith (2012) by artist Tzion Abraham Hazan. 
Referring to the Marganit Tower located within HaKirya, it depicts the urban architectural surroundings 
of the tower. I chose this image for the cover of the OnCurating journal issue I edited, Issue 28, published
in January 2016.
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The encounter outside of Artport's office and compound led to another new location – the legal 
department of the Hotline for Refugees and Migrants in Tel Aviv. We were invited by advocate 
Asaf Weitzen, head of the department and an active member of the group, and the idea was once 
again to expose the bureaucratic side of the law while conversing about the links between law 
and art. The visit to the court, just like the visit to the Hotline offices, offered a change of 
scenery, as well as a new sense of intimacy between the participants in the overcrowded and 
relatively worn-out offices of the Hotline. The talk with Weitzen, during which he introduced us 
to the work of the department, and we were able to learn close-up about his frustration with the 
current legal situation in Israel concerning refugees and migrants, ended with a direct and very 
personal call by him for action. Already in previous private meetings, he had time and again 
expressed an interest in finding ways in which to collaborate with art practitioners, since after 
five years in office he seemed to have reached a dead end in his capacity as a legal practitioner to
bring change into the lives of migrants. Given a reality in which under 1% of migrants are 
recognized by the State of Israel as refugees, he was interested in finding new mechanisms for 
action beyond the legal sphere. His plea seemed to have signaled that it might be the right time 
and the right place to seriously begin to consider what the group's next step should be. 
5.3. Towards an Exhibition: An Introduction 
The call for action by the head of the legal department of the Hotline for Refugees and Migrants 
was received with utmost attention by the group members. As one might have noticed, in the 
initial call for participation we did not mention any defined expected outcome. Vardit and I also 
agreed that we should allow the encounters to form and develop without the pressure to produce 
any specific product. Although Artport operates an exhibition space, it does not function in a 
similar way to that of museums or galleries. There are no set dates for exhibitions, but rather a 
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use of the space in accordance with the changing necessities of the artists and curators in 
residency. With this in mind, and with the wish to take the group to the next phase, we invited the
members to propose ideas and possible concepts for an artwork, project, event, talk, or 
exhibition. It was made clear that an exhibition was not necessarily the ultimate end goal, but 
rather that other formats and platforms were welcome to be envisioned. 
As a result, we received six proposals, out of which five ultimately made it into the final 
exhibition. The one project that did not come to fruition was the one proposed by a jurist, while 
the rest were suggested by artists who were part of the group. To my understanding, the project 
by the jurist did not take off mostly due to personal reasons; however, it might also be that it 
lacked an artistic vision with which it could have better been connected to the artists in the 
group. Unlike the jurist’s proposal, the artists had sketched quite a clear role for the jurists in 
their suggested projects. Also worth mentioning is that in private talks I had with members of the
group, it became apparent to me that most saw it as the “duty” of the group's artists to take the 
lead and propose projects for further collaboration. The most common explanation I heard about 
this was that at the outset the meetings were initiated by the “art world,” while others argued that 
they believed it to be the case because the realization of the project was part of the activity of an 
art institution.
The proposals received by the participants ranged from a performance dealing with the recruiting
of soldiers by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to the exploration of the relation between food 
and law. The variety of themes and mediums could be traced to the initial open invitation just as 
to the heterogeneity of the group itself. In order to allow a wide range of voices and ideas, we 
invited well-established, mid-career artists and curators to join, along with emerging ones 
working in video, cinema, performance, installation, and photography. Alongside PhD students 
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in law and law lecturers, the legal group was made up of associate professors, lawyers, and legal 
activists working in the fields of human and civil rights, labor and employment, anti-
discrimination law, tort law, and criminal law. In terms of age range, the group of art and legal 
practitioners was made of participants in their early 60s to ones in their early 30s. Gender-wise, 
the entire group was made up of an equal number of female and male participants. Nevertheless, 
it is important to mention that although Israeli society is made up of 20% Arab citizens, and more
than 20% Mizrahi/Arab Jews (Jews descended from Jewish communities of the Middle East and 
North Africa), the group had no Arab representatives and was underrepresented by Mizrahi/Arab 
Jews.453 The group also had a very low representation of religious participants from either the 
Arab or Jewish communities.454 
453 This fact was directly addressed by one of the law professors attending the meetings. This also reflects 
the current growing debate and struggle in Israel regarding the rooted discrimination in the cultural fields 
towards Mizrahi/Arab Jews in the cultural field in Israel. In the context of this research, I cannot expand 
much on this topic, but I will mention Sarah Chinski (1951-2008) as an example of an Israeli pioneer 
researcher who brought to the forefront the systemic marginalization of Mizrahi/Arab Jews in Israeli art 
through essays such as “Eyes Wide Shut: The Acquired Albino Syndrome of the Israeli Art Field” (2002). 
In contrast to her, Israeli art historian and curator Gideon Ofrat claimed: “There are Mizrahi artists in 
Israel. There are works of art here that draw inspiration from the East. There are even works that affirm 
characteristics of alienation. But there is no ‘Mizrahi art’ in Israel, since the work of artists with a Mizrahi
background is basically Western art – and as such does not extend beyond the Western character of Israeli 
art.” See: Iris Lana, “The Mizrahi Pioneers Who Transformed Israeli Art,” Ha'aretz, February 26, 2017, 
accessed June 30, 2019, http://www.haaretz.com/life/.premium-1.773780?=&ts=_1500502411713. 
454 Gideon Ofrat stated that, “Israeli art was created and is continuously created by secular artists.” 
Translated from the Hebrew by the author from Gideon Ofrat, “The Israeli Art and the Jewish Tradition,” 
Mahanayim 11 (1994), accessed June 30, 2019, http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/art/yahadut/haisraelit.htm.
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5.4. Towards the Space of Law and Art: On Violence 
The outcome of the proposals by the members of the group “Towards Legal Imagination” was an
exhibition and a series of events titled “Motions for the Agenda” that I curated in collaboration 
with Vardit Gross in May 2017.455 As the exhibition's title suggests, the organizing logic of the 
exhibition was formed around the notion of motions. In the Israeli legislative system, by placing 
“a motion for the agenda,” a parliament member can bring a matter to the attention of the 
plenum. The term “motion” is used also, for example, in American procedural law to describe a 
written, or in some cases an oral, application to the court to request an order or a ruling. In this 
sense, each work can be perceived as a sort of an independent proposal for the exhibition's 
agenda as it maintains and reflects the heterogeneity of the encounters at large. Since most of the 
motions, but certainly not all, were of a performative nature and dimension, an early set of 
questions was if, how, and to what extent can the exhibition as a platform and space link the 
different works? Beyond the common themes of migration and the military that were discussed 
in the preliminary meetings and that thereafter matured into some of the proposals, I was seeking
a way for the exhibition to become a space in which performances, video, and sound objects 
could maintain an ongoing accumulative, multilayered presence in the space. How can the 
violence of the law as it is captured and contested in the different motions be contained in the 
space, conveyed to the general public, and how might alternatives to the existing legal system 
also be suggested? 
The text I wrote to accompany the exhibition began with an exploration of the relation between 
law and art through the reading of Franz Kafka's short story “Before the Law.” I have also 
455 Motions for the Agenda: Performance, Video & Sound All About Law and Justice, curated by Avi 
Feldman in collaboration with Vardit Gross, May 16 – June 6, 2017, accessed June 30, 2019, 
http://www.artportlv.org/blog/motions-agenda. 
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referred to Kafka's seminal story in the introduction to this book in relation to my earlier 
discussion on ideology. In relating to Kafka as part of the preface to the exhibition, I noted 
Kafka’s invaluable contribution to our understanding of the law, and to the law and literature 
movement beginning in the 1970s dedicated to the study of the language of the law. The 
movement’s pioneering publication is considered by most to be The Legal Imagination, written 
by James Boyd White, in which he analyzes law beyond a mere set of rules and policies. White 
is interested in the culture of law made out of “habits of mind and expectations [...]. It is an 
enormously rich and complex system of thought and expression, of social definitions and 
practices, which can be learned and mastered, modified or preserved, by the individual mind.”456 
As I already mentioned in the introduction to this book, White's strong conviction in law as “a 
method of integration, a way of putting together different voices, different languages, into a 
single composition; a way of comprehending two opposing sides and what can be said in favor of
each”457 is oftentimes naive or even misleading, as the cases discussed throughout this book 
demonstrated time and again. In this sense, Kafka's subversive, critical, and often fatalistic 
approach to law seems to be able to unconditionally capture the failures and lacunae of the legal 
system. His determined insistence to draw our attention to law's overarching and abiding 
influence on all aspects of the human life might also hold within it a promise of the existence of 
an alternative to THE LAW (in capital letters as occasionally written by Gilles Deleuze458) as we 
supposedly know it. Kafka's deliberate infatuation with what may seem like insignificant details, 
from the fleas in the doorkeeper's fur collar to the shrinking size of the man from the country as 
456 James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1985), p. xiii.
457 Ibid., p. xv.
458 Gilles Deleuze, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty.
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he grows older before the law, are possible hints, traces, and entry points through which one 
must act in defiance of the law. 
How to stand next to and with the man from the country and envision a place beyond and/or after
the law was one of the main concerns of the preliminary encounters and the exhibition that 
followed. Kafka's story suggests that one need first gain admittance to the law from the 
doorkeeper that stands before it. “The gate stands open, as usual,” however, it is the figure of the 
powerful doorkeeper that is enough to deter one from stepping through. And as the doorkeeper 
assures the man from the country, he is only one of the least powerful of the doorkeepers. “From 
hall to hall there is one doorkeeper after another, each more powerful than the last. The third 
doorkeeper is already so terrible that even I cannot bear to look at him,”459 the doorkeeper tells 
the man from the country, who is faced with unexpected rigidity. The difficulties experienced by 
the man from the country encourage me at this point to expand on my text for the exhibition, in 
particular in relation to power and violence. As I have noted, the power upheld by the doorkeeper
deters the man from the country from crossing the gate of the law without any use of violence at 
all. Violence, as a matter of fact, is never explicitly mentioned in Kafka's fable. The doorkeeper 
and his “colleagues” are described as powerful and terrible, but never as violent or forceful. Yet, 
violence is inherent to the law and the legal system. I will argue that in Kafka's story, just as in 
any discussion regarding the relation between law and justice, power and violence intertwine. It 
was Walter Benjamin who pointed out early on in the first sentence of his “Critique of Violence” 
that, “The task of a critique of violence can be summarized as that of expounding its relation to 
law and justice.”460 Hannah Arendt argued in her writing on violence that, although power and 
459 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), p. 183.
460 Walter Benjamin, Reflections (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), p. 277.
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violence “usually appear together,”461 it is necessary to distinguish between them. The 
doorkeeper's warning to the man from the country regarding the presence of other doorkeepers is
the exercise of power. If we follow Arendt's argument, then the doorkeeper's power is based on 
the human ability to act in concert, for “power is never the property of an individual; it belongs 
to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together.”462 The man from 
the country obeys the instrumental violence of the doorkeeper who governs through collective 
power, as “no government exclusively based on the means of violence has ever existed.”463 
At this stage, we can state that although Kafka mentions only the concept of power, one cannot 
ignore the notion of violence hovering and shaping the plot of his short story. I mentioned above 
Benjamin's determined investigation of law and justice through violence, but it is Jacques 
Derrida's writings that held the capacity to enrich the exhibition's text and critical thinking, as he 
allows us an insightful realization into the groundless violence that establishes the law’s 
authority in the first place. According to Derrida, “Since the origin of authority, the foundation or
ground, the position of the law can't by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are 
themselves a violence without ground.” This conclusion leads Derrida to state that law is 
deconstructible and allows for the possibility of deconstruction. Justice, in contrast, is not 
deconstructible, which brings Derrida to claim that, “Deconstruction is justice.”464 I do not wish 
to go further into these ideas, some of which I have referred to in the exhibition's text. As I have 
461 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (San Diego, CA: A Harvest Book, 1970), pp. 51-52.
462 Ibid., p. 44.
463 Ibid., p. 50.
464 Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York and London: Routledge, 
1992) pp. 14-15.
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noted there,465 I am of the opinion that the mystical and fictional elements of the law, as 
described by Derrida, suggest and establish fruitful opportunities for the expansion of the 
relationship between law and art. However, at this point, I want to attempt to delve further into 
the notion of violence by asking what is that place of law of which Kafka imagines? In the 
exhibition's text, I followed Derrida's examination of Kafka's story as he inquires: “Did the man 
from the country wish to enter the law or merely the place where law is safeguarded?” Derrida 
does not leave this question open, but continues to quickly state that, “We cannot tell, and 
perhaps there is no choice, since the law figures itself as a kind of place, a topos, and a taking 
place.”466 However, in conjunction with the text of the exhibition but also differing from it, and in
accordance with the methodology I have proposed in this publication – linking law and art 
through legal interpretative methods in the reflective post-exhibition manner in which this 
chapter is written, I wish to linger on this particular place where law is safeguarded as I stress 
and connect it to the notion of the space of the exhibition. 
5.5. Towards a Counter-Archive: Between the Space of Law and the Space of Art
What is it, then, that connects violence, the space of the law, and the space of the exhibition?  
Here, I wish to bring Stacy Douglas' exploration of the museum as the counter-archive of law 
into the discussion. Researching the relation between advanced political imagination and new 
constitutions adopted by such countries as South Africa (1996) and Egypt (2014), Douglas 
maintains that oftentimes these constitutions are limited in their capacity to endorse and sustain 
political transformation. It might be that they are drafted with an intention to prompt and secure a
better, shared future, but “whether drafted in post-conflict times or otherwise, cannot help but 
465 The catalogue of the exhibition Motion for the Agenda can be found in the appendix. 
466 Derrida, Acts of Literature, p. 200.
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delimit and legally ground political community.”467 As such, Douglas searches for other devices 
that may contribute to newly imagining sovereignty, and argues that museums might be sites in 
which political transformation can be achieved. “Museums, like constitutions, are a place for the 
launching of imaginations of political community.” Douglas is aware of the problematic manner 
in which museums historically contributed to the marginalization and discrimination of certain 
communities. However, she insists that while museums can act in what she perceives to be a 
monumental practice, they can also integrate counter-monumental practices that “destabilise 
smooth and secure conceptions of community.”468 As an example, Douglas mentions the District 
Six Museum in Cape Town, South Africa, as a museum engaged in the creation of new 
categories for the re-imagining of the complexity of race discourse and representation. For the 
sake of the discussion in this chapter, it is not necessary to elaborate on Douglas' examples, but 
instead I intend to draw attention to her statement that, “The museum can act as law's counter-
archive, telling a story about political community that the constitution is unable to.”469 By law's 
counter-archive, Douglas follows a growing demand by scholars to open up the legal archive 
beyond official documents and materials towards “multiple forms, genres, sites and practices.” 
According to Stewart Motha and Honni van Rijswijk, “Counter-archives function as critical 
interventions within and beside legal processes. They challenge established forms of representing
and responding to violence.”470 The archive “is central to both the content and definitional 
467 Stacy Douglas, “Constitutions Are Not Enough: Museums as Law’s Counter Archive,” in Law, 
Memory, Violence: Uncovering the Counter-Archive, eds. Stewart Motha and Honni van Rijswijk 
(Oxon/New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 142.
468 Ibid., p. 144.
469 Ibid., p. 146.
470 Stewart Motha and Honni van Rijswijk, “Introduction, A Counter-Archival Sense,” in Law, Memory, 
Violence, p. 2.
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boundary of law and the museum,”471 argues Douglas, as she develops Derrida's notion of the 
archive into a site that connects museums, courtrooms, and parliaments alike.  
Now, it is well established that Derrida's lecture from 1994, titled “The Concept of the Archive: 
A Freudian Impression”—later modified into a publication titled Archive Fever—is known in 
both academic and artistic circles. Yet, unlike the “feverish” growing interest in the archival 
promise in artistic research and practice,472 law's archive and counter-archive still remain very 
under-researched and undervalued. Renisa Mawani argues that while in recent years historians, 
for one, have come to perceive the archive as “a dynamic, incomplete, and fiercely disputed site 
of knowledge production that carries profound implications for how we write history and 
approach and understand the past,” legal practitioners and scholars are “curiously silent”473 on 
the place and role of law's records and archives. According to Mawani, this stands in defiance of 
the well-established link made by Derrida between the law and the archive. At the very 
beginning of his exploration of the archive, Derrida marks this relation by arguing that the Greek 
word Arkhē “names at once the commencement and the commandment.”474 Mawani also refers to 
Cornelia Vismann as yet another example of how it has been demonstrated that “the history of 
the archive and the history of law are inseparable. The ‘transmitting, storing, canceling, 
manipulating, and destroying’ that has come to represent the archive also inscribes a history of 
471 Douglas, “Constitutions Are Not Enough: Museums as Law’s Counter Archive,” p. 153.
472 Ariella Azoulay, “Archive,” Political Concepts, accessed July 30, 2017, 
http://www.politicalconcepts.org/issue1/archive/. See also: “How the Art World Caught Archive Fever,” 
Artspace, Jan. 22, 2014, accessed June 30, 2019, 
http://www.artspace.com/magazine/art_101/art_market/the_art_worlds_love_affair_with_archives-51976.
473 Renisa Mawani, “Law's Archive,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 8:337-365 (December 
2012): 339-340.
474 Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press,
1998), p. 1.
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law.”475 Based on this, Mawani goes further to claim that “law is the archive,”476 established on 
what she calls a “double logic of violence.” According to this, the legal system functions through
“statutes and judgments that came before and by determining which are apposite, law cultivates 
its meaning and asserts it authority while at the same time concealing and sanctioning its 
material, originary, and ongoing violence.”477 Thus, the double logic of violence, described by 
Mawani, is derived from law operating as a self-referential system, and is most evident in the 
pivotal role precedents play in it. Statutes, judgments, and precedents make the law and its 
archive through a constant referential system safeguarded from external critical access by a 
double logic of violence.  
In light of the above, and by following Mawani's concept of violence and law as archive, we can
now make the claim for the possibility of envisioning Kafka's man from the country as standing
before the law, as standing before the archive. When law is the archive, as Mawani suggests,
their physical resemblance becomes more evident. Bruno Latour's inquiry of the essence of law
demonstrated how jurists are preoccupied with texts that are omnipresent, but it  is the “grey,
beige or yellow, thin or thick, easy or complex, old or new”478 file that makes the passage of law
visible. In a similar manner, Ariella Azoulay, in her exploration of the archive, also turns to the
materiality of the archive made of “cards, forms to be filled, search engines, lists, code words,
folders, clerks, laws, regulations, gloves, aprons, robes, brushes, chemicals [...],”479 which control
475 Mawani, “Law's Archive,” p. 340.
476 Ibid.
477 Ibid., p. 341.
478 Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d'Etat (Cambridge, Malden: Polity 
Press, 2010), p. 71.
479 Azoulay, “Archive.”
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and  manage  the  way  one  handles  the  archive.  In  this  sense,  the  methodology  guiding  this
publication, and the exhibition Motions for the Agenda, should be perceived as carrying a double
logic and operating simultaneously on two levels: on the one hand, as an attempt to penetrate
into the law as an archive; and on the other hand, opening up possibilities for an alternative law,
or the creation of a counter-archive through legal  and artistic interpretative methods; through
what in this book has been described as judicial-visual activism. Be it the projects examined in
this  publication, or the projects shown in the exhibition to be discussed herewith, a common
denominator can be found in an interest in broadening our notion of law and of art; investigating
en/counters  that  re-determine  the  role  of  art  and  legal  practitioners.  The  interdisciplinary
approach  manifested  in  this  publication and  in  the  exhibition  insists  on  the  importance  of
intertwining  and  intersecting  law  in  order  to  sustain  a  greater  sense  of  inclusiveness  and
transparency. It is a call for action based on a cautious, gradual reconstruction of legal rights and
justice.      
5.6. Five Motions for the Agenda: Interventions in Law's Archive
Approaching law as archive draws and unravels relations between the space of the exhibition and
of the law through the display of physical and visual objects accumulated and organized during 
the duration of the exhibition. I wish to emphasize that the intention of the exhibition Motions 
for the Agenda did not lie in further establishing the role of the curator as an archivist, nor in 
creating an archive out of the exhibition itself. Instead, it should be stated that investigating law's
archive in an exhibition setting is a theoretical and practical method in which the works shown in
the exhibition are directed towards an investigation of the law, its space, its language, its power, 
and its double violence. Some aspects of the notion of the archive are relevant to the exhibition 
and to the law; however, the objective has not been to perceive the exhibition as “a living 
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archive: a representation of the world that exists, as diffuse a membrane as possible between the 
outside world and the objects it produced,”480 but rather as a counter-archive consisting of 
motions for the agenda that suggest alternative ways to imagine legal subjects. These motions, 
directly and indirectly, endorse and manifest ways to challenge, rethink, and reconstruct law’s 
double violence through the excavation of legal documents and legal constructions hidden and 
concealed in forgotten and neglected archives. 
5.6.1 Motion Number One: “Pragmatic Failure”
The first motion for the agenda to be discussed here481 is “Pragmatic Failure,” a new performance
by artist Einat Amir created in collaboration with psycholinguist Orly Idan, and with legal 
counsel by advocate Tali Kritzman-Amir.482 The performance is the outcome of Amir's 
participation in the meetings of “Towards Legal Imagination” and her two-year residency 
(starting in 2016) at the PICR Lab at The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel. Exploring 
different aspects of human interaction mainly through performances, Amir dedicated her research
in the lab to psychological experiments dealing with the manner in which emotions function in 
group interactions and states of conflicts. Wishing to expand her investigation further into the 
role of emotions into a legal context and frame, Amir constructed a real-time experiment during 
which the public’s emotional reaction towards the human and civil rights of refugees in Israel 
was questioned. Based on Benjamin Lee Whorf's suggestion that language carves our thinking 
480 Christine Y. Hahn, “Exhibition as Archive: Beaumont Newhall, Photography 1839–1937, and the 
Museum of Modern Art,” Visual Resources 18:2 (2002): 145-152. 
481 “Pragmatic Failure” was also the first motion in the exhibition. However, for the sake of the discussion 
here, I will be re-numbering the rest of the motions, grouping them in a different order according to 
themes, and not in order of appearance in the exhibition. 
482 All works in Motion for the Agenda were newly commissioned, performed or exhibited for the first 
time as part of the exhibition.
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and consciousness, Amir and her collaborators invited the public to take part in a participatory 
performance that was at the same time a scientific psychological experiment examining the way 
distinct wording activates the emotion of anger. Israeli Supreme Court rulings regarding the legal
status of refugees was the center of interest for Amir and her collaborators, which gradually 
developed into a selection of short texts in which noun versus verb labeling was examined. The 
self-referential, almost scientific, and often “esoteric language [...] and carefully cultivated 
modes”483 of argumentation of the court was examined by Amir in order to both criticize it and to
suggest alternative word labeling. More specifically, in the context of the legal status of refugees 
in Israel, Amir asked how a difference in wording affects our emotional reaction to the rights of 
migrants, and how we can critically read and understand judicial judgments and verdicts that 
deal with controversial issues.  
As four out of the five works in the exhibition dealt with some aspects of the legal status of 
refugees and asylum seekers in Israel, and the public debate surrounding this topic, it is vital to 
acknowledge that in the last decade Israel, similarly to other countries in the Middle East and 
Europe, has experienced an increase in refugees and asylum seekers from Africa crossing its 
Southern border with Egypt. According to the Israeli NGO The Hotline for Refugees and 
Migrants (HRM) founded in 1998, 40,000 asylum seekers now live in Israel; 92% of them are 
from Eritrea and Sudan where their lives were under constant threat, as they faced a brutal 
repression of their civil and human rights.484 The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
that was adopted by the United Nations, also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention, is the legal
483 Latour, The Making of Law, p. 199.
484 The Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, Asylum Seekers page, accessed Aug. 9, 2017, 
http://hotline.org.il/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-en.
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frame in which the rights of refugees and displaced people are examined and protected.485 The 
State of Israel complies with the Convention through what the Hotline describes as “a policy of 
temporary protection, also called by the State ‘temporary delay of deportation’ vis-à-vis most 
asylum-seekers in Israel.”486 One must remember that, a year before the UN ratified the Refugee 
Convention, the State of Israel had passed its own legislation: The Law of Return (1950). This 
law grants every Jew around the world the right to come to Israel and to almost automatically 
receive a visa, and subsequently Israeli citizenship, with few exceptions, such as in cases deemed
as endangering the state or the Jewish people.487 In light of this law and the constitutional 
definition of Israel as a Jewish state,488 the Israeli government has refused almost completely to 
recognize non-Jewish asylum seekers as refugees, issuing them a limited visa until they can be 
deported. In the public debate, asylum seekers have been denoted as infiltrators, with parliament 
members such as Miri Regev (the current Minister of Culture and Sport) calling them during a 
2012 demonstration “a cancer in our body.”489 According to the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) 
2012 Peace Index, “More than half (52%) of the Jews agree with the statement.”490 In the past 
several years, the legal statues and the public debate regarding the rights of migrants in Israel has
485 “The 1951 Refugee Convention,” UNHCR, accessed June 30, 2019, http://www.unhcr.org/1951-
refugee-convention.html.
486 The Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, Temporary Protection page, accessed June 30, 2019, 
http://hotline.org.il/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-en/temporary-protection.
487 The Law of Return 5710 (1950), accessed June 30, 2019 , 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/return.htm.
488 The state of Israel does not have a constitution. However, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that the 
Declaration of Independence of 1948, in which the state was identified as a Jewish state, is a founding 
document and guiding legal principal. In 1985, the Parliament passed Basic Law: The Knesset (1985) in 
which the legal definitions of “democratic” and “Jewish” were enshrined. In 1995, Supreme Court Justice 
Aharon Barak interpreted and ruled that Israeli Basic Laws are to be perceived as constitutional laws.
489 Harriet Sherwood, “Israelis Attack African Migrants During Protest Against Refugees, The Guardian, 
May 24, 2012, accessed June 30, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/24/israelis-attack-
african-migrants-protest. 
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severely deteriorated, as a recent Interior and Environment Committee suggests in convening to 
discuss “consolidating a policy to handle the problem of infiltrators in south Tel Aviv,” while 
preventing any asylum seekers' representatives from joining the discussion.491 In July 2017, 
Radio France Internationale reported that the state of refugees and asylum seekers in Israel had 
“just gotten tougher”492 as a new law would force them to deposit twenty percent of their income,
to be returned only upon leaving the country. 
With this in mind, I wish to return to Amir's work, which made use of the entire space of 
Artport's gallery. The public entered through two identical “waiting rooms” resembling that of a 
waiting space in governmental administrative offices. Twenty audience members were instructed 
by an usher to enter one of the two designated rooms, where participants received a link to an 
online questionnaire to be accessed via their mobile phones. The participants were requested to 
rate their level of agreement to five policy items regarding the issue of refugees in Israel. They 
were also asked to rate the extent to which they experienced anger towards the government, or 
feelings of anger/empathy/guilt towards the refugees. After finalizing their answers, participants 
were directed to the other half of the gallery space, where each was asked to individually enter 
one of four small rooms. Upon entering a room big enough for only two people, one would be 
greeted by a young woman who waited in the room. Directing her gaze to the person in the room,
her task was to recite a variety of statements regarding refugees. It was planned that half of the 
audience members would be listening to statements using verbs – I am against implementing the 
490 The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), The Peace Index: May 2012, accessed June 30, 2019, 
http://www.peaceindex.org/files/The%20Peace%20Index%20Data%20-%20May%202012.pdf. 
491 Ilan Lior, “Asylum Seekers Prevented From Speaking at Knesset Hearing About Asylum Seekers,” 
Ha'aretz, June 21, 2017, accessed June 30, 2019, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-
1.797065.
492 Christina Okello, “It’s Just Gotten Tougher for Israel's African Migrants,” RFI, July 4, 2017, accessed 
June 30, 2019 , http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20170704-there-place-african-migrants-israel-eritrea-sudan.
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UN refugee conventions in Israel, while the other half would listen to statements incorporating 
nouns – I am against the implementation of the conventions of the UN refugees in Israel. To 
finalize the experiment and performance, from the small rooms the four young women came out 
to be revealed as two pairs of identical twins dressed in a similar manner. The young performers 
demonstrated to the audience the psycholinguistic premise on which the performative experience
was based on through reading and performing actions based on the difference between the use of 
verbs and the use of nouns. The entrance of psycholinguist Orly Idan into the space marked the 
closure of the performance, and the mechanism and the methods implemented were fully 
disclosed. 
The entrance into the realm of law through the examination of the language of court rulings 
exposes the archival layers upon which the law is constructed. In relation to Amir's work, which 
aimed at creating an art performance as a scientific experiment, it is worth mentioning Bruno 
Latour's comparison between the place in which the work of the law is done and that of a 
scientific laboratory. According to this, an outsider to the law can be part of some of the court's 
hearings, but will never be granted access beyond this. In contrast to this, “No area is barred to 
the authorized visitor” of a laboratory. “The two laboratories therefore have a very different 
relation between the public and private: although 'ignorance of the law is no excuse', the last 
stages of its flowering remain completely secret; by contrast, although laboratories are closed to 
anyone who is not an employee, in principle anyone could understand what goes on inside, 
which is no way mysterious: 'we have nothing to hide', they would say.”493 As with the law, one 
needs to deal with that which is kept secretive, as Latour states, mystical as Derrida described it, 
or mythical, transcendental, and timeless as claimed by Mawani; Amir's performances would be 
493 Latour, The Making of Law, p. 201.
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better described as expanding the notion of laboratory in order to expose law's language through 
the reuse of archival material. 
5.6.2. Motion Number Two: “5846, 5851, and 5852 v. the Population and Migration 
Authority” 
Artist Hinda Weiss worked with advocate Asaf Weitzen to take a different approach in their 
motion, which also concerns law's language. Analyzing a decision of the Israeli Supreme Court 
together,494 they intentionally chose a text that could be perceived at first glance to be 
insignificant, bureaucratic, and doomed to be neglected in the law's unattended archive. The 
decision of an administrative Petition for Leave to Appeal by three asylum seekers is far from 
being one regarded by legal experts and scholars as being exceptional or holding any distinctive 
merit. The title of the work, “5846, 5851 and 5852 v. the Population and Migration Authority” 
(2017), also indicates Weiss and Weizen's attempt to delve into law's archive and file 
classification. In their collaborative work, they activate the judicial alongside the artistic as they 
extricate a legal document from oblivion in the guise of numerical representation. 
The contribution of Weiss and Weizen to the exhibition came in the form of a one-channel video 
installation with sound. A thin black line marks the separation between the split screen, while the 
background colors change rapidly. On the right side of the screen, the Supreme Court's decision 
unfolds from beginning to end as it is read by one of the petitioners in Hebrew. The left side of 
the screen acts as the legend to deciphering the piece, displaying ten small squares, a digital 
sound bar, and a translation of the decision in English and Arabic. Each square has a different 
color and next to it indicators – Red for “Decision”; Orange for “Baseless Embellishment”; 
Purple for “Responders'; Violet for “Opinion”; Dark Purple for “Abdication”; Blue for 
494 Weizen was one of the two attorneys representing the petitioners.
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“Authority”; Pale Blue for “Procedures”; Pale Green for “Petitioners”; Green for “People”; and 
White for “Human Rights.” With what seems a direct and simple intervention, the artist and 
lawyer were able to create a visual template rendering of a legal document – a new reading of an 
archival document beyond the encoded legal articulation. The changing visual palette provides 
accessibility to any layperson who may possess little knowledge of legal language and 
vocabulary. It has only been tested on a small number of legal documents, but the intention of 
Weiss and Weizen is that the color scheme and legend be made to fit other texts just as well. The 
simplicity of the rapidly changing bright colors in the background, at times dissolving from one 
sentence to another, provides immediate access to a seemingly administrative and even dull text. 
When the background changes into white, the judge is discussing a matter concerning human 
rights; when the background changes to red, one knows that one is dealing with the court's 
decision; when the background changes to deep purple, one is made aware of the court's 
abdication and reluctance to provide legal aid to those most in need; and when the background 
changes to orange, then it is made crystal clear that the judge is diverting our attention, or is 
concealing concrete facts with unnecessary adornment in a typical case of law's double violence 
– ratifying its own power while renouncing its obligations by hiding its sources. In the subtle yet 
ironic criteria of a counter-archive invented by Weiss and Weitzen, the orange color represents a 
baseless embellishment used in this case by the court to make an excuse regarding why it will 
refrain from intervening in a lower court's ruling. It is legal wording that leads directly to 
denying the petitioners’ requests and to sentencing them to a bare life in a notorious detention 
center in the Israeli desert. 
5.6.3. Motion Number Three: “Kafka for Kids” (work in progress)
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The next and last motion for the agenda in the exhibition dealing with the issue of migrants in 
Israel was the new film and performance by artist Roee Rosen. “Kafka for Kids” (work in 
progress) is a cross-generic project dealing with the legal rights of migrants and minors in 
extreme political and legal situations. Rosen had only participated in the group's first meeting, as 
he was abroad during the other times, but he was kept informed of the developments and the 
planned exhibition. During our private talks, he had shared with me his long-time idea 
concerning a possible visual adaptation of Kafka's stories into children’s tales. He had not truly 
begun to conceptualize these preliminary thoughts, but at the time of our first conversation an 
article in the newspaper Ha'aretz caught Rosen's attention. It was a report about a twelve-year-
old Palestinian girl who was sent to jail at an Israeli prison. The headline announcing that the 
“youngest female Palestinian jailed by Israel was released two-and-a-half months after 
arrest”495 could not have been ignored, as we were contemplating issues concerning Kafka, the 
law, and children. It spurred Rosen to connect this devastating story to a questioning of the legal 
rights of minors under a state of occupation.
The newspaper's article indicated that minors under the age of fourteen are not incarcerated 
under Israeli law. So, how is it that a twelve-year-old can find herself behind bars? Was it only a 
case of discrimination against the young Palestinian under Israeli law, or also according to 
international law? How can a twelve-year-old girl be classified as a security risk? Are there other
similar cases in Israel, or in other places in the Western world advocating for the incarceration of 
minors? What, if any, are the legal rights of minors when put in prison? What was the legal 
procedure, and what can be said of the civil and military legal system in light of the 
495 Jack Khoury, “Youngest Female Palestinian Jailed by Israel Released Two-and-a-half Months After 
Arrest, Ha'aretz, April 24, 2016, accessed June 30, 2019, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-
1.716083. 
217
imprisonment of minors? These were some of the questions that Rosen decided to bring before a 
number of legal scholars whom he invited to take part in a panel discussion open to the public 
and filmed as part of the exhibition, which will become part of Rosen's upcoming film project. I 
suggested to Rosen that he use the exhibition's space as a film set for the panel, which was to be 
shot towards the end of the run of the exhibition. This way, the film would be able to depict some
of the physical traces left by previous performances and artworks, while connecting them 
through the film to a new narrative and new imagery. Thus, the film would become yet another 
manner through which the law and the exhibition are treated as an archive while they are both 
being rearranged, reconstructed, and exposed via an artistic intervention. 
In order to add another dimension to the work and to blur the boundary between fiction and 
reality, experts and performers, Rosen wrote a monologue for the actress Hani Furstenberg with 
whom he had collaborated for his video Hilarious (2010). In this new performance, Furstenberg 
was asked to play a legal scholar invited to give a public lecture on the case of the arrest of a 
twelve-year-old girl. Rosen titled the lecture “Explaining the Law to Kwame,” which is an 
attempt to explain the Israeli legal system to a young migrant from Ghana in a future time and in 
a different place. In a manner not unusual for Rosen, he links the character of the lecturer and the
twelve-year-old girl through their gender and sexuality. As Furstenberg reads her engaging 
lecture, it is gradually made obvious that something is distracting her. At first it might seem that 
it is the harsh question she raises concerning the legal definition of a minor that perplexes her. 
Childhood is a temporary state, and according to her, so is the law that concerns the arrest of a 
Palestinian minor. Through remarks on temporality, she questions both states as she emphasizes 
the fact that the laws implemented in the occupied territories were originally conceived as 
limited in time. She goes on to elaborate on the amendments made to those temporary laws, 
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describing a state in which childhood receives multiple meanings depending on nationality and 
citizenship. In between, the small breaks in her speech are evidently growing in frequency. The 
actress in the role of a legal expert seems to be troubled by an unidentified smell, as she sniffs 
more avidly searching for its source. While maintaining her posture and her talk on the liquidity 
of the legal terminology of childhood and minors, it becomes apparent that the disturbing smell 
must be her own body’s odor. When she takes off her blazer near the end of her performance, 
large sweat stains can be noticed. Her talk becomes less coherent as she begins to interconnect 
the changes in body odor from adolescence to middle age to the importance of legal 
transparency. The exposure of her body, in what she describes as the rotting of the body, is linked
to the vitality of legal transparency as she quotes the late Supreme Court Judge Haim H. Cohn 
who in 1961 wrote, “Legislation done in secrecy and kept in hidden archives is one of the 
identifying marks of a totalitarian regime, and is not in line with the rule of law.”496 By quoting 
Cohn who was regarded as “a lifelong fighter for human rights, and a key figure in laying the 
foundations of the legal system of the state of Israel,”497 the monologue written by Rosen directs 
us to the foundation of justice. This ruling by Cohn is quoted in legal briefs and court rulings to 
this day. Aharon Barak, president of the Israeli Supreme Court (ret.), hero of judicial activism in 
Israeli court system, also referred to these words by Cohn. Praising Cohn's originality, courage, 
and fortitude, Barak declares Cohn's judicial position to be that of a reproving prophet 
demanding the securing and active advancement of human rights through judicial activism.  
5.6.4. Motion Number Four: “The Interview”
496 Aharon Barak, “The Judge Haim H. Cohn: Prosecutor, Advisor, Judge, Scholar, and Mentor,” Mishpat 
Umimshal 3, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law (1996): 389.
497 Mordechai Beck, “Haim Cohn,” The Guardian, May 10, 2002, accessed June 30, 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2002/may/10/guardianobituaries.israel.
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If the motions mentioned above were developed around the language of law in relation to the 
legal status of migrants, “The Interview” (2017), a new performance by Public Movement, can 
be read as a motion seeking entry to and a contestation of a physical and emotional/mental 
archive. The starting point of the performance is a return to the first official encounter between 
young Israeli adults and the army. At the age of seventeen, all male Israelis (females to a much 
lesser degree) are summoned by the army to be interviewed for about twenty minutes to an hour 
by (mostly) female soldiers. This conversation is the main instrument through which the army 
penetrates into the mental and emotional world of the interviewee. The seemingly open and 
functional atmosphere in which the interview is conducted disguises the fact that one goes 
through a composed and well-formulated psychological observation. The goal of the interview, 
performed by well-trained soldiers, is to identify the suitability of each interviewee to serve in 
combat. The structure of the interviews used by the army was developed in the 1950s by Daniel 
Kahneman, then a young soldier and now a Noble Prize laureate (2002). Public Movement, thus, 
approaches the structure and method of these interviews as yet another device invented by the 
army for warfare purposes. As opposed to the production of weapons, this tool is devoted to 
conducting forced psychological tests, aimed at exposing the personality patterns and 
abnormalities of pre-recruited soldiers.498 
At the end of each interview, a short confidential report is made summarizing the mental and 
behavioral categories that most fit the interviewee. As a result, an exceptional emotional/mental 
archive of almost all-male Israeli young adults since the 1950s is kept solely in the hands of the 
state. This archive and the method of interviews are regarded as extremely confidential, and they 
498 Army service and reporting for registration are obligatory in Israel. See: Defence Service Law - 
Consolidated Version 5746-1986, accessed June 30, 2019, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1980-
1989/pages/defence%20service%20law%20-consolidated%20version--%205746-1.aspx.
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are kept out of reach of any citizen. Public Movement and its performers expose the Israeli 
army's unique model, which consists of sixteen mental symptoms for men and nineteen for 
women. This is achieved during a performance divided into four parts, and a preliminary stage in
which the public is organized according to those who will be interviewed and those who will be 
witnessing the interviews. The first part consists of a lecture about the historical background of 
the development of the army's method of interviews. The second part is the one in which the 
interview takes place in front of a limited number of viewers. In the third part, at the end of the 
interviews, the public is led into the “Layout Room” where along with refreshments and snacks 
they will be introduced to a wall of statistics presented in the form of colorful infographics. This 
wall is a representation of an alternative archive based on information and data collected by 
Public Movement about members of the public who participated in early rehearsals and in the 
live interviews. The whole event comes to an end in the fourth and last part, during which one of 
the performers dances the “Interviewer’s dance,”  producting bafflement, confusion, and a 
physical breakdown of the role and image of a dignified “official” interviewer and of the 
participating public. 
It is noteworthy to mention that, in the preliminary stages of research, Public Movement had 
worked with a leading Israeli law firm. The counseling of the firm was arranged especially for 
Public Movement’s needs in dealing with the IDF censorship and regulations, since the interview
method is strictly confidential. More can be said about the legality/illegality of the performance 
or of artistic disobedience, yet in the context of this book I have aimed at paving new and 
alternative routes into rather neglected or overlooked aspects of law and justice through what I 
refer to as judicial-visual activism. All the works in the exhibition are the outcome of preliminary
encounters, meetings, exchanges, and consultations between law and art practitioners. 
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Occasionally, aspects of the legal exchange are at the forefront, but mostly it is integrated rather 
seamlessly into the work. Yet, what I have aimed for in this publication and in the exhibition is to
go beyond immediate dichotomies such as that of the legal/illegal or obedience/disobedience by 
blurring the borders between law and art. Touching upon the law as archive in an exhibition 
setting is a proposal for imagining new possibilities and new spaces for judicial and visual 
activism.
5.6.5. Motion Number Five: “To Serve You” (work in progress) 
The last motion for the agenda to be discussed is Thalia Hoffman's sound installation and 
performance “To Serve You” (work in progress). The work is the outcome of the artist's 
determination to continue with the exchange between disciplines before committing to any 
specific outcome. The call to propose a concrete project seemed premature to Hoffman, 
prompting her to seek a possible prolongation of “Towards Legal Imagination” through linking 
them to her ongoing research and experimentation with public cooking and feeding. Hoffman has
expanded her creative reach in recent years from film and video into that of performance art and 
public interventions. From Beit Ha’Blia’a, Gullet//Chamber (2014/5), a dinner performance 
during which the audience was served a sixteen-course meal of fermented dishes on stage, to 
Interior Parts (2016), a rather more intimate performance in which Hoffman shared the stage 
with the actor Morad Hassan as she cooked and fed him meat consisting only of innards, 
Hoffman demonstrates a growing appetite towards the act of cooking as she explores the 
political, cultural, sociological, and economic meaning food holds in our time. 
Thus, and although food was never an 'official' topic of discussion in the preliminary meetings, 
Hoffman suggested arranging a couple of dinners during which she would be cooking and 
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discussing matters related to food, nutrition, law, and the act of eating with and feeding invited 
guests. With my continuing support and that of Artport and The Israeli Center for Digital Art in 
Holon, Hoffman took charge of the production of dinners, to which some, but not all, of the 
group members were invited to join a discursive evening meal with newcomers selected by 
Hoffman. With a focus on unraveling the relation and connection between food and law, 
Hoffman assembled jurists, cultural scholars, sociologists, and psychologists, who were informed
that they would be audio-recorded (but not video-documented) for future use in the creation of a 
new art piece. Together with scholar Yoav Kenny, who was recommended to Hoffman by a 
member of the group and co-hosted the dinners, the participants were encouraged to talk freely 
about their research as well as about their personal relationship to food without the need for any 
prior preparation on their side. The outcome was shown in the exhibition as a sound installation 
described by Hoffman as touching “on legal, theoretical, and practical issues concerning the 
diverse power relations between feeder and fed, between host and guest, and between diner and 
diner. And in the background, the similarities and differences between feeding-catering-
fattening-entertaining-food bank-infusion-force feeding.”499 
Both Hoffman and I were eager to find ways to involve the general public in the process, leading 
to the exhibition while furthering the notion of host and guest in an exhibition setting. A large 
part of my interest in curating this particular exhibition was the wish to expose some aspects of 
our preliminary encounters with the public. Hoffman's idea to only record audio of the dinners 
offered a way to share a sort of a private archive that documented personal information from 
eating habits and disorders, to research on the Book of Proverbs’ definition of daily bread, to 
499 “Meal // Feeding,” The Israeli Center for Digital Art, accessed June 30, 2019, 
https://www.digitalartlab.org.il/skn/c6/%d7%94%d7%9e%d7%a8%d7%9b%d7%96_
%d7%94%d7%99%d7%a9%d7%a8%d7%90%d7%9c%d7%99_%d7%9c%d7%90%d7%9e
%d7%a0%d7%95%d7%aa/e1530363/Meal_Feeding?localeId=en-us.
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food as a human right. Seeking to maintain a sense of informality and intimacy, Hoffman created
a wooden table made to accommodate six from which the sound was distributed in the space, and
on which a performance for six participants would also take place.
As in the case of the rights of migrants in Israel, it is important to address the political and 
judicial background that informed the work of Hoffman. In the weeks leading up to the 
exhibition, a mass hunger strike by Palestinian prisoners began. In mid-April 2017, more than 
1,000 Palestinians in Israeli prisons began to protest in order to demand better living conditions. 
The hunger strike erupted following the placement of Marwan Barghouti, an imprisoned 
Palestinian leader, in solitary confinement. It was reported that one of the main reasons for this 
was an essay smuggled out of prison written by Barghouti and published by The New York Times.
In his Op-Ed article, Barghouti explained that the reason behind his own hunger strike was to 
protest against what he perceived to be the “illegal system of mass arbitrary arrests and ill-
treatment of Palestinian prisoners.”500 In Barghouti's view, there is an immediate connection 
between the harsh imprisonment of Palestinian prisoners and the pain inflicted on their bodies 
and the violation of international law by Israel, resulting in the formation of an unjust legal 
system that he describes as “a dual legal regime, a form of judicial apartheid, that provides 
virtual impunity for Israelis who commit crimes against Palestinians, while criminalizing 
Palestinian presence and resistance. Israel’s courts are a charade of justice, clearly instruments of
colonial, military occupation. According to the State Department, the conviction rate for 
Palestinians in the military courts is nearly 90 percent.”501 These statements need to be 
500 Marwan Barghouti, “Why We Are on Hunger Strike in Israel’s Prisons,” The New York Times, April 16,
2017, accessed June 30, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/opinion/palestinian-hunger-strike-
prisoners-call-for-justice.html?
module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Opinion&action=keypress&region=FixedLeft&pgtype=article. 
501 Ibid.
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considered in the context of the history of hunger strikes in Israel, and recent developments in 
Israeli law. Yoav Kenny draws our attention to the frequent hunger strikes by Palestinian 
prisoners that occurred in 2012. According to Kenny, the government reaction can be traced in 
the amendments made in the Israeli Prisons Ordinance in 2015. These amendments granted 
authority to the President of a District Court to instruct the feeding and forced feeding of a 
prisoner. The legislative intervention by the government is regarded by Kenny as an immediate 
result of the avoidance of the Supreme Court of Justice taking a stance on petitions by hunger-
striking prisoners, and the court's unwillingness to draft clear legal guidance for the conduct of 
politically and conscience-based hunger strikes.502 
The issue of political hunger strikes in Israel sets off, as if in a chain reaction, a multitude of 
related and charged matters. It touches on the ongoing atrocious fifty years of Israeli occupation; 
the role and duty of the courts in balancing questions of human rights and national security; the 
right to starvation versus the state's obligation to ensure the health and well-being of its citizens; 
the autonomy of the human body, medical ethics, and prisoners’ rights. All these legal, political, 
sociological, and ethical subjects were vocalized as part of the sound installation and informed 
the research and background of Hoffman's performance. Nevertheless, the striking intimacy of a 
performance for only six participants taking place inside of a gallery space intensified the focus 
on the very personal relationship each of us as human beings has in relation to food, eating, 
nutrition, and force-feeding. Together with three female performers, Hoffman was able to capture
502 Yoav Kenny's essay “Feeding and Force: Food and Bio-politics in the Discussion Surrounding the 
Forced Feeding of Hunger Strike Prisoners” was published in Hebrew recently (2017) in Studies in Food 
Law, edited by Yofi Tirosh and Aeyal Gross, published by The Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv 
University. Both Tirosh and Gross were members in the group meetings of “Towards Legal Imagination,” 
and also participated in Hoffman's dinners. As part of the events taking place during the exhibition, a 
public panel of speakers was arranged together with Tirosh, Gross, Hoffman, Kenny, and Yossi Wolfson, a
lawyer and animal rights activist.  
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the very primal dimension that food and nutrition play in a person's life from birth until death. 
Being fed, softly, yet also with a latent aggressiveness by the performers, made the experience an
intense contemplation of food as an essential tool in which power and control, just as much as 
love and care, brutally intertwine. From a mother's milk, to the shared “family dinner table,” to 
public communal eating, to food deprivation and starvation, to taste and disgust, these all bring 
to mind notions of taste described by Pierre Bourdieu in his seminal book A Social Critique of 
the Judgment of Taste.503 The silent live cooking by Hoffman and the distribution of the food to 
the participants manifesting the unavoidable relationship between the taste of food and social 
relations in the world framed, intensified, and made this relationship more distinct by taking 
place in a gallery space.
5.6.6. Motions for the Agenda: From the Curator's Desk
All in all, as mentioned above, my initial idea was to have the exhibition built as layers 
overlapping each other. Leaving relics from previous works in the exhibition space touches upon 
the notion of the double violence discussed by Mawani in relation to the archive. As 
demonstrated earlier in this chapter, it is that which lends the law and the archive their authority, 
and it is that which is also destroyed to conceal and to protect the law and the archive from 
claims against their legitimacy. Leaving traces of food spilled in the space and stained into the 
wood of Hoffman's sound table; the four small rooms from Amir's performance; the yellow 
painted wall with statistics from Public Movement's performance; and Weiss and Weitzen's 
ongoing video projection exposed layers of law's archive through the exposure of the exhibition's
layers of works. Maintaining traces of different works in the space makes the exhibition's history 
visible, while also requiring the visitor to inquire about those “leftover” objects, since their 
503 Pierre Bourdieu, A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1996). 
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meaning in the space is unclear. Rosen's film is yet another manner in which to document the 
past of the exhibition while allowing the space and objects to acquire new meanings and 
interpretations. At the same time, besides occupying the exhibition's space for a day of filming in
which the general public was invited to take part as audience members or as extras, Rosen left 
two small drawings made especially for the exhibition hanging in the space.
Lastly, another manner in which I aimed at approaching the double violence of the law as archive
and of the exhibition was through adding a feature to the exhibition that I named the “Curator's 
Desk.” Composed of one wooden glass-topped vitrine and a desk, it was alternatively operated 
by Vardit Gross and me during the opening hours of the exhibition. The vitrine and desk 
presented books, catalogues, brochures, and posters that could be read in the space. Along with 
reading materials and newspaper clippings that we gathered on diverse current topics related to 
law and art, we also exhibited items in the vitrine that could be found at lawyers’ offices and 
meeting rooms, such as mugs and paperweights given out by the law bar on different occasions. 
Unlike the common curator's talks or tours of the exhibition, the “Curator's Desk” can also be 
perceived in the frame of institutional critique. The presence of the curator (alternately with the 
director of Artport) at the exhibition suggests a striving for critical reflection and enhanced 
transparency regarding the work of the curator and the institution. The material presence of the 
“Curator's Desk” invited visitors to sit down, drink some coffee or water, and have the chance to 
be exposed to the layers of the exhibition even when not attending any of the performances. The 
intention of the “Curator's Desk” was to give information about the exhibition while sharing 
knowledge about the making of the exhibition, the development of the different works, and a 
peek into the gradual accumulative formulation of the exhibition as law's counter-archive 
through intimate one-on-one conversations between the curator and the general public. The 
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“Curator's Desk” offered an informal casual space for an encounter about past, present, and 
future possibilities of the law's archive. It emphasized the longing for a sense of intimacy that 
can be traced in all the motions for the agenda. The “Curator's Desk,” just like most of the 
exhibition's works, facilitated a face-to-face discursive exchange in order to envision a time and 
place after the law as we remain forced to be standing before the law.
Epilogue
The question of whether judicial-visual activism can be further solidified in a real world context 
cannot be answered solely through this modest publication. Nor can it be allowed to rest on the 
efforts of a single individual. The intention of the aforementioned ideas, structures, and efforts 
has been to ignite the attention of the reader into becoming attuned to a new sensitivity to the 
relationship between law and art. It demands and provokes a more vigilant awareness of the 
structures and hidden characteristics of the law. Louis Althusser famously described the complex 
power and multivalent quality of the law as operating with the support of both the Repressive 
State Apparatus and legal ideology as part of the Ideological State Apparatus. In this winding 
study that meanders between Franz Kafka's “Before the Law” and Althusser's ideology, the 
Dreyfus Affair and the first Congress of “The Jewish Renaissance Movement in Poland”, 
Catharine A. MacKinnon on “Women’s September 11th” and the Right of Intervention of the 
New World Summit in Rojava, I have aspired to challenge common perceptions of both legal 
ideology and legal institutions. 
By insisting on unraveling the law in curatorial and artistic projects that seem at first glance to 
have little to do with the judicial, every chapter in this publication brings us, hopefully, closer to 
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realizing the potential in joining judicial activism with visual activism. Whether through a 
performative Congress, the construction of a Parliament, an artistic encounter as part of a 
residency in a governmental office, or by exposing law's archive, sound, and language, this 
research urges art practitioners and scholars to explore, oppose, and re-imagine existing legal 
structures in collaboration with legal experts and activists as part of their own creative process. 
By propagating the need to merge legal scholarship with artistic and curatorial knowledge and 
practices, I have intended to frame and herald judicial-visual activism as a key to establishing 
alternatives to existing laws and legal systems. This study argues that judicial-visual activism 
opens up a space between the “Era of the Witness/Testimony” and the “Era of the Forensic” 
through which a new comprehension of law and art can take hold. This is manifested when a 
concentrated effort is translated into action, detecting traces, gaps, and lacunae left unnoticed in 
the margins of the intersection between the judicial and the visual. Judicial-visual activism 
emerges as a third option when a constant pendulum movement between art and law is 
invigorated.. 
Considering artistic and curatorial capabilities in times of globalization, I have aimed at linking 
the judicial and the visual in order to carve out a political space for art. Coupling the Trial of 
Maurice Barrès with a Congress taking place almost a century later allowed me to embark on an 
investigation of justice and of the legal sphere in contemporary art. Bartana's Congress, as I have 
indicated, did not envisage itself as a legal platform. Yet, when read in relation to the Dreyfus 
Trial—considered by many as The Trial of the nineteenth century that continues to hold an 
influence on global politics—a legal terminology and dimension begin to form. The Congress, as
I have shown, is part of a growing phenomenon of organizations created by artists rooted in the 
art world while cultivating political aspirations. Jonas Staal's New World Summit and the 
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establishment of a Parliament in Rojava is undoubtedly a striking example of this tendency. In 
the context of this publication, Staal's work from the very first Summit in Berlin in 2012 to the 
establishment of a Parliament in Rojava serves as an excellent case study of how artists are 
currently envisioning the legal system anew. Reading Staal's actions alongside Nancy Fraser's 
concept of reframing justice and Catharine A. MacKinnon's writing on international law after 
September 11, 2001 have allowed me to demonstrate how artistic capabilities creates new rights. 
The emergence of rights through artistic engagement has been a continuous concern throughout 
this book. Borrowing from the legal theory on the transformation of disputes through the act of 
naming, blaming, and claiming, I have examined artistic and curatorial attempts to intervene in 
governmental and administrative institutions. It is in these spaces in which the ideological and 
the repressive come together that the rethinking of the event of the encounter is ever more 
necessary. Following Itamar Mann's exploration of the Right of the Encounter as part of a call for
a new theory of human rights, I have demonstrated how artists such as Lawrence Abu Hamdan 
and a research agency such as Forensic Architecture formulate a legal demand.  I have sought 
throughout this book and in my curatorial practice to outline possible ways in which to unveil, 
observe, and tackle the entangled relation between law and art. Confronting the violence of the 
law by dealing with its archive in the constellation of an art exhibition has allowed me to 
juxtapose the space of law and the space of the exhibition as a means through which to envision 
a place after the law. 
Further research and experimentation rooted in a collaborative mutual effort between legal and 
visual practitioners and scholars should be a prerequisite for any further investigation. Analyzing 
the two fields via the threefold methodology suggested in this publication considers that only 
through encounters and exchange can one begin, and only begin, to attain a critical perspective of 
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both fields. The lack of reciprocal channels of communication between legal and art experts and 
practitioners; the almost non-existent spaces for informal, open, and diverse meetings on subjects
of interest to the two fields; and the scarce resources dedicated to the study of law and art as an 
interdisciplinary field have resulted in the insufficiency of in-depth and subversive attempts to 
question, confront, and dispute prevailing and imagined relations between the two fields. 
The current research on art and law can be said to be mainly concerned with matters of aesthetics
on the one hand, and copyrights and contracts on the other hand. Alongside this, issues of 
censorship and disobedience seem to be the ones capturing much of the attention of artists and 
scholars in relation to the law. From the law and literature movement, to which I also referred in 
my writing, to an exploration of the image of law, or theatrical and performance-related 
dimensions of the law, this diverse body of research rarely aspires to ignite a collaborative effort 
in which legal and art practitioners investigate, re-imagine, and propose and create legal rights, 
legal institutions, and active means for intervention.
The persistent inquiry into art and curatorial projects that show traces of a legal inclination or 
interest and the experimental reading of art through legal scholarship both make an argument for 
the affiliation between artistic and legal imagination. Imagination is perceived throughout this 
book as one crucial common denominator binding the judicial and the visual in a mutual active 
quest to seek out, advance, and foster justice. I perceive this investigation as not only linking 
theory and practice, but also as a matter of advocacy for judicial-visual activism. In that, I follow
Drucilla Cornell, who in her research on uBuntu and indigenous values argued that, “Questions 
of theory and practice are raised when one becomes an advocate and not simply a researcher.”504 
The ideals and methodology suggested by Cornell, although rooted in her work on African 
504 Drucilla Cornell, Law and Revolution in South Africa (New York, Fordham University Press, 2014), p. 
xii.
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philosophy and law, seem to me to be of the utmost relevance when researching the relationship 
between law and art. Connecting European and African traditions, she calls for a “critical 
engagement [...] in that we need to see how the relations between the developments of different 
strands of critical theory both build off of and sometimes limit one another.”505 In this 
publication, I have aimed to broaden our perception of both law and art, while also 
acknowledging the limitations of each field positoning them in close proximity. 
Further undertakings in which curatorial theory, knowledge, and practice are critically linked 
might lead to establishing new spaces for studying and experimenting with judicial-visual 
activism. The potential in juxtaposing and relating legal imagination with artistic imagination, 
between the space of the law and the space of the exhibition, has been emphasized throughout 
the chapters of this book. And while there have been a number of art exhibitions dealing with 
legal issues,506 it is worth noting that there is no permanent ongoing platform anywhere in the 
world dedicated to visual research and a presentation of the law. 
It has been announced that the German Ministry of Justice together with the Federal 
Constitutional Court and the city of Karlsruhe have joined forces in initiating “Forum Recht” 
(Law Forum).507 From the limited information available to the public at this stage, one learns of a
plan to construct a new building adjacent to the Federal Constitutional Court to host a “Law 
Forum.” Susanne Baer, a judge on the Federal Constitutional Court, and one of the founding 
initiators of the forum, gave an interview to the Süddeutsche Zeitung in May 2017 in which she 
505 Ibid., xiii.
506 For example, nGbK’s Dreams&Dramas. Law as Literature (nGbK, Berlin, March 10–May 7, 2017), 
and Polyphonic Worlds: Justice as Medium (Contour Biennale 8, Mechelen, March 11–May 21, 2017) are
just two recent examples of exhibitions dealing directly with law and art in Europe in 2017. 
507 The website of the Forum shares some additional information, but only in German. Accessed June 30, 2019, 
https://www.forum-recht-karlsruhe.de/.
232
clarified that the intention is not necessarily to build a museum of law, but more of a space in 
which “the rule of law can be further thematized.”508 Against the background of increasing 
limitations on the independence of courts in European countries such as Poland and Hungary, 
Baer claims that in Germany as well one needs to constantly engage in debate with regard to the 
rule of law. In this sense, the judge perceives the Forum as a precautionary measure through 
which the German state can better secure the constitution, human rights, and a democratic 
culture. Exhibiting the law in such a forum is perceived by her as an opportunity to educate and 
mediate the legal system as a visual experience for the general public. According to the Forum's 
website, the goal is to gather information, documentation, and means of communication under 
one roof regarding the rule of law and its role and function in a democratic society. Through 
visual installations, talks, lectures, workshops, and conferences the “Forum Recht” aims at 
fostering a continuous debate on the relation and tension between law and justice.509 Time will 
tell what form and impact the “Forum Recht” will have, and whether it can become a vital player
in advancing legal and artistic imagination and activism. I am of the opinion that, in the case of 
limiting the aims and function of the Forum to that of defensive democracy, the Forum will yield 
little substantial ground. A Forum abstaining from critical engagement with judicial-visual 
theory, practice, and advocacy risks ending up as an irrelevant and negligible space. 
Based on the methodology and research conducted as part of this book, and in continuation with 
the structure of the exhibition Motions for the Agenda as detailed in Chapter Five, my upcoming 
theoretical and practical curatorial endeavor shall be to establish a rather dynamic, flexible, and 
nomadic structure for further experimenting with judicial-visual activism. Following an 
508 Wolfgang Janisch, "Wenn der ‚wahre Wille des Volkes’ herrscht,"  Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 29, 2017,
accessed June 30, 2019, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/karlsruhe-wenn-der-wahre-wille-des-volkes-
herrscht-1.3526052. Translated by the author. 
509 "Forum Recht Karlsruhe," accessed August 29, 2017, http://forum-recht-karlsruhe.de.
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invitation by the Goethe-Institut New York, I created an “Agency for Legal Imagination” as part 
of MINI/Goethe-Institut Curatorial Residencies Ludlow 38 in 2018.510 The Agency embarked as 
a one-year platform of exhibitions, meetings, performances, lectures, screenings, archival 
research, dinners, and think tanks at Ludlow 38 dedicated to furthering the exploration of 
existing and imagined relations between law and art. Against the backdrop of the US presidential
election and ongoing political upheaval in the European Union, the judiciary system is perceived 
by many as the last haven for a democratic and pluralistic society. At a time in which pressing 
questions regarding race, religion, migration, minority rights, and abortion await the ruling and 
protection of the courts in the US just as around the world, a rethinking of the legal through an 
“Agency for Legal Imagination” becomes essential. A strong emphasis was placed on integrating
and motivating legal experts and art practitioners to work with diverse local communities and 
institutions such as community courts and organizations in order to prompt innovative 
approaches to justice in the city of New York and its vicinity. As such, during its one-year 
residency the Agency transformed Ludlow 38 into a space devoted to reflecting and maintaining 
an intimate yet complex view on past, present and future developments of the legal system 
locally and globally. It should be mentioned, that although the Agency operated as part of a 
cultural institution, I plan in the future to expand it into educational institutions in order to 
further establish law and art as an interdisciplinary field of research.
Drucilla Cornell encourages us, through her writings about uBuntu and justice in post-apartheid 
South Africa, to envision our era as one that is committed, against all odds, to revolutionary 
thinking and action. “We will never understand what South Africa offers all of us who hope for a 
better world unless we use the now much contested vocabulary of revolution, emancipation, and 
510 For a list of all the projects developed and executed in 2018 by the Agency for Legal Imagination see: 
http://ludlow38.org/contributors/avi-feldman/,” accessed June 30, 2019.
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transformation.”511 Cornell follows Boaventura de Sousa Santos by claiming that, “Revolution 
and law had been decoupled in the twentieth century, and this of course helps us at least to 
understand the hegemonic opposition between democracy and revolution.”512 Time will tell 
whether the insistence on the power of judicial-visual activism expressed throughout this book, 
in the exhibition Motions for the Agenda, and in the “Agency for Legal Imagination,” will lead to
the recoupling of revolution and law. The striving for three-dimensional justice in a global world 
achieved through the reactivation of artistic capabilities via interventions, encounters, and the 
creation of new institutions, rights, and counter-archives, holds a modest yet noble promise for 
the future possibility of reinventing democracy and the rule of law and of art. 
511 Drucilla Cornell, Law and Revolution in South Africa (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), p. 
2.
512 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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9.40 min.
Muholi, Zanele, ZaVa, (2013), gelatin silver print
Public Movement, The Interview (2017), performance
Rosen, Roee, Kafka for Kids (work in progress) (2017), film and performance
Sela, Ruti, For the Record (2013), one-channel video, 18 min.
Staal, Jonas, The Geert Wilders works (2005-2008), installation
Staal Jonas, The New World Summit (2012- ), organization
Ukeles, Laderman Mierle, Maintenance Art (1969- ), manifesto, residency, performances, 
installations
Weiss, Hinda in collaboration with Asaf Weitzen 5846, 5851 and 5852 v. the Population and 
Migration Authority (2017), one-channel video installation, 13 min.
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Appendix
OnCurating 28 (January 2016)
Issue 28 of OnCurating was perceived and edited as a platform for presenting texts and visuals in
which the law is imagined by legal experts, art practitioners, and cultural researchers. For most 
of the contributors, it was a first-of-its-kind opportunity to reflect on their own practice and 
research in relation to the law. Contributors in order of appearance in the journal: Sabine 
Mueller-Mall, Zoltán Kékesi, Szabolcs KissPál, and Máté Zombory, Michal Heiman, Lawrence 
Abu Hamdan, Avi Feldman, Milo Rau, Hila Cohen-Schneiderman, and Avigdor Feldman.
Motions for the Agenda (May 16 – June 6, 2017), Artport, Tel-Aviv
The exhibition and series of events “all about law and justice” consisting of performances, 
videos, and sound installations were the culmination of encounters between legal experts, art 
practitioners, and cultural researchers that took place in 2015-2016. All works were newly 
commissioned, and performed or exhibited for the first time as part of the exhibition. 
Participating artists and experts in order of appearance: Einat Amir in collaboration with Dr. Orly
Idan, with legal counsel by Dr. Tali Kritzman-Amir, Hinda Weiss in collaboration with Asaf 
Weitzen, Thalia Hoffman, Public Movement, and Roee Rosen.
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